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ond policy document has a more limited focus. The 
French High Council for Literary and Artistic Property 
(“CSPLA”)’s Mission to Link Directives 2000/31 and 
2001/29 – Report and Proposals (“Mission Report”) 
aims to provide a persuasive intervention in current 
policy discussions at European Union level concern-
ing the liability or, more appropriately, the non-lia-
bility, of online intermediaries for copyright infringe-
ment. In this brief introduction, I outline the scope 
of both proposals and reflect briefly on their recom-
mendations.
Abstract:  Two very different proposals on 
copyright policy – one a privately drafted document, 
the other a governmental report – are published in 
this edition of JIPITEC. There is an interesting point of 
intersection between them because they both con-
sider the difficult question of the liability of online in-
termediaries for users’ infringements. The first doc-
ument is “The Berlin Gedankenexperiment on the 
Restructuring of Copyright Law and Authors Rights”. 
This is a wide-ranging proposal for a complete recast-
ing of the legal system that promotes the production 
of, and controls the use of, creative goods. The sec-
A. The Berlin Gedankenexperiment 
on the Restructuring of Copyright 
Law and Authors Rights
1 The Berlin Gedankenexperiment is the product of a 
project undertaken by a panel of German experts, 
predominantly from academic and “new media” 
backgrounds.1 It develops an earlier set of guidelines 
on copyright policy issued by the “Internet & 
Gesellschaft Collaboratory”,2 which is supported by, 
amongst others, Creative Commons, Google and the 
Wikipedia Foundation. The project takes a “blank 
1 The German original is available at <https://irights.info/
wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Gedankenexperiment.pdf>. - 
The English translation is reprinted on p. 76 of this volume.
2 <http://en.collaboratory.de/w/About_us>. 
page approach”, allowing the Gedankenexperiment 
to escape prevailing copyright norms where 
appropriate. However, it is clearly shaped by the view 
that the current system of copyright and author’s 
rights is problematic in a number of respects.
2 The dominant problem at which the proposal takes 
aim is the transferability of legal entitlements in 
creations from authors to other categories of actor 
(generally to “exploiters”, under the terminology 
employed). On this point, it is argued that, where 
one legal actor steps into the shoes of another in this 
way, there is a risk that the fundamental purpose of 
a legal regime designed to foster creativity will be 
subverted:
“Confusing and mixing authors’ and exploiters’ interests 
opens space for manipulative arguments, which may foster 
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undesirable developments. These lead to a conflict of values, 
which may ultimately undermine the copyright law system 
as a whole.”3
3 The Gedankenexperiment seeks to avoid this problem 
through the establishment of strict distinctions 
between the interests of different legal actors 
involved in the production and use of creative 
work. Under the proposed system, different 
categories of legal actors in the creative process 
(“authors”, “exploiters”, “non-commercial users” 
and “intermediaries”) are each accorded their own 
entirely independent rights and duties. The legal 
position of each is balanced against that of others, 
without attribution of “structural superiority” to 
any amongst them. The underlying idea is that the 
separate contribution of each to the generation of 
creative products should be separately recognised 
and protected.
4 The authors of the Gedankenexperiment suggest that a 
whole-hearted commitment to this core idea would 
produce a legal structure differing from that which is 
currently applicable. For example, under the system 
proposed, a creator (such as a novelist) would be 
able to grant an “exploiter” (such as a publisher) 
(contractual) permission to exploit a protected 
work. However, as a matter of law, such permission 
could only be granted for a limited period of time.4 
At the same time, the publisher would itself acquire 
its own separate legal right in its published edition 
(recognising its own distinctive contribution to the 
dissemination of creativity). At the end of the limited 
period of permission, the publisher could continue 
to market its own published editions. However, 
from that point forward, it would potentially be 
subject to competition from other published editions 
permitted by the author.
5 The proposal is not intended to establish a 
fully codified body of rules. It is, after all, a 
Gedankenexperiment and it therefore raises, but 
does not come to a concluded view on, a number 
of features of the proposed system - including the 
precise duration of the various forms of protected 
interest and the specific treatment of complex works 
such as films and of works created by employees. In 
3 Berlin Gedankenexperiment, 3.
4 Ibid, 4. The document does not provide a final 
recommendation of an appropriate period for which 
permission may be given. – It should be noted that in its 
recent proposal for a law improving the claim of authors and 
performers to adequate remuneration, the German Federal 
Government proposes, albeit on the basis of a different 
legal construction, a somewhat similar result in providing 
that an author, who has granted an exploiter an exclusive 
exploitation right against payment of a lump sum fee, 
shall be free after ten years to exploit his work otherwise, 
with the initial exploiter retaining a non-exclusive right 
to continue his own exploitation; see § 40a (1), BT-Drucks. 
18/8625.
tracing the outline of a legal structure in this way, the 
project insulates itself from detailed critical analysis. 
Nevertheless, even against this avowedly sketchy 
background, it invites questions from the concretely-
minded. For example, one of the categories of legal 
actor to which the proposal attributes rights and 
duties is described as “non-commercial users”. Such 
users have a right to carry out acts which either (i) 
fall within a specified catalogue of use rights or (ii) 
are covered by an open fair use-type norm. However, 
the document makes no mention of commercial users 
in this context. Such users presumably fall within 
the category of “exploiters”, who have their own 
designated duties and rights. However, while the 
proposal traces the entitlement of exploiters who 
have been granted contractual permission to use a 
copyright work, it does not appear to deal explicitly 
with the situations in which a commercial actor is 
typically entitled to use a copyright work without 
permission under current law (for example, for the 
purpose of quotation, news reporting or parody). 
This must surely simply be an omission. If the project 
team had intended to restrict the circumstances 
under which commercial users are entitled to 
commit otherwise infringing acts, it would surely 
have done so explicitly.5
6 The Gedankenexperiment’s ‘blank page” approach 
undoubtedly brings a breath of fresh air to the 
sometimes poisonous debate on copyright reform. 
However, while it might appear to be based on a 
radical premise, its recommendations are relatively 
incremental in some respects. Many features of 
existing copyright and authors’ rights systems – 
including creators’ moral rights, copyright contract 
regulation and the special regimes applicable to 
film productions and to creations by employees 
– are retained. Indeed, even those elements of 
the proposal involving significant change to the 
existing legal order (with the possible exception 
of the elaborated “balance of independent rights” 
system outlined above) echo suggestions for reform 
made elsewhere in the recent past. Thus, for 
example, under the Gedankenexperiment, the terms 
of protection for authors’ and exploiters’ rights 
would be significantly shorter than those currently 
prevailing in European and international law. Many 
such calls to reduce the term of copyright so that it 
more closely reflects its underlying rationales have 
been made. Similarly, the proposal’s suggestions 
that authors’ promises of exclusivity should be 
5 Editor’s note: The drafters of the Gedankenexperiment have 
explained that the term „non-commercial user“ was only 
chosen to set a clear terminological distinction between 
users who are entitled to use protected material by statute 
and those who need a license for their uses (the latter are 
referred to as „exploiters“). This does not necessarily mean 
that there uses for a commercial purpose cannot fall under 
the user’s statutory rights. Whether this is the case or not, 




noted in a public registry, that the continuation of 
the exclusive protection for those that invest in the 
dissemination of works should be conditional on the 
payment of progressively increasing fees and that 
exceptions and limitations should be replaced with 
a set of “user’s rights” for non-commercial users and 
a fair use-type clause all are not without precedent. 
Indeed, in the last case, recent judgments of the 
Court of Justice may already have delivered such an 
outcome in the European Union.6
7 Even the Gedankenexperiment’s most distinctive 
proposal, the “balance of independent rights” 
system may not have been breathed into life ex 
nihilo. To this common lawyer’s untrained eye, 
the project’s emphasis on the non-transferability 
of author’s entitlements looks rather like a super-
charged extension of the current German system 
for the protection of author’s rights. It would appear 
that the page upon which this stimulating proposal 
has been drawn up may not have been entirely blank 
after all.
B. Intermediaries
8 The relatively reasonable, modest characteristics 
of the Gedankenexperiment are also apparent in its 
proposals concerning the potential liability of 
online intermediaries for copyright infringement. 
This is one of the most contested questions in 
current debates on copyright policy. Legal systems 
have struggled to develop appropriate theories to 
impose responsibilities on intermediaries without 
over-burdening them in a manner that would 
unreasonably hamper the functioning of new 
forms of communication technology. Considerable 
uncertainty on this question persists in many 
jurisdictions.7 Within the European Union’s legal 
order, online intermediaries benefit from the 
E-Commerce Directive’s “safe harbours” for 
6 Through its reliance on the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in interpreting the copyright acquis. See, for example, (C-
201/13) Deckmyn v Vandersteen, 3rd September 2014.
7 For discussion, see, for example, J Wang, “Not all 
ISP Conduct is Equally Active or Passive in Differing 
Jurisdictions: Content Liability and Safe Harbor Immunity 
for Hosting ISPs in Chinese, EU and US Case Law” [2015] 
EIPR 732; Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof); 26 
November 2015 – Case No. I ZR 174/14, “Germany: Disturber 
Liability of an Access Provider” [2016] IIC 481; A Gärtner & 
A Jauch, “Gema v RapidShare: German Federal Supreme Court 
Extends Monitoring Obligations for Online File Hosting 
Providers” [2014] EIPR 197; C Angelopoulos, “Beyond the 
Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary 
Liability for Copyright Infringement in Europe” [2013] IPQ 
253; M Leistner, “Structural Aspects of Secondary (Provider) 
Liability in Europe” [2014] Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law & Practice 75.
information service providers.8 Under these general 
provisions, when information service providers 
function as “mere conduits”9, “caches”10 or as 
“hosts”11 for information originating from others, 
they enjoy immunity from liability for damages for, 
inter alia, copyright infringement as long as certain 
conditions are satisfied.12
9 Thus, for example, under Art 14 of the E-Commerce 
Directive, where an information society service 
provider stores information provided by a recipient 
of its service (i.e. it functions as a “host”), it will not 
be liable for damages if it (i) has no actual knowledge 
of illegal activity and is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which illegal activity is apparent 
and (ii) acts expeditiously to bring any illegal activity 
to an end on receiving such notice.13 The scope of 
this provision is contested and some have argued 
that, while it might have been appropriate to grant 
such an immunity in the early years of development 
of networked electronic communications, online 
platforms, such as YouTube, now make vast profits 
through the hosting of unlicensed copyright 
materials posted by users and have no need for 
such shelters from liability. Critical concerns have 
been exacerbated by the Court of Justice’s broad 
interpretation of Art 14 in cases such as Google France, 
in which the Court interpreted the hosting immunity 
as applying in circumstances in which a service 
provider lacks specific knowledge or control of 
stored data and fulfils a “merely technical, automatic 
and passive” role.14 The European Commission is 
currently considering this issue within its review of 
the Union’s copyright rules.15
10 The Gedankenexperiment advocates a nuanced 
approach to the legal responsibility of intermediaries:
“For an appropriate balance of interest, it seems necessary 
8 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information 





12 The provisions do not preclude the grant of injunctions 
against service providers conducting the specified activities 
(Arts 12(3), 13(2), 14(3). Information service providers also 
benefit from a prohibition on the imposition of a general 
obligation to monitor for infringement and/or a general 
obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating 
illegal activity (Art 15).
13 Art 14(1)(a), (b).
14 (C-236/08 – 238/08) Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] 
ECR I-2417. See also (C-324/09) L’Oréal SA v eBay [2011] ECR 
I-6011.
15 See European Commission, Towards a Modern, more European 
Copyright Framework, 9th December 2015, COM (2015) 626 
final.
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to differentiate between intermediaries whose offers tend to 
compete with goods and services from exploiters/creators 
or may even substitute them (“competing intermediary 
services”), and those whose offers complement the goods 
and services of rights owners or even make them possible in 
the first place (“complementary intermediary services”).’16
11 Intermediaries that are “close to the content” (such 
as video and image hosting platforms) are considered 
to be more likely to compete with the offering of a 
creator/exploiter than intermediaries that are “far 
from the content” (such as, for example, technical 
internet access providers). Within the category of 
“competing” intermediaries, the Gedankenexperiment 
makes further distinctions. It recognises, for 
example, that the full range of legal remedies 
ought to be available against an intermediary that 
is concerned purely to freeride on the creative 
contribution of authors and exploiters. However, it 
is acknowledged that the situation of other online 
platforms is more ambiguous because, while they 
may cause prejudice to rightholders’ distribution 
channels, they also promote public welfare in certain 
important respects.
12 In keeping with the approach that it adopts 
throughout, the Gedankenexperiment suggests that, 
in such circumstances, the interests of the various 
affected categories of actor must be balanced and 
that:
“A possible result of such a balancing act could be that 
providers of legitimate (potentially) competing offers…
would be given an obligation to pay monetary compensation 
in lieu of their users, e.g. in the form of shares in revenue or 
an adequate compensation.”17
13 Under such a system, which is acknowledged to bear 
similarities to some currently applicable mechanisms, 
an intermediary would have to decide itself whether 
to pass on the costs of such compensation to users or 
to finance the payment in other ways (presumably, 
for example, by advertising). In return for the 
assumption of an obligation to pay compensation, 
intermediaries would be completely relieved of 
monitoring obligations18 and would be provided with 
immunity from liability for its users’ infringements.
14 In truth, this analysis of the problem does not get 
us particularly far. On the face of it, the “close to 
the content”/”far from the content” distinction is 
16 Berlin Gedankenexperiment, 13 (footnote omitted).
17 Ibid, 14.
18 While Art 15 of the E-Commerce Directive precludes 
general monitoring obligations, some Member States have 
sometimes imposed more specific monitoring obligations 
on information service providers. See, for example, A 
Gärtner & A Jauch, “Gema v RapidShare: German Federal 
Supreme Court Extends Monitoring Obligations for Online 
File Hosting Providers” [2014] EIPR 197.
more descriptive than analytical and the suggestion 
that the potential loss of revenue to rightholders 
could be made up through a balanced compensation 
system is not revolutionary. Nevertheless, the 
Gedankenexperiment’s strong commitment to the 
recognition and reconciliation of competing interests 
takes the notion of “balance” beyond rhetoric and, 
at least, establishes a foundation for the exploration 
of the problem of intermediary liability. By contrast, 
the second proposal published in this edition of 
JIPITEC addresses the same question but takes a very 
much less tentative and reflective position.
C. The Mission to Link Directives 
2000/31 and 2001/29
15 The High Council for Literary and Artistic Property 
(Conseil supérieur de la propriété littéraire et artistique, 
CSPLA) is responsible for advising the Minister 
of Culture and Communications of the French 
Republic on matters relating to literary and artistic 
property. Created under legislative order, it has 
produced a number of reports on questions relating 
to authors’ rights.19 Its “Mission to Link Directives 
2000/31 and 2001/29”20 was presided over by 
Professor Pierre Sirinelli21 and reported at the end 
of 2015.22 The Mission, which consulted a number 
of stakeholders,23 focused on two questions. First, it 
considered whether: “…[T]he regimes implemented 
by Articles 12 to15 of the E-Commerce Directive of 
8 June 2000 (Directive 2000/31/EC) truly provide a 
full understanding of the activities of certain service 
providers (Web 2.0 in particular) who were barely in 
existence when this legislation was adopted?”
16 Secondly, should the answer to the first question 
prove to be negative, the Mission’s role was to 
investigate potential solutions to the problem 






20 The original site for the document reprinted on p. 88 of 







21 Université Paris-I (Panthéon-Sorbonne).
22 3 November 2015. Vice-Presidents of the Mission were Josée-
Anne Benazeraf (lawyer at the Paris Bar) and Alexandra 
Bensamoun (Senior Lecturer, Université Paris-Sud).
23 Although “some technical service provider representatives 





E-Commerce Directive’s safe harbors in the current 
technological context. The Mission Report builds on 
an earlier CSPLA report, likewise led by Professor 
Sirinelli, on proposals to revise the Information 
Society Directive.24 That earlier report recommended 
that the E-Commerce Directive’s immunities should 
be re-examined because of their negative effect on 
the holders of rights in literary and artistic property.
17 In these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the first question (“Does something need to be 
done?”) does not detain the authors of the Mission 
Report for very long. They note a near unanimous 
view among stakeholders that platforms’ claims to 
immunity are problematic.25 The Mission then goes 
on to consider the cause of, and potential solutions 
to, the problem that it has identified. It is highly 
critical of the Court of Justice interpretation of 
the scope of the Art 14 immunity as covering the 
activities of highly profitable platforms (described as 
“false hosting providers” in the report). The finding, 
in Google France, that information service providers 
fall within the safe harbour where they do not play 
an active role, so as to give them knowledge of, or 
control over, stored data, is characterized as an error 
of interpretation that should be remedied through 
European legislation. The Mission’s preference in 
this regard is for the implementation of a copyright-
specific solution rather than for a general revision 
of the E-Commerce Directive.
18 More specifically, it recommends the introduction 
of a new Article in the Information Society Directive 
(Art 9a):
“Without prejudice to Articles 12 and 13 of the Directive on 
electronic commerce, information society service providers 
that give access to the public to copyright works and/or 
subject-matter, including through the use of automated tools, 
do not benefit from the limitation of liability set out by Article 
14 of said Directive.
 These service providers must obtain permission from 
the relevant rightholders as they, either alone or with the 
participation of users of their services, are implementing the 
rights set out by Articles 2 and 3.
 Such permission covers acts performed by users of their 
services when they send the copyright works and/or subject-
matter to the aforementioned service providers in order to 
allow the access set out by sub-paragraph one, as long as 
these users are not acting in a professional capacity.” 26
24 Conseil supérieur de la propriété littéraire et artistique, 
Report of the Mission on the Revision of Directive 2001/29/EC on 
the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related 
Rights in the Information Society, December 2014.
25 “This affirmative response would have been unanimous 
but for the caution of certain technical service providers” 
(Mission Report, 3).
26 The proposed new Article is accompanied by two proposed 
19 According to the Mission Report, this provision would 
restore a “better sharing of value” by distinguishing 
between service providers which purely “store” 
information for third parties (and would presumably 
still be covered by Art 14) and service providers 
which “give access to the public” to copyright 
works, and other protected material, and which 
would therefore be liable for infringement (with 
their infringing users).
20 Such a change would diminish the scope of the 
Art 14 immunity as it is understood today. Given 
that the Report’s aim is to amend the Information 
Society Directive, it also seems possible that the 
introduction of the new Art 9a might risk expansion 
of the scope of liability well beyond the “YouTube”-
type situation at which the Mission is ostensibly 
aimed. If the draft provision were introduced, the 
Court of Justice would have to wrestle with the 
relationship between the concepts of “giving access 
to the public”, “making available to the public” 
and “communication to the public”.  As a result, it 
seems likely that the introduction of the proposed 
Art 9a would add complexity to an already confused 
area of jurisprudence.27 As any shifts in the current 
situation would be likely to favour right-holders, this 
consequence might not be entirely unwelcome to 
the authors of the Mission Report. Nevertheless, they 
acknowledge that a diminution in the scope of Art 
14 might cause difficulties for online intermediaries. 
Their proposed solution is, first, the introduction 
of transitional protection for intermediary business 
models developed on an expectation of immunity 
and, secondly, the implementation of a “duty of 
collaboration” between rightholders and service 
providers. It is perhaps rather ironic that, while 
the Mission Report is based on the assumption that 
the initially intended reach of the E-Commerce 
Directive’s immunities is no longer appropriate in 
current technological conditions, the solution that it 
identifies is a reversion to legal orthodoxy, anchored 
by the authority of the Berne Convention,28 a Treaty 
first agreed in 1886 and last revised in the 1970s.
21 By contrast with the Gedankenexperiment’s somewhat 
incomplete and speculative tracing of principle, 
the Mission Report is pragmatic and detailed. It 
is therefore not surprising that its faults are 
very different from those of the open-minded 
Gedankenexperiment. The disdainful rhetoric of the 
report leaves a reader with the strong impression 
that it might have been possible to predict the 
broad thrust of its conservative recommendations 
new recitals (16a and 24a).
27 For recent interventions on this issue, see (C-160/15) GS 
Media (Opinion of AG Wathelet, 7th April 2016); (C-117/15) 
Reha Training (Court of Justice, Grand Chamber, 31st May 
2016).
28 See Mission Report, 11, 12.
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in advance of its consultation with stakeholders. 
It takes no account whatsoever of arguments that 
could be advanced in favour of a less conservative 
solution to the “value sharing” issue. Presumably, 
one of the underlying reasons for the Court of 
Justice’s broad interpretation of Art 14 in Google 
France was its sense that some of the public benefits 
of technological advance might be lost if right-
holders were granted unmitigated dominion over 
the activities of online platforms. The Mission Report 
does not engage with such concerns. Similarly, there 
is no mention of the fundamental rights framework 
upon which the Court of Justice has structured 
all its recent responses to intermediary liability. 
Through the application of the Charter, the Court 
has acknowledged the need to balance the right 
of property of copyright owners with the right to 
conduct a business of service providers and the right 
of freedom of expression, and access to information, 
of users.29 In the Mission Report, no time is wasted on 
a discussion of this framework of competing rights 
or, indeed, on the due process rights of users under 
the “notice and take down” process facilitated by the 
E-Commerce Directive’s safe harbours.
22 It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the 
Mission’s predominant intention was to put down a 
marker for current discussions on copyright reform 
at European level. However, it seems unlikely that 
the European legislator will be entirely persuaded by 
its call to apply a right-maximalist form of regulation 
in the online environment. The “duty to collaborate” 
that the Mission envisages is surely too weak to offer 
adequate protection to online intermediaries (and, 
therefore, to the public interests that their activities 
support).30 The strengthening of such a system based 
upon forced negotiations might, however, bring 
the proposal closer to the zone occupied by the 
Gedankenexperiment’s suggestion of an obligation to 
pay compensation or, indeed, to the current legal 
situation in which platforms pay a proportion of 
advertising revenues to creators and have negotiated 
licence agreements with bodies representing right-
29 See, for example, (C-275/06) Promusicae v Telefonica de Espana 
[2008] ECR I-271; (C-70/10) SABAM v Scarlet Extended [2011] 
ECR I-11959; (C-314/12) UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin 
Film Verleih GmbH, 27th March 2014. For discussion, see C 
Angelopoulos, “Tracing the Outline of a Ghost: the Fair 
Balance between Copyright and Fundamental Rights in 
Intermediary Liability” (2015-16) Info – the Journal of 
Policy, Regulation and Strategy for Telecommunications, 
Information & Media” 72.
30 The Mission Report has not been particularly well received 
by online intermediaries. See CSPLA, Commentaires des 
organismes professionnels membres du CSPLA sur le rapport relatif 
à l’articulation des directives 2000/31 et 2001/29, 2-5 (Response of 
ASIC, l’Association des Services Internet Communautaires). 
For an example of an interpretation of copyright rules in a 
manner that recognises to develop legal principles in the 
face of technological change, see the recent Opinion of AG 
Spuznar in (C-174/15) Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken, 16th 
June 2016.
holders. I would argue that a half-appropriate 
solution to the problems presented by platforms’ 
hosting activities is much more likely to be found 
through a difficult exploration of this contested 
zone than through any reassertion of doctrinaire 
copyright orthodoxy.
* Jonathan Griffiths, BA (Oxon) MA is a Reader in Intellectual 
Property Law at Queen Mary University of London.
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Preface:1
1 The concept for a regulatory system concerning 
creative goods, as elaborated within the Berlin 
Gedankenexperiment, dates back to the third initiative 
of the “Internet & Gesellschaft Collaboratory” 
(2010-2011).
2 Back then, a panel of experts took the initiative 
and developed a set of Guidelines for a copyright 
law in the digital world, which took the form of a 
regulatory system for creative informational goods2 
(see final report of the 3rd. Initiative, p. 99 et. seq)3. 
The idea was to develop a new form of regulation 
that would withstand the challenges of the year 2035 
(that means a time perspective of about 25 years).
3 From the outset the Guidelines were considered a 
working hypothesis, which should be discussed, 
reconsidered and redefined. This task was taken up 
by a newly composed working group that concluded 
its work in 2015. With the Berlin Gedankenexperiment 
this group submits a thoroughly reviewed version 
of the Guidelines of 2011.4 The Gedankenexperiment at 
hand is thus a further stage of development of the 
first version of the Guidelines.5
4 The project´s work was based on a “blank page 
approach”. The project team was asked to imagine 
that copyright law had never existed and that we 
could, in fact, create a new legal concept, fit for the 
digital world. We tried to prevent that the conceptual 
work would be influenced by the current legal 
situation, e.g. by the status quo and the boundaries 
arising from international treaties and other 
frameworks. Nevertheless, the considerate reader 
will notice that there are a number of references 
to present deficits and comparisons to the current 
copyright regime. In some cases these references 
might apply more to authors´ rights regimes than to 
1 This paper was initially written in German. Translation into 
English by Sylvia Jakob and Till Kreutzer.
2 Original: „Leitlinien für ein Urheberrecht für die digitale 
Welt in Form eines Regelungssystems für kreative 
informationelle Güter“.
3 <http://dl.collaboratory.de/reports/Ini3_Urheberrecht.
pdf>. An English translation of the guidelines (not the whole 
report) can be found at: <http://www.collaboratory.de/w/
Datei:Ini3_Copyright_Excerpt.pdf>.
4 The present project was sponsored by the Internet & Society 
Collaboratory e.V. (Co:Lab) with 10.000 Euros. The amount 
was spent on workshops, travel expenses and organization. 
No expert was paid a fee. We thank the steering committee 
of Co:Lab for its support. Co:Lab was not involved in the 
production of the contents and did not influence their 
development. The present publication reflects the personal 
opinion of the experts involved and is not necessarily 
consistent with the position of Co:Lab or of any of the 
respective institutions for which the experts work.
5 For a better understanding of the Gedankenexperiment it is 
recommended to read the original guidelines.
copyright regimes, in others the opposite might be 
true. It should be noted, however, that the criticism 
of the present situation is not the focus of this paper. 
It is rather a means to illustrate and underpin the 
arguments for the newly suggested approach.
5 Akin to the Guidelines, the Gedankenexperiment 
constitutes a contribution to the discussion on the 
restructuring of copyright law in the digital age. 
However, the Gedankenexperiment does not come 
up with concrete legislative proposals; instead it 
outlines a regulatory concept. In particular, it is 
meant to determine actors and their particular 
interests and assign them roles and abstract rights 
and duties.
6 Within this framework, suggestions for essential, 
regulatory aspects of copyright law are made, for 
example regarding exclusive rights of creators and 
exploiters6. However, no specific evaluative decisions 
regarding points of detail are made. To answer these 
is not the aim of the Gedankenexperiment – but can 
and should be the task of follow-up projects.
A. Preamble
I. Regulatory Purpose
7 The Gedankenexperiment serves to conceptualize 
a framework of an institutionalized balance of 
interests in the form of a regulatory system that 
governs the creation, commercialization, use and 
mediation of creative goods. This regulatory system 
will foster creativity, art, culture and entertainment 
and thereby serve the public as a whole. To achieve 
this aim, individual interests will be guarded by 
protective, partly exclusive, rights. Guaranteeing 
such rights is meant to secure income opportunities 
for creative professionals and provide incentives to 
invest in creative, immaterial goods.
8 These protective rights, however, have to be 
implemented in a way that pays due regard to the 
public interest and to other conflicting interests. In 
other words, a balance needs to be struck, in which 
the respective interests receive the greatest possible 
consideration.
9 The regulatory system is thus more than a means 
to protect individual rights. It is an instrument that 
will allow the balancing of diverging interests, which 
may from time to time collide with one another. Akin 
6 In this context the term „exploiter“ is used for commercial 
users of protected creative goods. These are especially 
traditional producers such as publishers, labels or 
distributors and on top of that anybody who needs a license 
to use a protected work.
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to the principle of balancing fundamental rights 
the Gedankenexperiment assumes that none of the 
involved interests enjoys a structural superiority. 
Whether one interest should be given priority 
over another needs to be determined in concrete 
evaluative decisions. In this context we assume 
that every legal position assigned by the regulatory 
system will have to be justified per se. This applies 
as much to the legal positions of non-commercial 
users, as to those of creators, exploiters and 
intermediaries7. A right will thus only be granted to 
the extent that it is justified in relation to the public 
interest and conflicting individual interests of the 
other parties involved.
II. Regulatory concept 
10 The regulatory system for creative goods 
distinguishes four relevant groups of actors: 
creators, exploiters, non-commercial users and 
intermediaries. Their corresponding rights and 
duties are separate and separable, thus creating 
isolated spheres, within which the interests of the 
differing groups will be assessed. Thereby, distinct 
rights of creators, exploiters and non-commercial 
users accrue.
11 Due to the systematic separation, all actors will obtain 
distinct legal positions, which do not overlap and 
may not be re-assigned or licensed. The framing of 
each legal position is based on a thorough assessment 
of the individual situation of the respective actor. 
Thereby, one major flaw of current copyright 
regimes, as identified by the expert group, shall be 
prevented: If an actor assigns her legal position to 
another actor, the purpose of the protective right 
is undermined, as these rights were tailored to the 
needs of the first actor. This happens often in the 
relation between authors and exploiters who often 
have and pursue different interests. The balance of 
interests is thus jeopardized. A protective system 
based on these premises cannot establish a true 
balance of interests, as it is impossible to predict who 
ultimately owns the rights and who may exercise 
them.
12 The current copyright law systems, notably the 
European authors´ rights regime, suffer considerably 
from this flaw. Officially they are guided by the 
interests of the author. Political decisions are 
generally justified in the author’s name. Practically, 
however, most legal positions accruing from the 
right of the author lie in the hands of exploiters. 
These legal positions, and in particular copyrights 
7 “Intermediaries“ stands for actors who are not using 
protected material in terms of the law. They do not copy 
or distribute protected goods but provide the technical 
infrastructure that enables others (their users) to do so.
and exploitation rights, are in many cases to a 
greater or lesser extent contractually assigned or 
exclusively licensed. Exploiters, however, have 
other interests as to the exploitation of the work, 
i.e. in many cases they exercise the rights differently 
than the author herself might have exercised them. 
In addition, exploiters have their own legitimate 
interests for protection, which differ from those 
of the author and vice versa. Confusing and mixing 
authors’ and exploiters’ interests opens space 
for manipulative arguments, which may foster 
undesirable developments. These lead to a conflict 
of values, which may ultimately undermine the 
copyright law system as a whole.
13 To prevent such inconsistencies the 
Gedankenexperiment abandons the concept of 
derived rights and assignments. It proposes a strict 
distinction between authors´ and exploiters’ rights. 
The authors´ rights will focus on the creator and will 
not be able to be licensed or assigned to exploiters. 
The latter, in turn, have rights of their own rights, 
which are tailored to their specific economic needs 
and which – opposed to authors´ rights – may be 
traded on the market.
14 The concept resembles the system of copy- and 
neighboring rights in the current authors´ rights 
systems. However, there is a fundamental difference 
due to the inability to re-assign or license legal 
positions of the author.
15 According to current law it is not only possible, but 
also necessary for a exploiter to obtain the rights to 
exploit a creative work from the author. In addition, 
exploiters have their own neighboring rights e.g. in a 
film production. Thereby different protective rights 
accumulate in the position of the exploiter.
16 An example: A composer licenses the copyrights in 
her work exclusively and for the whole duration of 
the copyright to a music label. The label thereby 
obtains the exclusive right to exploit the work, 
potentially for the coming 100 years or more, 
depending on how long the author lives. The work, 
however, is blocked for the exploitation by third 
parties, unless the copyrights owner (here the label) 
decides to allow it. In addition, the label has exclusive 
rights in the recordings that were produced from the 
composition.
17 Under the Gedankenexperiment such rights 
accumulation is neither possible, nor necessary.8 
Instead, its regulatory system suggests a different 
approach:
8 An exception applies only to those cases in which the 
creator is simultaneously the exploiter (e.g. in the case of 
self-publishers).
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18 The creator can only grant the label a permission to 
exploit the work9 for a limited period of time (e.g. 
five years10). This permission might also be exclusive. 
During this time the exploiter’s initial investment 
is protected by two legal positions: (1) The contract 
with the author that prevents her from giving further 
permissions to publish her work to other exploiters. 
(2) The exploiter’s own right in the published work, 
which enables them to take legal action against free 
riders. After the creators’ permission has expired, 
she can allow another producer to use the work 
or exploit it herself. The exploiter, in turn, can 
continue marketing their own edition/production 
of the work, although they might have to cope with 
competition by other productions. The creator will 
not only benefit from the first, but also from any 
following publication by means of contractually 
agreed remunerations and statutory claims for 
monetary compensation. Society as a whole, in turn, 
profits from the resulting free competition.
B. Rights and duties of the creator
19 One of the main principles of the regulatory system 
is that the creator of a work should own the right in 
her creation (author’s right)11. The right is bound to 
the individual and cannot be assigned nor licensed 
to third parties, neither exclusively nor non-
exclusively, neither entirely, nor in parts. It can only 
be owned by a natural person.
I. Objective and scope of protection 
of the author’s right
20 The work will be protected as an intangible 
commodity (as under current copyright law). The 
exclusive ownership of the work that follows from 
the author´s right includes both economical and 
moral rights. The author can therefore decide, if 
and who may use/exploit her work and under which 
conditions. The scope of protection ends where 
interests of third parties – in particular those of the 
general public – prevail.
9 See the details of this concept below, sec. II.2.
10 As far as terms of protection or other terms are named 
in the Gedankenexperiment they need to be understood as 
variable. How long individual protective positions shall be 
granted or promises of exclusivity be valid, would have to 
be determined considering various factors, e.g. economic 
and demographic ones, etc. Such valuation is not part of the 
Gedankenexperiment.
11 Note the difference: “copyright” versus “author’s right”.
II. Relationship between the author’s 
rights and the exploiter’s rights
21 In principle, both exploiters and creators have their 
own rights, which they can exercise independently. 
The creator cannot assign or license any usage/
exploitation rights to the exploiter. Nonetheless, 
she may grant the exploiter an all-encompassing 
or limited permission to use/exploit the work for a 
limited period of time.
22 This is a contractually declared permission to first 
publish the work or use/exploit the work exclusively 
and/or non-exclusively for a limited period of 
time. Legally, the permission does not constitute 
a license/transfer of individual author’s rights in 
rem but a consent under the law of obligations, i.e. 
under contract law. It can, if the creator agrees, be 
transferred to third parties. Should a creator grant 
a exploiter an exclusive permission to use or exploit 
the work (exclusivity agreement), she can only do 
so for a limited amount of time. The exclusivity 
agreement expires, depending on which point in 
time comes first, either after its maximum term of 
duration (e.g. 5 years) or with the expiration of the 
exploiter’s right in her own edition/production. 
Should the exploiter’s exploitation right be 
extended by means of registration (see below IV.4), 
the exclusivity agreement can also be extended. 
However, in order to prevent the creator from 
entering into promises of exclusivity without being 
able to predict their overall effect on her interests at 
a later stage, any extension should be accompanied 
by an additional agreement. For works made-for-
hire or those which are part of more complex works 
such as films exceptions could be made from the 
aforementioned restrictions on the transferability 
of author´s rights.
23 If the exclusive permission to use/exploit is not 
extended, it may continue on a non-exclusive basis 
(depending on the agreement with the author). 
This would ensure that the exploiter can continue 
marketing the product, although without being the 
exclusive exploiter of the work.
24 Promises of exclusivity should be registered in a 
public registry in order to provide legal certainty. 
Promises of exclusivity not registered by the 
exploiter cannot be enforced against third parties.12
25 If the exclusivity agreement is registered, one can 
assume that it is publicly known and effective 
against any third party independent of their actual 
knowledge of the exclusivity agreement. The effect of 
12 This means the exploiter may use or exploit the work. 
Without registration, however, she cannot prevent a third 
party from using or exploiting the work even though the 
creator promised her exclusivity.
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a registered exclusivity agreement is thus similar to 
exclusive licenses under current copyright law but 
the negative ramifications of extensive licensing for 
the author are prevented.13
26 Should a competitor violate a registered exclusivity 
agreement, the exploiter can pursue them on the 
basis of either unfair competition law or the right 
accruing from their own production. In turn the 
creator who violates the exclusivity agreement by 
allowing a third party to use or exploit the work can 
be pursued under contract law.
27 Examples of the effects of the permission to use 
or exploit a particular work:
•	 Example 1: An author writes a novel. She grants 
a publisher the permission to first publish the 
work and promises him exclusivity for the 
maximum duration possible (e.g. 5 years). The 
publisher’s exclusive right in his own edition 
(i.e. the proofread version of the book) might 
also last for five years since the date of first 
publication.14 The exclusivity agreement thus 
expires simultaneously with the publisher’s 
own right. After its termination the exclusivity 
agreement automatically transforms into a non-
exclusive permission to use or exploit the work. 
From the date of termination, the author can 
allow a different publisher to re-publish her 
novel.
•	 Example 2: (variation): The author promises 
exclusivity but only for a period of three years 
after the first publication. Subsequently the 
creator can allow a different publisher to re-
publish her work. This re-publication does not 
interfere with the first publisher’s own exclusive 
right since it does not have the exclusive right 
to market the work (i.e. a novel), but only an 
exclusive right to its own edition of the novel 
(i.e. the version proofread and arranged by the 
first publisher).
•	 Example 3: A singer-songwriter allows a record 
label to produce, publish and market her song 
for a period of three years exclusively. The 
label’s own exclusive right in the production 
has a duration of (assumingly) ten years. After 
the exclusivity agreement expires, the label’s 
13 For example the negative consequences of rights diffusion 
are avoided, inter alia because the exclusivity agreement 
only applies as long as the exploiter’s own rights exist and 
because it can only be exercised vis á vis third parties if it 
has been registered. This approach prevents the erosion 
of values underlying the exclusivity right in copyright by 
avoiding unimpeded, unlimited transfer of rights or licenses 
to the exploiter.
14 See in relation to the proposition of time frames in this 
Gedankenexperiment the annotation in fn 10.
own right continues to exist for another seven 
years. During these seven years the label can 
exploit its production on the basis of its own 
exclusive right. After three years however the 
composer can allow a different label to create 
a new production, which will again acquire 
rights of its own. In the years after the expiry 
of the exclusivity agreement, both productions 
compete on the market.
•	 Example 4: A film director allows a film 
producer to exploit her work for a period of 
three years exclusively. The producer’s own 
right in the production amounts to (assumingly) 
10 years. Since the creative achievement of the 
film director will be inextricably interwoven 
with the contributions of the other participants 
in the production (e.g. cameramen) as well as 
being an inextricable part of the film production 
as a complex work, the terms of the exclusivity 
agreement and the producer’s own rights should 
be synchronized. The director will in any case 
not be able to permit other producers to use her 
particular creative achievement. For cases like 
these special rules are needed.
III. Additional protection through 
copyright contract law
28 Although the power imbalance between creators and 
exploiters can be mitigated to a considerable degree 
by restricting extensive exclusive agreements, 
the need to protect creators against contractual 
overreaching still subsists.
29 There is, for instance, still a need to guarantee 
the author an appropriate remuneration and to 
protect her from entering into excessive promises 
of exclusivity. Hence there is a need for a strong, 
albeit balanced, copyright contract law.
30 Furthermore should creators be given the 
unlimited possibility to grant the general public 
far reaching, non-exclusive, indefinite and royalty-
free permissions to use the work in order to ensure 
the functioning of open source and open content 
licenses.
IV. Protection of the alimentation 
interests through rights to a fair 
share and adequate compensation
31 In order to safeguard the interests of the general 
public, the term of protection for exclusive author´s 
rights should be restricted adequately. Excessively 
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long exclusive rights obstruct the use of intellectual 
creations and generate legal uncertainty for re-
publications or may even render them impossible 
since it is increasingly difficult to ascertain who 
owns the copyright.
32 This leads to the phenomenon of orphan works, 
excessive pricing and under- or non-usage, caused by 
the exclusive right´s artificially elevated transaction 
costs (licensing efforts and royalties). This applies 
first and foremost to digital exploitation, for which 
the marginal costs are so low that the likelihood 
of a re-use by third parties after the expiry of the 
protection period would normally be very high. 
However, if exclusive rights are granted excessively 
and their term of protection is determined too long, 
the likeliness of re-publication and further use will 
decrease significantly since there is no economic 
incentive to re-publish the work.
33 If the transaction costs to identify the rights owner 
or concluding individual license deals are too high 
for commercial disseminators or public institutions, 
many cultural works will disappear sooner or later 
although there might be a strong cultural interest in 
their availability and preservation. The protection 
of the public interest as the main goal of the legal 
system outlined in the Gedankenexperiment requires 
adequate restrictions of the exclusive rights.
34 As such a more reasonable duration for exclusive 
author´s rights than it is provided in current 
copyright systems is proposed. Instead of excessive 
exclusivity the Gedankenexperiment proposes a less 
invasive instrument of protection for authors. After 
the expiry of exclusive rights the creators should 
be legally entitled to profit sharing. Such claims 
particularly aim to protect the economical interests 
of the creators.
35 Any author should have a claim to a fair share of the 
commercial revenues derived from the exploitation 
of her work. Such a share would allow the creator 
to participate economically in her work’s success, 
but prevents inflated licensing transaction costs. 
The difference to exclusive rights is obvious: 
whoever wants to use or exploit the work can do so 
without seeking prior permission and may not be 
prevented from doing so but has to pay the creator 
a monetary compensation. Hence the monetary 
compensation has only a narrow limiting effect 
on the use. Functioning structures to collect and 
distribute such remunerations provided, the burden 
for using the material would be manageable. A well-
balanced system of exclusive rights and rights to 
monetary compensation enables an adequately 
refined protection of the creator and at the same 
time serves all other parties involved.
V. Protection of idealistic interests 
– the author’s moral rights
36 The creator has moral rights, which protect in 
particular her interest in being recognized as the 
author, but also protect the work against distortions 
and non-authorized primary publications. These 
moral rights are based on other requirements than 
the economic exclusivity rights. Therefore they 
have an independent term of protection and may 
– similarly to claims for monetary compensation – 
under certain circumstances be bequeathed.
VI. Duration of the author’s rights
37 When assessing the duration of author´s rights, 
it is important to consider their independent 
components. First and foremost a distinction should 
be made between economic protection rights and 
the author’s moral rights.
38 The author’s moral rights are inheritable; their 
duration can be determined (as under current 
copyright law) by the creator´s lifetime. Moral 
rights should have a uniform term that should be 
determined balancing the different interests.
39 For economic exclusive rights and claims for 
monetary compensation, different terms of 
protection are proposed. Above all, the exclusive 
rights allow the creator to control the first 
publication of her work and the negotiation of the 
best possible conditions. Their duration should not 
depend on the category of the work and be assessed 
according to the principle “as long as necessary, as 
short as possible”. Since the purpose of the exclusive 
rights is first and foremost directed at the primary 
publication, their term of protection should be 
calculated from the moment of first publication.15
40 After a certain period of time exclusive rights 
are transformed into a claim for monetary 
compensation. This approach allows the creator to 
continue participating in the economic exploitation 
of her work. For employed creators exceptions can 
be made. The claims for monetary compensation 
should be calculated autonomously and objectively 
and be equal for all types of creators and works.
41 Since the author’s exclusive exploitation rights (and 
in particular the claims for monetary compensation) 
15 That does not mean that the rights only accrue with the 
first publication, but that the duration of the exclusive 
rights will only be counted from that point in time. That 
way it cannot occur that the exclusive rights have already 
expired, when a creator decides to publish her work long 
after its creation.
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will also serve alimentation interests, they should 
be inheritable.16 In order to prevent increasing legal 
insecurity their duration should not extend beyond 
a reasonable period. They could, for instance, be 
limited to 20 years after the creator´s death.
C. Rights and duties of exploiters
42 In the digital world the exploiter still assumes 
a leading role. He invests in the production and 
distribution of creative goods and services and is, 
in many cases, the first to make them available (e.g. 
film productions). Based on the underlying idea of 
investment protection for distinct achievements, he 
ought to obtain an exclusive right on his specific 
design, edition or production (i.e. his “edition of 
the respective work”). Being an exclusive right, 
the exploiter’s right is meant to safeguard the 
amortization of investments and provide financial 
incentives to make them. The exploiter´s right 
accrues for the exploiter and is not a right derived 
from the creator. It can be assigned to third parties – 
as a whole or in parts. Exploiters obtain the necessary 
permission to use the work from the creator via 
promises of exclusivity or non-exclusive permissions 
(for details see above B.II).
I. Subject matter of the 
exploiter’s right
43 It is the individual achievement of the exploiter 
which is being protected, i.e. the particular 
production, edition or issue of the respective work. 
The subject matter of the exploiter’s right is thus the 
specific implementation of a creative product (e.g. a 
music recording or a movie).
II. Accrual of the exploiter’s right
44 In order to prevent unjustifiable disadvantages for 
small exploiters, the exploiter’s right should accrue 
automatically and without registration when their 
edition of the work has been produced. The right 
accrues, similar to today’s neighboring rights, for 
the one who has made the essential investments 
and carries the financial risk. The publication of the 
product is, however, only allowed if the creator had 
previously granted the necessary permission to use 
and exploit his work.
16 Even though the duration of the exclusive rights is measured 
relatively shortly, they should be heritable. In any case it is 
possible that the creator dies shortly after the creation of 
the work.
III. Subject matter and scope 
of the exploiter’s right
45 Exploiters have an exclusive right to their product, 
i.e. in their own specific implementation, edition, 
assembly, production. They can transfer that right 
and assign it fully or in parts to third parties or grant 
exclusive or non-exclusive licenses (as long as the 
creator agreed to grant a transferrable permission 
to use her work). Following therefrom, the concept 
of the exploiter’s right corresponds to the concept 
of neighboring rights. Exploiters can enforce their 
right against piracy and other non-authorized uses 
of their goods and services based on their own right. 
Being a right owner they can claim injunctive relief, 
removal and damages. Should a competitor violate a 
registered exclusivity agreement, the exploiter can 
resort to competition law.
IV. Terms of protection of 
the exploiter’s right
46 The exploiter´s right constitutes first and foremost 
a protection of investment. Its term should 
therefore be calculated based on economic facts and 
assessments. Given that the product of the exploiter 
enjoys a quasi monopoly that interferes extensively 
with free competition, the principle of “as long as 
necessary, as short as possible” should be applied 
in this context.
47 As to the specification of the term of protection two 
models can be considered, both of which come with 
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand it 
might be possible to define product specific terms 
of protection, in order to account for the different 
diffusion curves on the markets.17 The advantages of 
market-oriented differentiation are, however, offset 
by serious disadvantages as to legal security. The 
convergence of traditional and new types of works 
based on multi-media, such as computer games, 
would raise considerable problems in this model. 
In addition, in a model based on market-oriented 
differentiation the terms of protection would have 
to be continuously changed in order to be able to 
account for the changing market conditions.
48 In light of these disadvantages it seems that an 
approach applying uniform terms of protection – 
i.e. terms of protection which are independent of 
product and market – should be preferred. In order 
to calculate an ideal uniform term of protection, one 
should – just as in patent law – consider the average 
17 This approach was preferred in the original guidelines, see 
final report, p. 117 (<http://dl.collaboratory.de/reports/
Ini3_Urheberrecht.pdf>).
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amortization period as a guideline. In other words, 
the term would have to be determined in line with 
the period of time in which investments into creative 
products usually pay off.
49 In order to prevent (in individual cases) inadequately 
short terms of protection, they should be able to be 
extended by registration. The registration should 
be subject to considerable yearly fees that should 
progress in amount the longer the protection lasts. 
The opportunity to extend the term of protection 
should be limited in time (e.g. 20 years after 
publication) in order to avoid the negative effects 
of excessively long exclusive rights and to reconcile 
the interests of the general public with the interests 
of investment protection on the side the exploiters. 
The registration fees can be spent on cultural 
purposes or similar.
D. Rights and duties of non-
commercial users
50 The duties of non-commercial users18 ensue from the 
protection rights of creators and exploiters. Within 
the scope of the exclusive rights of creators and/
or exploiters, the work may not be used without 
permission. Should legislation guarantee the non-
commercial user a right to use the work or the 
respective production, these rights prevail over the 
exclusive rights. In other words the exclusive rights 
are limited in scope.
I. Non-commercial users rights 
as enforceable personal rights 
51 Different from the current system of exceptions and 
limitations especially in author’s rights systems, 
the Gedankenexperiment protects the interests of 
non-commercial users by own rights. These user’s 
rights are not derived from statutory limitations of 
the author’s or exploiter’s rights. They rather are 
separate and individual legal positions that belong 
to the non-commercial users.
52 The balance of interests between creators, exploiters 
and non-commercial users is realized by defining the 
scope of the exclusive rights on the one hand and 
the user´s rights on the other. The non-commercial 
user’s interests are thus not subject to limitations 
of unlimited exclusivity rights, but constitute own 
subjective rights. They are outside the scope of 
18 Non-commercial users are referred to as users who use 
protected creative goods for their private or the public 
interest. Non-commercial users are individual members 
of the public and public institutions like museums, 
universities, archives and the like.
protection.
53 All rights – i.e. those of the non-commercial users, 
the creators and the rights owners – are generally 
considered equal. Hence, the freedom to use is 
no exception to a general overall exclusivity. 
Consequently, the non-commercial users´ rights do 
not form part of the protective exclusivity rights. 
As such, they cannot be contractually excluded.19 
Being individual rights they can even be enforced, 
e.g. when citations of films are impossible, because 
the exploiter sells his copies with technical 
copy protection measures. Such a system would 
acknowledge the public interest in legally protected 
freedoms to use and affirm them with strong legal 
positions.
II. Relationship between non-
commercial users’, authors’ 
and exploiters’ rights
54 The creation of an independent statutory sphere 
for non-commercial users´ rights establishes a 
consistent systematic approach towards balancing 
of the opposing interests. In addition, this approach 
prevents inconsistencies by guaranteeing that non-
commercial users´ rights are considered equal to 
the creator’s and the exploiter’s rights. Should a 
non-commercial user have a right of citation, she 
can enforce that right against both creators and 
exploiters.
III. The implementation of non-
commercial user rights 
55 As described in the original Guidelines20 non-
commercial users´ rights should be implemented 
by means of a regulatory system, which combines 
elements of both the continental European author´s 
right and US copyright law.
56 In practice, this means the establishment of a rule 
catalogue of typified usage rights (such as the 
limitation provisions under the present author’s 
right system) in which permitted acts are specifically 
described, such as the quotation right or private 
copying. This catalogue however is – other than 
19 In this model an exclusion of usage rights would lead to the 
contractual creation of protective rights and the extension 
of existing protective rights that are not envisaged by the 
law. Such a “law-perverting” drafting of contracts should 
(under certain circumstances) be expressly prohibited by 
law.
20 See p. 112 et seq. of the final report (< http://dl.collaboratory.
de/reports/Ini3_Urheberrecht.pdf>).
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under the current European copyright law – not 
exhaustive. It will be complemented with an open 
norm, i.e. a general clause for constellations, which 
do not fall under the rule catalogue.
57 This regulatory system ensures on the one hand 
side legal certainty and on the other, the necessary 
flexibility in view of the ever-changing digital 
environment, which may easily upset the balance 
of interests. As far as it seems appropriate, monetary 
compensation through levies should be introduced 
to compensate certain forms of free uses.
58 The open norm only applies to uses which fulfill 
the criteria of a proportionality test. This could 
be guided by the four-step test set out in Art. 107 
US Copyright Act (fair use).21 In order to further 
substantiate the freedoms to use not explicitly 
mentioned in the legislation and to enhance legal 
certainty, complementary regulatory means could 
be established. It might, for instance, be possible 
to create a regulatory authority which defines 
permitted acts of usage under the open norm and 
lays down binding conditions for their applicability 
(e.g. the duty to pay adequate compensation). It 
could also assess whether existing freedoms to use 
are still necessary.
59 Alternatively or even cumulatively, certified user 
associations could be allowed to take representative 
action. Legitimized associations could apply for a 
generally binding decision in front of specialized 
courts determining whether, and if so, under which 
conditions an act of use falls under the open norm 
and thus constitutes a non-commercial users’ right. 
A combination of regulatory instruments, courts, 
regulatory authorities and legislators would be 
involved in the further development of the balance 
of interests, which is so important for the effective 
regulation of creative goods. The involvement of 
all these powers in the development of the law 
can considerably accelerate the advancement of 
regulation and avoid protracted backlogs of reforms.
E. Rights and duties of 
intermediaries
60 Intermediaries are those which engage in the 
21 According to Art. 107 of the US Copyright Act, four factors 
need to be taken into consideration when assessing 
whether an act of use constitutes fair use: (1) The purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or for non-profit educational purposes; 
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work; (3) The amount 
and the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) The effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.
widest sense in the storing, making available and 
searchability of creative goods and services, without 
being commercial or non-commercial users or 
creators.22 These include platform providers, web-
hosting and web-sharing services, search engine 
providers, electronic program guides or similar 
services. Also telecommunication providers are in 
this broad sense “intermediaries”.
61 Current copyright law does not govern the interests 
of Internet Service Providers. Since they are – 
according to jurisdiction and legislation – neither 
right owners nor do they engage in acts of use 
relevant under copyright law23, their rights and 
duties are regulated outside the law of copyright. 
Instead they are regulated under Telecommunication 
Laws and especially under ISP liability rules found 
e.g. in the E-Commerce Directive of the European 
Union (2000/31/EC) or the US Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.
62 In a new regulatory system for creative goods 
intermediaries are of systemic importance. That 
does not mean that intermediaries should be given 
protective rights of their own. It is a rather a question 
of balancing their interests against the interests of 
the other stakeholders involved.
63 As much as the label “intermediary” covers very 
different services and constellations, it may 
generally be said that intermediaries can exert an 
important influence on the commercial exploitation 
and use of creative goods. This becomes all the more 
obvious in the case of search engines and platforms. 
The activities of intermediaries can have a positive 
impact on creators, exploiters and non-commercial 
users, for instance when they enhance the findability 
and visibility of works and thus make them more 
accessible for a larger target group.
64 The activities of intermediaries, however, can also 
have a negative impact, for instance when free 
unlicensed services (such as user generated content 
platforms) start competing with fee-based offers 
provided by the right owners, or when an important 
intermediary obstructs access to creative goods.
22 For the definition see also fn. 7. An intermediary is thus not 
somebody who uses works or creative products in terms 
of the regulatory system (or: copyright) and is thus not 
subject to licensing obligations. The scope of application 
of the intermediaries’ regulations will therefore have to be 
defined according to the acts of use and not according to 
the identity of the user. Since in the online world content 
and infrastructure services are increasingly converging, it 
is very likely that providers are in some cases both users, 
intermediaries and under certain circumstances exploiters. 
The concrete regulations refer – as is the case under the 
current copyright law system – to the particular activity.
23 E.g.: A hosting provider does not copy protected works. It 
rather provides the technical facilities that are used (by end 
users) to copy.
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65 The current legal system has difficulties in defining 
the role of intermediaries, since the economic 
principles of an intermediary´s role cannot be 
captured in a differentiated way under the current 
mechanism.
66 Under current copyright law, an act is either an act of 
use not relevant to copyright law – and thus neither 
requiring permission nor remuneration – or it is an 
act of use to which copyright applies in its entirety. 
Economically, intermediaries often lie somewhere in 
between. Although the intermediary does not “use” 
the provided goods in the legal sense, he profits 
nonetheless to a considerable extent of their being 
made available by third parties (his users), since his 
services would not be attractive without them.
67 On the other hand the commercial success of 
intermediaries is mostly based on their own 
achievements. They render a – for exploiters and 
authors – free service, which can also be beneficial 
for them. User generated content platforms such 
as video services can, for instance, significantly 
enhance the visibility and potential popularity of the 
uploaded creative content. The result is a marketing 
effect that comes for free for the right owners. In 
short: intermediaries are both beneficiaries and 
apporteurs of benefits in relation to creative goods. 
In a regulatory system for creative goods both roles 
need to be captured adequately.
I. The intermediary in the regulatory 
system for creative goods
68 At a glance, three regulatory areas for intermediaries 
can be considered in a regulatory system for creative 
goods:
• A precise definition of the term “intermediary”;
• Whether authors and/or exploiters should have 
a direct claim to a share of the profit or other 
kinds of remuneration against (certain kinds of) 
intermediaries (primary liability);
• Whether intermediaries should be liable for 
right infringing acts of their users (secondary 
liability).
II. Categories of intermediaries
69 The potential for a conflict of interest between 
intermediaries, creators and exploiters depends most 
importantly on the kind of intermediation. Different 
types of intermediaries can be distinguished. Not all 
of them are relevant for the regulatory system for 
creative goods. Only those conflicts need to be solved 
which may have a negative impact on the interests 
of the other actors of the regulative system. As far 
as offers of intermediaries have a positive impact or 
can be rated neutrally in this regard, no legislative 
intervention is necessary.
70 The fact that an intermediary facilitates in some way 
the use of creative goods does not, on its own, point to 
a conflict of interest. In order to distinguish relevant 
conflicts of interests from irrelevant causal chains, 
criteria are necessary, which allow an abstract 
and general assessment of potential conflicts of 
interest which may ensue vis-à-vis particular types 
of intermediaries and which should carry different 
legal consequences.
71 For an appropriate balance of interest, it seems 
necessary to differentiate between intermediaries 
whose offers tend24 to compete with goods and 
services from exploiters/creators or may even 
substitute them (“competing intermediary 
services”), and those whose offers complement the 
goods and services of rights owners or even make 
them possible in the first place (“complementary 
intermediary services”).
72 Complementary services complement the goods 
and services of exploiters and foster the use and 
reception of works and are thus generally neutral 
or even beneficial for right owners. From the overall 
perspective of an information society they fulfill the 
important function of lowering information costs.
73 Competing services on the other hand can constitute 
a threat to the offers of the rights owners. In contrast 
to complementary services, they profit directly from 
the use of protected material. Although they do not 
use protected material themselves (in that case 
they would be non-commercial users or exploiters), 
they generate added value, e.g. by providing their 
users with services outside the marketing channels 
envisaged by creators and exploiters. That may even 
lead to the substitution of goods and services of the 
right holders. It thus appears generally necessary to 
consider intermediaries with potentially competing 
offers in the balance of interests which the regulatory 
system for creative goods envisages.
74 An important indicator for the division between 
competing and complementary offers is the 
24 „Tend to“, since in special cases every offer may have the 
contrary effect. A video platform, for instance, may be 
beneficial for the rights holder due to the advertising effects 
and the increase in publicity; for others on the other hand 
it might be detrimental due to its competitive impact. As 
always in the case of general assessments it is only possible 
to define general cases and to focus the regulations on 
them. For special cases exceptions to the general rule could 
be considered.
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“proximity to the content”. “Close to the content” 
are those services, which allow their users to place 
protected material online and to store and distribute 
it directly. By contrast services which only provide 
the means, especially the technical infrastructure, 
that enable the general use of the Internet are “far 
from the content”. The same applies for services 
which merely systemize materials already available 
on the Internet and make them findable.
75 For instance, Internet access providers may be 
regarded as intermediaries in the sense of the 
definition, since their activities are a sine qua non 
for every Internet communication including the use 
of protected works. However, they only provide the 
technical means that make online communication 
generally possible. They are thus “far from the 
content”. In addition, the offering of Internet access 
does not have a negative impact on the interests of 
creators or intermediaries. The offers of the right 
owners are thereby not substituted or impeded; 
instead they need access providers to enable the 
users to access their services. The fact that illegal 
acts of use are also being made possible does not 
change this fundamental assessment.
76 The same applies to other infrastructure and 
service providers or search engines. Neither do 
they compete with the offers of intermediaries nor 
do they replace them. They merely facilitate their 
searchability. They are therefore not competing 
against but complementing offers in the sense of 
the above categorization as long as they do not 
substitute or compete with the contents to which 
they point.
77 Counterexamples for services which are “close to 
the content” are, for instance, file hosters and video 
and image platforms. Such services can be operated 
in a way that competes with the offers of creators 
and exploiters or even replace them. Whether that 
happens depends on several other factors which 
cannot be examined in detail at this point, e.g. 
whether whole works or – as in the case of images 
– works in their full resolution are published on the 
Internet, whether access extends to everyone or 
only to a distinctive, limited user group, whether 
only own or also other people´s contents can be 
published, etc.
III. Legitimate and illegitimate 
intermediation and the 
consequences
78 Based on the proposed free differentiation the 
regulatory system for creative goods will be able 
to define appropriate legal consequences. Whereas 
intermediaries of complementary offers principally 
do not appear to require regulation, intermediaries 
of competing offers should invoke differently graded 
legal consequences.
79 Certain forms of competing offers may simply not 
be acceptable, for instance, when the service of 
intermediation is marginal and the true intention 
is to freeride and market the works circumventing 
exclusive rights. In this case the services should be 
subject to the full range of legal remedies, including 
injunctions and damages.
80 However, for most intermediaries the competing 
effect results from the attractiveness of the service, 
which represents an added value for the user. Such 
services are legitimate. There is – besides the own 
interest of the provider – a public interest in these 
services, so that they fall under the protection of the 
market and of the law. However, a balance of interest 
between intermediaries, the general public and the 
right owners, whose distribution channels may be 
prejudiced by such offers, needs to be struck.
81 A possible result of such a balancing act could be that 
providers of legitimate (potentially) competing offers 
– contrary to those offers providing complementary 
services – would be given an obligation to pay 
monetary compensation in lieu of their users, e.g. 
in the form of shares in revenue or an adequate 
compensation.
82 This could be justified, since they compete with the 
offers of the right owners or may even replace them, 
without having to invest in content or licensing. 
Their business model is based on the use of protected 
creative content by their users. Experience tells that 
especially non-commercial users do not only upload 
their own contents but also third party content – 
usually without having a license.
83 Unlicensed uses of non-commercial users provided 
through intermediaries are currently usually 
not economically compensated. This appears 
unacceptable in a regulatory system for creative 
goods. Experience has shown that copyright 
enforcement towards non-commercial users is not 
practical and leads to unwanted effects. Monetary 
compensation paid by intermediaries has the 
advantage that remunerations can be raised from a 
central actor and be passed on to the right holders. 
Decentralized licensing or royalty obligations 
towards end-users could also be prevented, avoiding 
mass enforcement against citizens.25 Since the 
25 The contemplated compensation paid in lieu by the 
intermediary does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that all acts of end-users have to be legalized. Both questions 
can in principle be assessed separately. Should it, however, 
emerge that compensatory payments are generally passed 
on to the users, but they are still being sued, legalization 
The Berlin Gedankenexperiment on the restructuring of Copyright Law and Author’s Rights
201687 2
intermediaries would only be called upon in lieu of 
the end-users, it would be in their discretion to ask 
users to reimburse them or to find other ways of 
refinancing26 the payments made.
84 Such a solution resembles the systems of levies on 
blank media and storage devices, in which producers, 
traders and importers are liable for the payments in 
lieu of the end-users. In most European countries the 
system proved to be effective, at least in principle. In 
addition, the approach resembles industry specific 
solutions already established in some areas (such as 
YouTube’s Content ID System)27.
IV. Responsibility for legitimate 
intermediary offers with 
competitive potential 
85 The inclusion of intermediaries into the 
remunerative relationship between right holders 
and non-commercial users is potentially contrary 
to their interests. Since their success is based on 
own achievements and self-created added value, and 
they do not engage in any act of use themselves, but 
only profit from the fact that their users do so, they 
should be granted advantages in return. This could 
be, for instance, the limitation of liability for use acts 
of their non-commercial users.
86 It might thus not be far-fetched to reduce the liability 
of intermediaries to purely reactive duties to act in 
a framework of notice and takedown procedures. 
This approach would most probably reduce the 
challenges currently faced by intermediaries in 
many parts of the world, where they sometimes 
face proactive duties to check uploaded content for 
its legitimacy and may even have to pay damages.
87 On the whole, such a system of monetary 
would be inevitable. Otherwise the end-users would be 
charged twice for their uses and could still face legal 
consequences.
26 It would lie in the discretion of the intermediary to decide 
whether and, if so, in which form to make use of this 
opportunity. This would most likely depend on the business 
model and the technical feasibility.
27 The success of YouTube’s Content ID System (see < https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YouTube#Content_ID>), which is 
voluntary for both sides, shows on the one hand that it 
can be more advantageous for intermediaries to make 
payments and share revenues than being exposed to 
legal remedies. In addition, they protect their users and 
maintain their business model. On the other hand, the 
active participation in the program (again voluntarily) by 
music labels and producers shows that such systems are 
regarded as advantageous also by the right owners. It would 
be interesting to examine, whether general lessons could be 
learned from this example. Should this be the case, it might 
be worth considering turning it into a regulatory approach.
compensation and limitation of liability would 
be beneficial for all parties involved: instead of 
restricting the uses on platforms and hosting 
services, revenues would be generated for creators 
and exploiters. The intermediaries would be included 
in the remuneration system but not exposed to 
extended liability. Furthermore the approach would 
create more legal certainty, which is advantageous 
for all actors concerned.
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1 In a mission letter dated 3 April 2015, the High 
Council for Literary and Artistic Property (CSPLA) 
expressed its wish for research to be carried out 
on “proposing changes to current European Union legal 
provisions enabling the effective enforcement of copyright 
and related rights in the digital environment, particularly 
on platforms which disseminate protected content”.
2 The President of the mission will be Pierre Sirinelli, 
a Professor at the Université Paris-I (Panthéon- 
Sorbonne), while the Vice-President roles have 
been entrusted to Josée-Anne Benazeraf, a lawyer 
at the Paris Bar and Alexandra Bensamoun, Senior 
Lecturer HDR [accreditation to supervise research] 
at Université Paris-Sud.
Modus operandi
3 The mission began by setting up round tables in order 
to gauge the opinions of various professionals within 
the sector, both from the CSPLA and elsewhere. It 
continued by working on the proposals put forward 
by some of the contributors and has itself outlined 
some solutions. The draft legislation contained in 
this report is the result of these various discussions.
4 In addition the work of the mission – which met twice 
a week for several months – took many different 
forms including hearings, bilateral discussions, 
consultation meetings by sector or stakeholder 
category, cross-analysis of legislation and plenary 
meetings.
5 All sectors were heard, including the technical 
service providers, although some technical service 
provider representatives opted not to respond to the 
mission’s invitation.
6 Work was performed alongside the work conducted 
in Brussels by the Commission and the Parliament, 
which recommended that the liability regime for 
some information society service providers1 ought 
1 The harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights, a European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015, 
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to be clarified in order to prevent these providers 
from capturing the value of the works which fuel 
their economy2.
7 This mission’s work has given rise to numerous 
discussions in this area with European institution 
representatives.
Questions
8 In a nutshell, the mission has been asked to resolve 
the following questions:
• Do the regimes implemented by Articles 12 
to15 of the E-Commerce Directive of 8 June 
2000 (Directive 2000/31/EC) truly provide a 
full understanding of the activities of certain 
service providers (Web 2.0 in particular) who 
were barely in existence when this legislation 
was adopted?
• If not, what solutions could be implemented in 
order to prevent some of the consequences of 
these statutes from being applied in the field of 
literary and artistic property?
9 In order to bring together initial impressions on the 
topic together with outlines of the answers to these 
two questions, the mission felt it necessary to ask 
each participant a series of simple questions:
1. Must we intervene in order to change the 
solutions adopted by certain courts in the 
absence of clear legislation providing a 
harmonised understanding of the new activities 
conducted by certain service providers?
2. If so, which activities need to be understood in 
order to be able to propose new solutions?
3. What form should this legislative change take?
4. What consequences should it have?
point 45, suggests “a review of the liability of service providers 
and intermediaries in order to clarify their legal status and 
liability with regard to copyright (...)”; A Digital Single Market 
Strategy for Europe, European Commission Communication of 
6 May 2015, p. 8: “In addition the rules applicable to activities of 
online intermediaries in relation to copyright protected works 
require clarification, given in particular the growing involvement 
of these intermediaries in content distribution. “
2 The harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights, European Parliament Resolution as specified above, 
point O: “whereas creative works are one of the main sources 
nourishing the digital economy and information technology 
players such as search engines, social media and platforms for 
user-generated content, but virtually all the value generated 
by creative works is transferred to those digital intermediaries, 
which refuse to pay authors or negotiate extremely low levels of 
remuneration. “
Positions expressed
10 The first question has been answered in the 
affirmative. This affirmative response would have 
been unanimous but for the caution of certain 
technical service providers.
11 The second question also gave rise to some main 
areas for consideration:
• A large majority of the respondents deemed that 
it would not be appropriate to reform the legal 
regime for activities related to mere conduit, 
internet service provision or caching.
• Moreover, there were no requests to revise the 
legal regime for hosting providers conducting 
activities which fully meet the definition 
proposed by Directive 2000/31 in the year 2000. 
This denotes a ‘transparent’ technical service 
provider which hosts content and remains out 
of direct and intentional contact with the 
public.
• However, almost all of the contributors 
agreed	 that	 a	 clarification	 ought	 to	 be	
added to indicate that the regime proposed 
by Article 14 of the 8 June 2000 Directive 
should in no case be applied to what many 
professionals call ‘false hosting providers’, 
in other words, information society service 
providers whose role extends beyond that 
of a technical service provider as defined by 
the Directive. This includes certain Web 2.0 
platforms (particularly contribution-based 
or community sites), certain social networks, 
and certain services that may be used by certain 
search engines. It should however be noted that 
although opinion was unanimously in favour 
of intervention for the former, more varied 
opinions were expressed on the latter. The 
proposed solutions were therefore considered in 
the light of the former parties, and are therefore 
not fully applicable to the other categories. Our 
thinking does not cover conduits, ISPs, cache 
providers or personal file storage services.
Basis of requests for change
12 The reasons put forward for the development of the 
solutions or clarification of the inadequacy of the 
manner in which the solutions set out by Article 
14 of Directive 2000/31 have been applied for the 
above activities tend to be technical or economic 
rather than legal. Although all parties noted that 
the above activities do not match the assumptions 
made by the European authorities in 2000 when the 
legislation was drafted, it was also highlighted that 
better sharing of value may be gained through a 
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clarification of the non-applicability of the European 
procedure to these activities.
13 This point does not require a long explanation:
1 - Claiming that they are covered by the 
conditional exemption from liability provided 
by Article14 enables the above service providers 
to make considerable profits due to the 
(unauthorised) existence of copyright protected 
works or items covered by related rights on their 
platforms. These services (whether charged or 
free-of-charge) generate considerable advertising 
revenues due to the existence of such works, 
yet consider that they do not need to seek 
authorisation and therefore redistribute a share 
of the profits made to the extent sought by rights 
holders. This is due to the fact that:
1.1. Either the courts wrongly apply this regime 
to information society service providers. It 
should be noted in this respect that in its Google 
judgments of 23 March 20103, the CJEU ruled that 
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive could be 
applied to a service provider that “has not played 
an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge 
of, or control over, the data stored”.
This condition, which is based on recital 42 of 
the E-Commerce Directive, is however a foreign 
concept to hosting providers. In addition it seems 
to have been distorted by the aforementioned 
assessment by the Court of Justice.
First and foremost, it is clear when reading 
recital 42 that it does not apply to hosting 
providers (which are covered by recital 46), nor 
to the search services in question in the case 
ruled on by the Court, but rather to conduits, 
ISPs and cache activities. The activity covered by 
the aforementioned recital 42 is indeed “limited 
to the technical process of operating and giving access 
to a communication network over which information 
made available by third parties is transmitted or 
temporarily stored”.
Therefore, the condition (as expressed by the 
final sentence of the recital) under which one is 
covered by the exemption from liability based 
on a “mere technical, automatic and passive nature”, 
applies to Articles 12 and 13 of the Directive, but 
not to Article 14.
Please also note that the vocabulary used by 
the Directive differs according to the service 
provider, i.e. “exemptions from liability” for 
3 Case C-236/08 to C-238/08; also see CJEU, 12 July 2011, 
L’Oréal et al. v. eBay, case C-324/09; CJEU, 11 September 2014, 
Sotiris Papasavvas, case C-291/13.
conduits, ISPS and caches (recital 42), and 
“limitation of liability” for hosting providers 
(recital 46).
Secondly, the above-mentioned statement by 
the CJEU does not match recital 42, under which 
the “mere technical, automatic and passive nature 
[...] implies that the information society service 
provider has neither knowledge of nor control over 
the information which is transmitted or stored”.
In recital 42, the Directive states that in order 
to occupy a passive role, the service provider 
must have neither knowledge of nor control 
over the information. But this does not mean 
that the service provider is necessarily passive 
just because it does not have knowledge and/or 
control  of  the  information,  or  likewise  that 
the  service  provider  must  have knowledge 
and control of the information in order to play 
an active role (as stated by the CJEU).
In other words, the condition set out by recital 
42 is necessary but insufficient.
By turning the recital around, the CJEU has 
substantially changed its meaning, as its 
interpretation would mean that ‘false hosting 
providers’ would never actually be active, given 
that when users post content, service providers 
generally do not have knowledge of or always 
control over said content.
1.2. Or, rights holders refrain from enforcing 
their literary and artistic property rights on 
providers due to the cost of proceedings and 
the difficulty of implementing their exploitation 
monopoly in such circumstances.
a It is therefore clear that the balance of power 
is not at all on the side of the rights holders, 
and that the economic and technical power as 
well as the high-profile nature of some of the 
providers makes it even more difficult to hold 
true negotiations, or even proper discussions 
between the two sides.
2 - The reasoning provided by rights holders is 
varied.
2.1. Some simply comment that the situation 
ought to be resolved purely for reasons of legal 
integrity, and that the application of Article 14 
to the above activities is the result of twisted 
logic, a misunderstanding of circumstances or 
a manipulation of the legislation.
2.2. Others simply highlight the fact that the 
rejection of Article 14’s conditional exemption 
system would enable better negotiation of 
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the remuneration which is legally payable 
in order to provide access to copyright works or 
material. In other words, the objective of rights 
holders is not to prohibit their works from being 
posted online, but rather to ensure that they are 
in a position in which they can obtain improved 
compensation and sharing of value.
2.3. Other rights holders are less prepared to 
negotiate with service providers, and intend 
to recover the full scope of their copyright and 
related rights in order to ensure that they can 
continue with their own strategies without 
hindrance, and in order to be able to implement 
(at least initially) their own individual policies to 
make works available over networks.
14 To conclude, it is clear that there is a high demand 
for intervention in order to change current case law 
solutions, which are deemed to be both unfounded 
and unjust.
15 There are therefore two questions to consider:
1 - Which type of intervention should be 
carried out, and which means should be used 
(I)?
2 - What new solutions are sought (II)?
*****
I. TYPES OF INTERVENTION
16 First of all, one needs to look at the means to be used 
in order to develop a solution, and which reform 
instrument ought to be used.
Intervention at a European level
17 There are several possible routes, all of which involve 
a European-level solution. Of course, it would 
be easily possible to add numerous progressive 
changes to fill the voids of European Member State 
legislation, enabling national legislators to make 
their own clarifications or adjustments. Yet due to 
case law developments in many Member States, it 
was unanimously decided that it would be wiser to 
act at directive level in order to obtain a standard 
solution which would apply in all 28 Member States.
18 The question is whether this should be done by way 
of official drafted legislation or through a process 
of interpretation?
Preference for an official intervention setting 
out a clear standard
19 In a document4 sent to the French Ministry of 
Culture (Ministère de la Culture), the audiovisual 
production sector initially expressed its preference 
for a purely interpretation-based route. Based 
on the statements that the existing legislation 
has advocated (recitals 405 and 486 of Directive 
2000/31/CE), for the past 15 years, the existence of 
a duty to act for technical intermediaries in order 
to be able to block access to illegal content, some 
audiovisual professionals considered that “the best 
way to address all of the areas that require improvement 
is to use a cross-disciplinary process of interpretation, the 
purpose of which would be to provide clarification to the 
concepts included in several European legislative texts on 
the subject of making works available online (2000/31/
EC, 2001/29/EC and 2004/48/EC in particular). This could 
involve an interpretative communication by the European 
Commission”.
20 This option failed to convince a substantial 
majority of the contributors, who wish to see more 
clearly defined and effective action, so that the 
interpretation route could be used as a fallback 
solution should the adoption of specific legislation 
be unlikely to be implemented.
21 The route	of	an	official	intervention	setting	out	a	
clear standard is justified both on a positive basis by 
the need to be able to rely on a provision which sets 
out the solution, in certain cases, of rejecting Article 
14 of Directive 2000/31, and on a negative basis by the 
fear of the interpretation route being insufficient.
22 One of the fears expressed, apart from the risk of 
European judges retaining the disputed approach, 
lies in the fact that the interpretation route proposed 
to resolve the issue at stake here would involve 
clarifying the concept of a hosting provider as 
defined by Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive. 
4 Propositions pour une meilleure efficience des droits (Proposals 
to ensure that rights are more effective), 13 July 2015.
5 “Service providers have a duty to act, under certain circumstances, 
with a view to preventing or stopping illegal activities. This 
Directive should constitute the appropriate basis for the 
development of rapid and reliable procedures for removing and 
disabling access to illegal information”.
6 “This Directive does not affect the possibility for Member States 
of requiring service providers, who host information provided 
by recipients of their service, to apply duties of care, which can 
reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by 
national law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal 
activities.”
2016
French High Council for Literary and Artistic Property
92 2
In other words, it would therefore relate to all types 
of infringements which could be committed by a 
service with hosting provider status, and would not 
specifically deal with content protected by copyright 
and related rights.
23 Moreover, many of the participants believed that 
this approach may be counterproductive, as it would 
not provide a focus on the copyright-specific central 
issue of the sharing of value. They all however 
considered it essential to ensure that the issue of 
‘false hosting providers’ remains at the heart of 
the issue of copyright and related rights, therefore 
justifying a change in legislation and the defining of 
the regime’s boundaries.
24 This approach of enacting a specific standard does 
not only seem to be the most secure and targeted, 
but it also appears to offer more potential, in that 
it grants the option (where required) of adding a 
number of stipulations, including in cases in which 
it would be insufficient to simply reject Article14 
for the service providers in question, but would 
also potentially be necessary to better define the 
applicable legal regime in such a scenario.
25 Of course, everyone is aware that the forthcoming 
solution is not necessarily a new concept, as the 
vast majority of contributors considered the case 
law solutions applying Article 14 to the above- 
mentioned scenarios to be flawed. Yet putting pen 
to paper offers certain advantages, such as being able 
to make a clear and simple statement of the most 
timely solution, taking into account the balance 
sought by the joint implementation of Directives 
2000/31 and 2001/29, and providing a solution which 
is acceptable both to the political authorities and to 
professionals within the sector.
26 It remained only to decide which Directive the 
above-mentioned solution should be inserted into.
Intervention in copyright legislation
27 Some requests were made to change the actual 
wording of the E-Commerce Directive. Others 
expressed a preference for the legislative 
intervention to be restricted to clarifications in a 
legislative text covering only to copyright and 
related rights.
28 The decision between these two options was quickly 
made. Although a wider amendment may have 
seemed more apt to some, it soon became apparent 
that such an amendment would come up again 
strong objections and problems, and therefore a 
limited intervention was quickly deemed to be 
more realistic and apt in this case. Furthermore, the 
specific	nature	of	literary	and	artistic	property	
rights provides a solid basis for the rejection of 
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive when 
copyright and related rights are applied by certain 
service providers.
29 The vast majority of the contributors therefore 
ideally wanted the forthcoming standard to be 
inserted into the body of Directive 2001/29, should 
the latter be reopened. This report favours the latter 
route. Yet technically, the proposed provisions could 
be inserted into any copyright legislation.
30 Based on these considerations, what solution ought 
to be recommended?
II. THE CONTENT OF THE 
NEW LEGISLATION
31 Once the vehicle has been chosen, the boundaries of 
the new rule must be set out (A) and then a drafting 
proposal must be completed (B), followed by an 
explanation of the proposal (C).
A – The boundaries of the proposal
32 This consists of planning the scope of the legislation 
and its intended position.
33 Drafters are likely to have the option of several 
different constructions.
34 One might decide to create a whole new status 
(definition, regime etc.), but this option did not win 
the support of the contributors for two main reasons:
• Firstly, it has the disadvantage of having to 
propose new solutions, with complex boundaries 
to be set out, which themselves could quickly 
become obsolete due to future technical 
innovation and economic and social change.
• Secondly, it leads one to believe that new 
standards need to be drafted, where in fact it is 
simply a case of rejecting the consequences of 
case law which has failed to correctly interpret 
the pre-existing legislation. Such rejection is 
easily justified by the need for clear content due 
to the specific nature of copyright.
35 It was therefore deemed that this option ought to 
be rejected as long as it had not been proven that 
the renewed enforcement of copyright through 
the rejection of Article 14 was likely to prompt any 
problematic imbalances.
36 The route of shifting copyright and related rights 
back towards ordinary law was therefore deemed 
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to be more reasonable, especially as the option of 
(potentially and in certain cases) accompanying it 
by a simple duty of collaboration between rights 
holders and service providers seemed likely to 
maintain a balance between potentially opposing 
interests.
37 Based on these considerations, where should the 
new rule be inserted within Directive 2001/29?
• Does a new Article need to be created (9a)?
• Does the solution need to be written into an 
existing provision (Article 9)?
• Do several provisions need to be changed at the 
same time (Article 9 and Article 3)?
38 Option one has been chosen for the sake of simplicity 
and in order to avoid any adverse effects.
B -Drafting proposals
39 Insertion of a new recital 16a:
1. This Directive and the Directive on electronic commerce 
have been prepared in such a way as not to contradict 
one another, particularly insofar as the limitation of 
liability set out by Article 14 of the second Directive has 
been devised exclusively for hosting providers offering 
a mere technical service for storage of information. And 
yet their respective objectives, namely both the wish to 
provide a high level of protection for copyright and related 
rights, and that of ensuring immunity in order to allow 
hosting providers to develop their businesses, have been 
shown to be contradictory at the expense of rightholders 
when the aforementioned limitation of liability has begun 
to be applied to information society service providers 
whose intervention, beyond or besides the mere storage 
of information, consists of giving access to the public to 
copyright works and/or subject- matter. Such evolution 
in the application of the Directive on electronic commerce 
inhibits a high level of protection for copyright and related 
rights, and prevents rightholders from exercising the 
rights granted to them by this Directive.
2. It is therefore necessary to stipulate that these 
information society service providers whose intervention 
consists of giving access to the public to copyright works 
and/or subject-matter do not benefit from the limitation 
of liability set out for a different purpose by Article 14 of 
the Directive on electronic commerce.
In this respect, it is of no consequence whether the 
infrastructure or features used by these service providers 
to give such access to the public to copyright works and/or 
subject-matter are automated, as this does not provide an 
exemption from the implementation of the rights protected 
hereunder.
The provision of an access to the public to copyright works 
and/or subject-matter, which should not be confused with 
the mere provision of physical facilities as set out by recital 
27 of this Directive, constitutes an act of communication to 
the public and/or making available to the public as defined 
by Article 3. This act is performed by the service provider 
giving such access, under its own liability. If the copyright 
work or subject-matter is sent to said service provider by 
a user of its services in order that an access to it is given 
to the public, the service provider and the aforementioned 
user together perform the act of communication to the 
public and/or making available to the public, and therefore 
hold their joint and several liability.
As they, alone or with the participation of users of their 
services, are implementing the rights set out by Article 
3 and, where relevant, the right set out by Article 2, the 
information society service providers who give access to 
the public to copyright works and/or subject-matter must 
obtain permission from the relevant rightholders.
Such permission covers acts performed by users of their 
services in order that an access to copyright works and/
or subject-matter is given to the public, as long as these 
users are not acting in a professional capacity.
40 Insertion of a recital 24a:
In accordance with the provisions of Article 11bis of the 
Berne Convention, these rights must apply whenever 
the copyright work or subject-matter is subject to an 
act of communication to the public and/or making 
available to the public by a third party to the initial act 
of communication to the public and/or making available 
to the public, whether this third party uses the same 
technical method or a different technical method to that 
used for the initial act.
41 Insertion of a new Article 9a:
Article 9a:
Linking of Directives 2000/31 and 2001/29
Without prejudice to Articles 12 and 13 of the Directive on 
electronic commerce, information society service providers 
that give access to the public to copyright works and/or 
subject-matter, including through the use of automated 
tools, do not benefit from the limitation of liability set out 
by Article 14 of said Directive.
These service providers must obtain permission from the 
relevant rightholders as they, either alone or with the 
participation of users of their services, are implementing 
the rights set out by Articles 2 and 3.
Such permission covers acts performed by users of their 
services when they send the copyright works and/or 
subject-matter to the aforementioned service providers 
in order to allow the access set out by sub-paragraph 
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one, as long as these users are not acting in a professional 
capacity.
C – Notes
42 1. The new provision states clearly that the activities 
performed by certain service providers do not match 
the definition provided by Article 14 of the Directive 
on electronic commerce (sub-paragraph one).
43 These service providers, whether alone or with the 
participation of users of their services, perform acts 
which apply copyright (sub-paragraph two), which 
does not necessarily need to be demonstrated within 
the body of the legislation. A technical and legal 
analysis of the performed acts provides sufficient 
proof, for example after a post has been made on a 
Web 2.0 content contribution site.
44 Such an analysis shows, however, that a single act 
of making available to the public can be attributed 
to two people or entities (the uploading web user 
and the website manager), while sub- paragraph 
three allows for the legitimacy of the two acts being 
technically performed simultaneously, as long as the 
uploading web user is not acting in a professional 
capacity.
45 2. The mission proposes that the service user’s 
action of posting the protected content and that 
of the technical posting online by the information 
society service provider should be deemed to be 
a single act in the sense of copyright. Indeed, 
although a piecemeal understanding is possible in 
intellectual terms, it would not be logical here as 
autonomous actions alone have no interest as such7. 
The service provider is dependent on the user who 
provides it with the content, and the web user must 
use the service of the provider which, through its 
intervention, grants access to the work. There is only 
one final result.
46 This access criterion is essential in order to 
constitute the act of making available. Indeed, the 
service providers in question enable the public to 
access protected content. Without their intervention, 
the public would not have access to this content. 
Their role is therefore ‘indisputable’8. The concept of 
access is moreover central to Article 3.1 of Directive 
2001/29: “(...) including the making available to the 
public of their works in such a way that members 
of the public may access them from a place and at a 
time individually chosen by them.” Thus, the service 
provider’s intervention to give access to the work 
7 Comp. CJEU, 13 October 2011, Airfield, caseC-431/09 and 
C-432/09.
8 See, on these issues, not. CJEU, 7 December 2006, SGAE, case 
C-306/05, para. 42; CJEU, 13 February 2014, Svensson, case 
C-466/12, para. 18.
prevents Article 14 of Directive 2000/31 from being 
applied, insofar as the activity in question cannot be 
summarised as mere storage.
47 Furthermore, the fact that the intervention has 
been made using automated tools has no bearing 
on the qualification of the act in question. Indeed, 
even a technical act does not prevent copyright and 
related rights from being applied (see for example 
the transient or incidental copy which required an 
exception).
48 The wording used in sub-paragraph one may seem 
broad, but this shouldn’t be a cause for concern as 
it in fact only pertains to those parties that claim to 
be covered by Article 14, even though they are not 
simply storing but also giving access to the protected 
content. ISPs and conduits continue to be covered by 
the exemptions set out by Articles 12 and 13 (mere 
conduit and caching), as specified by the chosen 
provisions.
49 Furthermore and in order to reinforce legal 
certainty, it is proposed that permission granted by 
rights holders to service providers will ensure the 
legitimacy of the act in question as a whole, as long 
as the service users are not acting in a professional 
capacity. The latter would therefore no longer be 
threatened with legal action.
50 3. The reference to the Berne Convention made in 
recital 24a, is crucial at a time at which the Court 
of Justice of the European Union is interpreting 
legislation (particularly the right of communication 
to the public) in a manner which seems to be far 
removed from a strict legal orthodox approach. This 
critical change in approach is demonstrated by many 
of the Court’s global case law specialists, particularly 
but not exclusively in the area of hyperlinks9. 
Two robustly-argued resolutions10 adopted by the 
International Literary and Artistic Association (ALAI) 
are of relevance here. It is of note that this ‘learned 
society’ –  which was at the source of the Berne 
Convention – has criticized the Court of Justice for 
deviating from the meaning that ought to be taken 
from the international legislation by adding a legal 
assumption of the requirement of a ‘new public’ as 
a basis for the enforceability of copyright.
51 This is an important point, given that some service 
providers may in the future decide to provide link 
databases rather than storing files of copyright 
works.
9 See CJEU, 13 February 2014, case C - 466/12, Nils Svensson et 
al. vs. Retriever Sverige AB and C - 348/13, 21 October 2014, 
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52 4. So what will be the consequences of the service 
providers described by the proposed legislation 
no longer being covered by Article 14 of Directive 
2000/31?
53 The first logical effect, as mentioned earlier, will 
be the enforceability of copyright and related 
rights on these service providers where they have 
made copyright works or material accessible. The 
issue raised is therefore that of a harmonised and 
balanced application of copyright and related 
rights in order to enable fair sharing of value 
without hindering the launch of new services 
that might be offered to the public.
54 There are therefore two potential areas for concern.
55 The first is linked to the issue of the implementation 
of the new rules over time, given that, as far as 
many are concerned, the solutions in question 
should have been applied as soon as Directive 
2000/31 was adopted. It may be wise to consider 
the circumstances of service providers which have 
rightly or wrongly relied on the solutions provided 
by case law, by setting out a time period for 
application of the procedure, with a view to enabling 
service providers to adapt to it and find solutions in 
consultation with rights holders.
56 The second area for concern is linked to the setting 
up of a system to prevent the ‘backlash’ of copyright 
and related rights which might be considered overly 
drastic, in a scenario in which certain rights holders 
refuse to grant user licences to service providers. 
The exercising of the right to prohibit may in this 
case be accompanied by a duty of collaboration 
between the aforementioned rights holders and 
service providers.
57 This duty of collaboration is likely to occupy various 
forms in the light of the state of the art technology 
and the virtuous uses likely to be developed in this 
domain. One might decide to set up the negotiation 
of charters, standard contracts or fingerprint 
recognition in order to screen works and prevent 
acts of infringement, potentially from the outset.
58 This approach forms part of a move to create an 
environment of participation and respect for the 
various interests represented. It is not a question of 
forcing consent, but rather of creating a virtuous 
circle and above all a positive spiral enabling the 
development	of	new	markets	to	benefit	all.
59 Moreover, this forms part of a greater movement 
which is already beginning to take hold, and 
which has led some service providers to enter into 
discussions with rights holders, as well as being part 
of the extension of initiatives that some advertising 
professionals have agreed to in order to clean up the 
sector and remove the economic dominance of those 
providers offering works unlawfully by attempting 
to position themselves out of reach of intellectual 
property rights.
60 In addition, it is clear that the generalisation of 
virtuous systems will benefit not only rights holders 
but also those service providers that are very keen 
to develop new lawful methods of distributing 
intellectual works. The latter are however 
apprehensive of being forced into a situation of 
‘unfair competition’ with those that do not, for 
the time being, share these concerns, and prefer to 
maximise their profits by using illegal set-ups rather 
than considering ways of improving the sharing of 
value and complying with intellectual property 
rights.
61 The adoption of a specific legislative text would 
provide the necessary boost in order to trigger and 
maintain a virtuous spiral. It would offer rights 
holders and service providers a ‘win-win’ situation 
and provide a basis for the development of new 
consumer services.
62 In the light of the sheer diversity of circumstances 
to be taken into account, the detail of each party’s 
duties and rights is of course a sensitive issue, and 
therefore the reference to the general notions of 
‘cooperation’ and ‘collaboration’ would appear to be 
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city of sufficient explication of key terms like ‘data/
information’ in these legislations may fuel such ten-
dency whereby laws originally intended for the infor-
mational world may end up applying to the biological 
world. The article also analyzes various predicaments 
that may arise from applying data privacy laws to 
biological materials. A focus is made on legislative 
sources at the EU level though national laws are re-
lied on when pertinent.
Abstract:  Though controversial the question 
of applying data protection laws to biological ma-
terials has only gotten a little attention in data pri-
vacy discourse. This article aims to contribute to 
this dearth by arguing that despite absence of pos-
itive intention from the architects to apply the EU 
Data privacy law to biological materials, a range of 
developments in Molecular Biology and nano-tech-
nology—usually mediated by advances in ICT—may 
provide persuasive grounds to do so. In addition, pau-
A. Introduction
1 There were numerous reasons for enacting the 
first data protection laws in the 1970s. Among 
the most important factors was a public fear 
and disempowerment engendered by greater 
dissemination, use, and re-use of personal data 
across organizational boundaries facilitated by new 
technology in the form of electronic data processing. 
The latter has also created a sense of loss of control 
over technology and automation of societal 
processes.1 In addition to rapidly increasing capacity 
to store data, computers permitted information to 
be searched and organized by multiple attributes, 
rather than through a single index (for example, 
first and last name only). This capacity changed the 
1 Lee Bygrave (2014), Data Privacy Law, an International 
Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford p. 8-15; See 
also, Article 29 Working Party, “Opinion 4/2007 on the 
Concept of Personal Data,” Adopted on 20th June, 2007, 
01248/07/ENWP 136, p.5. Recital 4 in the preamble to the 
DPD makes a similar assertion.
way information could be linked to an individual2 
which led to data protection laws focused on 
protecting “personal data” in the EU and “Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII)” in the United States 
of America.3 The definitions of these key concepts 
delimit the scope of application of data protection 
laws. Since those early days one of the major changes 
in the EU has been the recognition of data protection 
as a fundamental right in itself, independent from 
the right to respect for private life.4
2 Today, more than 40 years since the early data 
2 Paul Schwartz & Solove Daniel, “The PII Problem: Privacy 
and a new Concept of Personally Identifiable Information,” 
New York University Law Review, Vol. 86, (2011), p. 1820.
3 The U.S., however, lacks a comprehensive set of data 
protection rules as is available in Europe and relies instead 
on sector specific rules. (See, Bygrave (2014), p. 110-12).
4 See Article 16 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union and Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.
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protection laws5 and two decades after the EU Data 
Protection Directive was adopted, the technological 
landscape has dramatically changed. Computer power 
continues to grow6 with additional capacities and 
data processing capabilities. The growth in computer 
power has aided a significant transformation in 
many fields of study including molecular biology 
and nano-technology. Consequently, there is strong 
criticism on sustainability of the definition of 
personal data7 maintained in the EU data protection 
laws. According to this definition personal data is, 
in essence, information which is capable of identifying 
living human data subjects. Other elements8 of the 
definition have gotten a fairly detailed analysis 
except the phrase ‘any information.’ I seek to analyze 
and challenge the conceptual predispositions behind 
this criterion: the notion that data protection laws 
apply to ‘data and/or information.’
3 The propriety of data as exclusively ‘informational’ is 
being put to test as advancements in bio-technology 
and ICT continue to blur the distinction between 
the human biological materials9 on the one side 
and information derived from them on the other.10 
The fear is that such distinction may arbitrarily 
undermine the protections offered under the right 
to privacy in general. 
5 The first national Data Protection law was enacted by 
Sweden in 1973 (Sweden’s Data Act); repealed and replaced 
by Personal Data Act of 1998; the first data protection 
law ever enacted was the Data Protection Act passed by the 
German Land Hassen in 1970. (See, Bygrave, 2002, p. 179, 
187).
6 According to the notorious ‘Moore’s Law’ (an observation 
named after Gordon E. Moore of Intel) computer power 
(i.e. transistor count on an integrated circuit) continues to 
double every two years at least for another decade.
7 Article 2(a) of the DPD reads: ‘personal data’ shall mean any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who 
can be identified , directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more 
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity. The definition remains 
essentially the same in the new General Data Protection 
Regulation.
8 For an overview of the elements of the definition, see, 
Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion no. 4/2007 on ‘the 
concept of personal data.’
9 In this article the phrase ‘biological materials’ is used to 
describe a natural substance taken from a living human — 
such as blood or tissue — where information contained in 
the material can be traced back to the individual.
10 See Lee Bygrave, “Information Concepts in Law: Generic 
Dreams and Definitional Daylight,” Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, Vol. 35, No.1 (2015): 1-30; Lee Bygrave, “The Body 
as Data? Bio-bank Regulation via the “Back Door” of Data 
Protection Law,” Law, Innovation and Technology Vol. 2, issue1 
(2010): 1-25; Irma van der Ploeg, “Genetics, biometrics and 
the informatization of the body,” Ann 1st Super Sanità, Vol. 
43, No. 1, (2007): 44-50, and Mark Taylor, Genetic Data and 
the Law: A Critical Perspective on Privacy Protection, Cambridge 
University Press, 2012, Chapter 7.
B. Data/Information Defined 
4 The terms ‘data’ and ‘information,’ though key legal 
terms, are often taken for granted and insufficiently, 
if at all, defined in data protection discourse.11 Data 
is habitually used as synonymous with information. 
Scholars attribute this dearth in clarity, specifically 
in laws directly dealing with information concepts, 
to various factors and contestable assumptions 
ranging from a simple oversight, to an assumption 
of obviousness, and to pessimism that the terms are 
incapable of definition, at least a legally workable 
one.12
5 While it might have worked reasonably well in the 
past, the paucity in clearly defining13 the two terms 
appears to have reached an unsustainable stage. 
The most germane reason for the purpose of this 
study is the challenge scientific and technological 
developments14 introduce to the boundary between 
information and biological materials — and, in effect, 
traditional distinction between the message and 
the medium — which can also trigger application of 
laws that employ information concepts to biological 
material.15
6 Outside of the legal world, the day-to-day usages 
of the two terms seem to draw no clear line of 
distinction; neither is there a need to make a major 
differentiation between the two. In their normal 
parlance, Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘data’ as 
‘facts and statistics collected together for reference 
or analyses’16 and ‘information’ as ‘facts provided 
or learned about something or someone.’17 Even 
though a first glimpse at these definitions tells us that 
information is a result of analysis carried out on data, 
one can also see the usage of the word ‘facts’ in both 
definitions which suggests that no serious distinction 
is aimed to be made. Besides, the thesaurus18 section 
11 The A29WP as well, in its opinion 4/2007 where it defined 
the concept of ‘personal data’, took the term ‘data’ for 
grated and had never even asked the question.
12 Bygrave (2015), p. 107-111.
13 By clear definition it is not meant here to necessarily create 
a distinction between the two terms; clarifying them to be 
synonyms works well.
14 As will be discussed further below, these technological 
developments include: the advancement in ICT and 
Biotechnology which enabled an ever greater generation 
of information from biological materials, and making 
them core constitutive elements of information systems. 
(Bygrave, 2015, p. 93) In addition, developments in nano-
technology and neurology are also blurring the boundaries 
between technology and human body.
15 Bygrave (2015), p. 94.
16 Available at: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/english/data>, last accessed 23 May 2016.
17 Available at: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/english/information>, last accessed 23 May 2016.
18 The thesaurus also lists other related words like facts, 




of the same dictionary puts ‘information’ and ‘data’ 
as synonyms.19
7 In the fields of Informatics and Computer Science, 
however, a more systematic distinction is drawn 
between data and information. In these fields, the 
notion of ‘data’ usually denotes signs, patterns, 
characters or symbols which potentially represent 
something (a process or object) from the ‘real world’ 
and, through this representation, may communicate 
‘information’ about that thing.20
8 Expectedly, compared to the nebulous day-to-
day and, even, legal usage the distinction made in 
Informatics appears to be more logical and coherent. 
The question, however, is would these conceptual 
walls built in the fields of Informatics and Computer 
Science be sustainable in the face of the current 
development in ITC and bio-technology? And, even 
if they continue to work, should the same distinction 
be made in legislating new or interpreting the 
existing laws dealing with information concepts? 
By focusing on data protection law among the latter 
types of laws, the following sections will strive to 
address these questions.
C. Are Biological Materials 
Personal Data in the EU Data 
Protection Regime? (lex lata)
I. The Existing Legal Regime
1. The Data Protection Directive 
9 A brief glimpse at the EU Data Protection Directive 
(DPD) not only fails to answer whether biological 
materials are considered to be personal data but 
makes the answer even fuzzier by its interchanging 
usage of the words ‘data’ and ‘information.’21 
However, a closer look at the provisions of the DPD 
information.
19 Available at: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/english-thesaurus/information>, last accessed 
23 May 2016.
20 Paolo Atzeni et al, Database Systems: Concepts, Languages and 
Architectures (McGraw-Hill, 1999) p. 2; Chrisanthi Avgerou 
and Tony Cornford, Developing Information Systems: Concepts, 
Issues and Practice (Macmillan, 2nd eds 1998) p. 115.
21 For instance, recital 26 in the preamble to the DPD uses 
both ‘information’ and ‘data’ in the same context when it 
tries to delimit the application of data protection principles. 
This is problematic because, even when human biological 
materials may be considered as ‘data’, along the lines of the 
conceptual distinction between information on one side 
and data on the other, the directive does not make sense of 
such distinction.
indicates absence of intention by its architects to 
consider biological materials to be personal data. 
Though absence of intention to cover biological 
materials appears clear, for reasons discussed below, 
one cannot, at the same time, plausibly argue that 
that was an intentional exclusion either.
10 First, nonexistence of a clear intention to consider 
biological materials as personal data is rooted on how 
the law and policy in this area generally operates. 
Professor Bygrave observes:
“[T]he law and policy on data protection have generally 
tended to operate on the assumption that a distinction exists 
between data/information on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the person(s) to which the data/information can be linked.”22
11 We see this in the definitions of ‘personal data’ and/
or ‘personal information’ given in data protection 
laws.23 Therefore, paucity of a good indication to treat 
biological materials as personal data begins from 
the very definition under Article 2(a) of the DPD. 
The definition portrays ‘humans’ as data subjects to 
which information relates; not humans, or a sample 
taken from them, as information by themselves. It is 
worth noting, though, that when it tries to further 
define ‘an identifiable person’ the directive employs 
terminologies that relate to the human body. It 
provides that, in addition to information like a 
person’s identity number, a person can be identified 
by his physical, physiological or mental identity. Yet, 
a reference to, say, physical identity of a person to 
identify him, quickly winds up being an information 
about his physique, like his appearance, and not 
the physical self as such. The same is implied by 
the preparatory materials towards adoption to the 
directive.24 The then EC Commission’s commentary25 
to this part of Article 2(a) of the directive, after 
indicating the typical numerical information26 as 
identifying factors, mentions that the definition 
would also cover data such as appearance, voice, 
fingerprints and genetic characteristics.27
12 Secondly, other key provisions of the DPD are also 
indicative of the absence of a positive intention28 
by the legislature to treat biological materials as 
22 Bygrave (2010), p. 13.
23 Ibid.
24 Commentary of the Commission, October 1992: COM (92) 
422 final—SYN 287, p. 9.
25 Ibid.
26 A person can be identified....indirectly by a telephone 
number, a car registration number, a social security number, 
a passport number or by a combination of significant 
criteria.
27 Commentary of the Commission, October 1992: COM (92) 
422 final—SYN 287, p. 9.
28 By positive intention I mean a deliberate and calculated 
move from the architects to consider biological materials as 
personal data.
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personal data. Some vital words and phrases used 
throughout the directive cannot semantically 
accommodate human biological materials. Words 
like ‘recording’ and ‘alteration’ as set of operations 
to be performed on personal data under Article 
2(b) of the DPD epitomize such inhospitable 
accommodation. Other instances are under Article 
6 whereby personal data is required to be ‘accurate’ 
and ‘up to date’ which presupposes that data could be 
‘inaccurate’ and/or ‘out of date’, which a biological 
material cannot be. Similarly, the right to ‘rectify’ 
under Articles 10 and 11 presuppose some form of 
error in recording.
13 Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, the crafting 
of the scope of application of rules of the DPD, 
under Article 3, cannot comfortably accommodate 
application of rules of the directive to human 
biological materials. The directive applies to the 
processing of personal data in two scenarios: 
wholly or partly by automatic means, and to manual 
processing of personal data which form/intended to 
form part of a filing system. At least partly-automatic 
processing of data, which the directive requires 
under the first scenario, has in mind the use of a 
device, computers mostly, to process information 
electronically, i.e. when data is computerized. This 
is exactly what is referred to by the Commission’s 
commentary on this provision.29 As far as biological 
materials are concerned, one may not, right away, 
use computers to process blood samples or a swab 
of specimen of a person. An exposure to a different 
interpretative framework may be required. The same 
holds true for the second scenario, i.e., filing system: 
a file literally presupposes recorded information.
2. The General Data Protection Regulation 
14 Having been invited by the European Council to 
evaluate the functioning of EU instruments on 
data protection, as part of the Council’s Stockholm 
Program Notices30, the EU Commission came up 
with a proposal for the GDPR in December, 2012.31 
On 12 March, 2014, European Parliament made 
its formal First Reading vote confirming the text 
of the draft Regulation.32 EU Justice and Home 
Affairs ministers reached a general approach on 
the Regulation at their Council meeting on 15 June, 
29 Commentary of the Commission, October 1992: COM (92) 
422 final—SYN 287, p. 12.
30 The Stockholm Programme — An open and secure Europe 
serving and protecting citizens, OJ C 115, 4.5.2010, p.1.
31 COM(2012) 11 final.
32 Bird & Bird, EU Framework Revision: Overview, at: <http://
www.twobirds.com/en/practice-areas/privacy-and-data-
protection/eu-framework-revision>, last accessed 23 May 
2016.
2015.33 After months of “trilogue” negotiations, the 
EU Commission, Parliament and Council of Ministers 
reached agreement on the GDPR on 15th December, 
2015.34 Following political agreement reached in 
the “trilogue” the official texts of the Regulation 
was published in the EU Official Journal on 4 May, 
2016. While the regulation will enter into force on 24 
May, 2016, it shall be applicable from 25 May, 2018 
onward.35
15 To examine the position taken by the GDPR on the 
issue of human biological material, I will analyze, 
mainly, the official text (of 4 May, 2016). However, in 
order to trace the developments on this issue, I will 
also make references to the Commission Proposal (of 
January 2012), Parliament’s first reading (of March, 
2014), the Council’s general approach (of June, 2015) 
and the compromise text that resulted from the final 
trilogue. 
16 The Commission’s proposal explicitly mentions 
the term ‘biological samples’36 in recital 26 of the 
preamble to the proposed regulation. The mention 
is made as part of enumerating the constituents of 
personal data relating to health. It reads: 
“Personal data relating to health should include... information 
derived from the testing or examination of a body part or 
bodily substance, including biological samples...”37
17 Whilst a bold step in separately and explicitly 
bringing up ‘biological samples’ which creates a 
tempting syntax to consider ‘biological samples’ as 
personal data relating to health, a closer examination 
of the recital as a whole shows that it is dealing with 
information derived from testing or examination of 
biological samples, not biological samples in and of 
themselves. In other words, the recital conveys the 
following meaning: personal data relating to health 
should not be limited to the information derived 
from testing/ examination of body part or bodily 
substance (which require the physical presence of 
the examinee) but should also include the result 
of examination of samples when it is taken from 
examinees, the presence of whom is no longer 
required for examination.
18 While the same ambiguous syntax is employed in 
other language versions such as Danish, Swedish and 
French, Professor Bygrave observes that the German 
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 European Commission, Personal Data Protection, available 
at: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/>, last 
accessed 23 May 2016.
36 The word is mentioned for the first time in EU instruments 
on data protection.





version rules out such ambiguity.38 In that case, it 
comes down to a question of interpretation: which 
language version takes precedence? Recourse to the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the EU tells 
us that the different language versions are all equally 
authentic and that the interpretation of a provision 
of Community law involves a comparison of the 
different language versions.39 The court further 
notes that every provision of Community law must 
be placed in its context and interpreted in the light 
of the provisions of Community law as a whole, 
regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its 
state of evolution at the date on which the provision 
in question is to be applied.40 Therefore, the task of 
ascertaining the true meaning of deferring language 
versions is not simply mechanical, i.e. it does not 
depend on the comparison of the number of versions 
that avoid the problematic syntax against those 
which contain such syntax. It should be rooted in the 
context in which the words are placed, its evolution 
and the objective of the law as a whole. Seen from 
this angle, it is difficult to claim that the proposed 
Regulation, indeed, considers biological materials as 
personal data related to health.
19 The European Parliament’s first reading did not 
introduce changes to the Commission’s proposal 
in this regard. A small alteration with additional 
mentions41 of ‘biological samples’ came with, first, 
consolidated text of the Council and the Commission 
and, latter, with the compromise text. In these 
versions, recital 26 to the preamble of the regulation 
reads:
“Personal data concerning health should include... 
information derived from the testing or examination of a 
body part or bodily substance, including genetic data and 
biological samples....”42
20 As can be discerned, in this version of the regulation 
the phrase ‘genetic data’ is added to the original 
script. The overall reading of this part of recital 26 
would not offer the exact same meaning that the 
corresponding sentence in the Commission’s version 
did. In that version, the phrase ‘biological samples’ 
can be meaningfully read back to the phrase: 
‘Information derived from testing or examination 
38 “Informationen, die von der Prüfung oder Untersuchung 
eines Körperteils oder einer körpereigenen Substanz, 
darunter biologischer Proben, abgeleitet wurden” (See, 
Bygrave (2015), p. 6).
39 Case-283/81, CILFIT v Ministry of Health [1982], Para. 18.
40 Ibid, Para. 20.
41 The compromise text mentions the phrase ‘biological 
samples’ at three different instances in the regulation. The 
first being in recital 26, the other two are made in relation 
to elaborating and defining ‘genetic data’ under recital 25(a) 
and Article 4(10) respectively.
42 See recital 26 in the preamble to the GDPR (the compromise 
text).
of...’ That makes sense because like body parts or 
body substances, biological samples can also be 
subjects of said testing/examination, and, thus, be 
carriers of personal information to be derived from 
them. In addition, referring the phrase ‘biological 
samples’ to the ‘information derived from testing 
or examination of…’ would be repeating oneself as 
‘examination of a body part or bodily substance’ is 
already mentioned and biological samples can be 
considered to be body parts/ bodily substance.
21 However, the same interpretation wouldn’t be 
logical with the addition of ‘genetic data’ in the 
later versions of the regulation. That is mainly 
because genetic data is already a result of analysis 
of biological materials.43 Genetic data is generally 
understood to be information by itself, and while 
possible, it is usually not a subject of testing or 
examination to derive information, as we frequently 
do from body parts/ bodily substances. Therefore, 
it creates a temptation to read ‘genetic data’ and 
‘biological samples’ back to the phrase with which 
the recital begins: ‘personal data concerning health 
should include...’ Otherwise, referring it back to 
the inner phrase which reads: ‘Information derived 
from testing/examination of...’ would end up being, 
‘information derived from testing/examination 
of information about heritable characteristics of 
individuals. That, in turn, ends up being ‘Information 
derived from testing/examination of information.’
22 While not particularly strong, this can be taken as 
a reasonable interpretation of the wordings of the 
compromise text. But, it still remains ambiguous 
at this point. This interpretation also advances 
the attainment of the general objectives44 of the 
regulation set out by the Commission, particularly 
the first objective: helping citizens to be in control of 
their data.45 After all, the very conception of privacy 
is ingrained in the protection of personal integrity, 
which, at some level, requires extending protection 
to our biological materials.
23 However, towards the end of writing this study, the 
official text of the Regulation was published in the 
EU Official Journal on 4 May, 2016.46 Recital 35 in 
43 Recital 25(a) and Article 4(10) of the compromise text of the 
regulation clearly testify to the fact that genetic data results 
from the analysis of biological samples.
44 The Commission sets out three general objectives for the 
regulation, See The Proposal for GDPR, P. 102.
45 Some commentators, though, have argued these objectives 
are based on fallacious assumptions, thus, unattainable. 
See, Koops, B.J. (2014) “the trouble with European data 
protection law,” International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 4, No. 4.
46 REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation).
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the preamble to the official text of the regulation 
clarifies some of the issues raised with in recital 26 
of the previous versions. The relevant part of the 
recital reads:
“Personal data concerning health should include … 
information derived from the testing or examination of a 
body part or bodily substance, including from genetic data 
and biological samples…”47 (emphasis added)
24 The addition of the preposition ‘from’ now makes 
it difficult to read ‘biological samples’ back to the 
beginning of the recital. It should be read with 
the phrase ‘information derived from testing 
or examination of...’ This implies the absence of 
positive intention by the architects of the regulation 
to consider biological samples to be personal data. 
The previous version can, therefore, be considered 
a result of poor draftsman-ship.
25 Having said this much about the DPD and the GDPR, 
I will now briefly turn to the status of biological 
materials under European case laws, and national 
legislations. The focus of the study being on the 
legal regime at the European level, the coverage of 
national legislation will be brief. As far as national 
laws are concerned, they appear to be divided along 
geographic lines. Many western European countries 
tend to adopt the view that biological materials are 
not personal data while some eastern European 
countries have taken the opposite stance. Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia and Romania are among eastern 
European countries that recognize body samples 
as data in contrast with other western European 
countries like Spain, Portugal and Germany.48 
Outside Europe, the Australian state of South New 
Wales’s privacy and information legislations clearly 
include bodily samples in their definition of personal 
information.49
26 As was the case for data protection in general, case 
law on the issue of ‘biological materials as data’ has 
not been abundant. While there is a considerable 
number of case law relating to data protection today, 
many of them have hardly shed any light on the issue 
of bio-materials as data. That could be attributed, at 
least in part, to the level of awareness of the European 
population regarding the systemic accumulation and 
use of biological materials in general. For instance, 
it is not only unclear what bio-banks are used for or 
how their use may affect the status of fundamental 
rights but it also is not widely-known that they even 
exist.  One study of the European Commission found 
47 Recital 35 in the preamble to the GDPR (EU Council’s 
Position with the view of adoption, 6 April, 2016).
48 See, Bygrave (2010), p. 16-17 for references.
49 Section 4(2) of Privacy and Personal Information Protection 
Act 1998, section 5(2) of the Health Records and Information 
Privacy Act 2002 and the Government Information (Open 
Access) Act 2009, Schedule 4, clause 4(2).
that more than two-thirds (67%) of Europeans have 
never even heard of the term itself.50 Only 2% of the 
population has actively inquired into and searched 
for bio-banks.51 As awareness rises on what bio-banks 
are, how they are used, and their adverse effects 
on privacy, it can be expected to lead to privacy 
litigations which would involve biological materials.
27 Among the few instances in which courts dealt 
with this issue are the cases of S and Marper v United 
Kingdom52 handed down by the European Court of 
Human Rights and the decision of Norwegian Data 
Inspectorate.
28 In Marper the European Court of Human Rights 
essentially ruled that the retention of fingerprints, 
cellular samples and DNA profiles of individuals 
arrested but who are later acquitted or have 
charges against them dropped is a disproportionate 
interference to their right to privacy under Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. That 
being the chief finding of the court in this judgment, 
the court has also directly, though scarcely, 
addressed the issue of human tissue samples. It 
found that cellular samples constitute personal data 
within the meaning of Data Protection Convention:
“The Court notes at the outset that all three categories of 
the personal information retained by the authorities in the 
present cases, namely fingerprints, DNA profiles and cellular 
samples, constitute personal data within the meaning of the 
Data Protection Convention as they relate to identified or 
identifiable individuals. The government [UK] accepted that 
all three categories are “personal data” within the meaning 
of the Data Protection Act 1998 in the hands of those who are 
able to identify the individual.”53
29 While a remarkable judicial activism, the effect of 
this view in the judgment is limited in a number of 
ways. It figured only marginally in the judgment 
because the court did not need to delve in to the 
issue of biological material as application of Article 
8 ECHR, on which the judgment is based, does not 
turn upon whether ‘data’ or ‘information’ are/is 
processed but on whether or not there is interference 
with the right  privacy. Also, the court does not have 
a legal mandate of interpreting the Data Protection 
Convention.54
30 It is also worth mentioning here that in prior 
litigation of the case in the UK by the House of Lords, 
50 EU Commission(2012), Bio-banks for Europe: A challenge for 
governance, P. 24.
51 Ibid, p. 25.
52 S and Marper v United Kingdom, European Court of Human 
Rights, (App no 30562/04 and 30566/04), 4 December 2008.
53 S and Marper Vs UK, para. 68.





the issue of bio-samples as data is directly touched 
upon by Baroness Hale. She argued that the same 
privacy principles should apply to all the three 
(fingerprints, DNA profiles and cellular samples), 
essentially, because they are all kept for and as 
‘information.’ Those are her words:
“But the only reason that they [samples] are taken or kept 
is for the information which they contain. They are not kept 
for their intrinsic value as mouth swabs, hairs or whatever. 
They are kept because they contain the individual’s unique 
genetic code within them. They are kept as information about 
that person and nothing else. Fingerprints and profiles are 
undoubtedly information. The same privacy principles should 
apply to all three.” 55
31 As will be discussed in the next section, Hale’s point 
forms one of the basic arguments put forth in favor 
of considering bio-samples to be data/information.
D. Should Biological Materials 
be treated as Personal 
Data (lexferenda)?
32 There is no consensus on the issue of whether 
human biological materials should be treated as 
personal data. Some scholars, commentators and 
agencies enforcing data protection laws have taken 
the view that personal data should not be seen to 
include biological materials for the purposes of data 
protection laws. The Article 29 Working Party56 and 
the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)57 
are cases in point. In its opinion where it clarifies the 
concept of personal data under the DPD, the Working 
party makes a clear distinction between biometric 
data — which it rightly considers as personal data 
— and human tissue samples from which biometric 
data is extracted, which it is opined not to constitute 
personal data. In the Working Party’s words:
“Human tissue samples (like a blood sample) are themselves 
sources out of which biometric data are extracted, but they 
are not biometric data themselves (as for instance a pattern 
for fingerprints is biometric data, but the finger itself is not). 
Therefore the extraction of information from the samples is 
collection of personal data, to which the rules of the Directive 
apply.”58
55 S, Regina (on application of) v South Yorkshire Police, [2004], 
Para.70.
56 The Article 29 Working party (A29WP) is an independent 
advisory body established by the Article 29 of the EU Data 
Protection Directive.
57 The ICO is the UK’s independent body set up to uphold 
information rights in general, including those under the UK 
Data Protection Act.
58 A29WP, Opinion 4/2007, p. 9.
33 In a similar way, the official view from the UK’s 
Information Commissioner is reported to be 
analogous: a sample is not treated as personal data, 
‘because it is physical material’.59
34 On the other hand, even though much of the data 
protection law and policy have been operating on 
such distinction, scholars60 have questioned the logic 
underlying the distinction between human biological 
materials on the one hand and personal data on 
the other. Those pushing the view that biological 
material may be personal data or information tend to 
pay more regard to pragmatic considerations, such 
as the need to fill lacunae in  bio-bank regulation, 
the growing ease with which persons can be 
identified from biological material, and the fact that 
such material is often only stored for generating 
information.61 Others who take the view that 
biological material does not constitute personal data 
depend on conceptual logic claiming that “data is a 
formalized representation of objects or processes, 
while information comprises a cognitive element 
involving comprehension of the representation.”62 
In the following sections I will analyze whether such 
conceptual distinction still makes sense, at least as 
far as (human) biological materials are concerned, 
in relation to recent developments in the field of 
bio-technology.
I. The Conceptual Framework: 
Does it still make Sense? 
1. DNA: the Game Changer
35 The discovery of the structure and basic nature of 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) as carrier of human 
genetic information around mid-20th century63 
brought about significant development of how we 
understand the code of life. It has been argued that 
the discovery of DNA, as well as our understanding of 
its structure and functioning, may well be the most 
important discovery of the last century.64 The effect 
59 Beyleveld, Deryck et al., “The UK’s Implementation 
of Directive 95/46/EC” in, Deryck Beyleveld et al (eds.)
Implementation of the Data Protection Directive in Relation to 
Medical Research in Europe. Ashgate, 2004 P. 428.
60 Bygrave (2010); Bygrave (2014); Taylor (2012), Chapter 7; 
Ploeg (2007).
61 Bygrave (2015) p. 7, Bygrave (2010) p. 8-9.
62 Ibid, p. 6-7.
63 The chemical DNA was first discovered in 1869, but its role 
in genetic inheritance was not demonstrated until 1943. 
In 1953 James Watson and Francis Crick determined that 
the structure of DNA is a double-helix polymer, a spiral 
consisting of two DNA strands wound around each other. 
(Encyclopedia Britannica: Science and Technology).
64 Murnaghan (2016), available at Explore DNA, <http://www.
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of the discovery of DNA on scientific and medical 
progress has been enormous, whether it involves 
the identification of our genes that trigger major 
diseases or the creation and manufacturing of drugs 
to treat these devastating diseases.65
36 Among the noteworthy effects of this discovery 
(reinforced later by the genome project66) is the 
characterization of DNA as a recipe of life; a carrier 
of information based on which our cells make the 
necessary protein. That means the very essence of 
all living cells which make up a human person are 
the products of those information. But before that 
analysis, it will be important to say few words on the 
nature and meaning of DNA to put the discussion 
in context.
37 Our bodies are made from billions of individual cells, 
and DNA is the control center of each and every 
cell.67 DNA is the hereditary material in humans and 
almost all other organisms. Nearly every cell in a 
person’s body has the same DNA.68 Therefore, almost 
every cell in our body houses a complete set of our 
hereditary materials, i.e., the genome.
38 On a deeper level, DNA consists of a strand of  four 
nucleotides called adenine, guanine, cytosine, and 
thymine, commonly abbreviated to A, G, C, and T, 
respectively.69 A particular arrangement of these 
nucleotides forms a gene. Genes specify the kinds 
of proteins that are made by cells.70 That means, 
the sequence of the nucleotides are read to make a 
particular type of protein that our body needs. It is 
from that information that proteins are made.
39 Almost everything in the body, from hair to 
hormones, is either made of proteins or made by 
them.71 Therefore, as a protein forms the building 
blocks of our body, it literally means that we are 
made up of information read from our DNA, the 
exploredna.co.uk/the-importance-dna.html>, last accessed 
23 May 2016.
65 Ibid.
66 The Human Genome Project (HGP), undertaken from 1990 - 
2003 with billions of dollars involving multiple continents, 
was an international scientific research project with the 
goal of determining the sequence of chemical base pairs 
which make up human DNA, and of identifying and mapping 
all of the genes of the human genome from both a physical 
and functional standpoint.
67 Calladine, Chris, Horace Drew, Ben Luisi and Andrew 
Travers, Understanding DNA: The Molecule and how it Works. 
London: Elsevier Academic Press, 2004, p.3.
68 Some cells, like the red blood cell, do not have nucleus, thus, 
a DNA (Ridley, Matt. Genome: The Autobiography of a Species in 
23 Chapters, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999, P.6).
69 Amos (2005), p. 6.
70 Jeremy Berg, John Tymoczko and Lubert Stryer, Biochemistry. 
New York: W H Freeman, 2002, Chapter 5.
71 Ridley, (1999) P.7.
arrangement of nucleotides. That is why Matt 
Ridley wrote “the idea of the genome as a book is 
not, strictly speaking, even a metaphor. It is literally 
true.”72
40 This striking scientific discovery about our body is at 
odds with the traditional conception of distinguishing 
data as (medium representing reality) opposed to 
information (comprehension of the representation), 
at least as far as the body is concerned. The human 
body itself is a construct of information; information 
which instructed the formation of proteins, which, 
in turn, make up our body.73 The conceptual rigor, 
thus, begins to crumble when we closely scrutinize 
the human DNA.
41 In addition to being a source of our genetic code, 
it is now understood that DNA also possesses a 
capacity to carry external information; a scientific 
breakthrough has discovered that it can carry 
external large size information for a long time.74 But, 
that development still remains nascent.
2. Other Developments in 
Biotechnology and Beyond
42 In addition to the scientific facts revealed about our 
DNA, the conceptual distinction between data and 
information is also challenged by multiple other 
developments that blur the clear boundary between 
biology and technology.
43 First, after the Human Genome Project, another 
initiative labelled ‘America’s next big thing’75 
in neuroscience research, called the ‘BRAIN’ 
(Brain Research through Advancing Innovative 
Neuroethologies) was announced by President 
Obama in his State of the Union address of January 
2013.76 The BRAIN initiative aims to decode the tens 
of thousands of connections between each of the 
~86 billion neurons77 that form the basis of human 
72 Ridley (1999) p.6.
73 It may be important to note here that my argument is only 
limited to biological materials. The conceptual distinction, 
otherwise, still makes full sense elsewhere.
74 See, Independent, Single DNA molecule could store information 
for a million years following scientific breakthrough, 17th August, 
2015.
75 Such project, though, is not of interest only in the United 
States of America; the European Commission has almost 
simultaneously announced the Human Brain Project with 
an award of 1.19 billion Euros. (See, Kaku (2014), p. 250).
76 See, Isabelle Abbey, News and Views: The Brain Activity 
Mapping Project – What’s the plan? April 24, 2013. Available 
at: <http://thebrainbank.scienceblog.com/2013/04/24/
news-and-views-the-brain-activity-mapping-project-
whats-the-plan/>, last accessed 23 May 2016.
77 Neurons are nerve cells that carry information between the 




brain.78 That means, as the Human Genome Project 
sequenced all our genes, the BRAIN initiative will 
map all of our neurons. That can be said to be the 
general goal of the initiative.
44 The unstated goal of this initiative, the part directly 
germane to this study, is eloquently described by 
Dr. Michio Kaku, Professor of Theoretical Physics 
at City University of New York in his 2014 book 
titled ’The Future of the Mind.’79 The ambitiously 
expected main output of this project is what 
scientists call a connectome: a comprehensive map 
of neural connections in the brain which encodes all 
our memories, dreams, hopes and desires, perhaps, 
on a CD. This raises very important questions: by 
putting together a CD of a person’s connectome 
with their genome, are scientists creating, in some 
sense, immortality?80 Because even after people are 
dead, their body could be revived from their genome 
and their consciousness can be restored from their 
connectome. That means that we can continue 
to live, even after we are dead, as information. 
That possibility that we can still continue to live 
as information tempts us to conclude that we are 
nothing but information.
45 Secondly, the undergoing various forms of ‘human 
enhancement projects81’ are clouding the boundary 
between human body and technology. Our body 
may no longer be limited to what it is today;82 its 
shape, composition and, as a result, its capabilities 
are radically changing. It is now clear that “human 
enhancement” is a reality and not just a product 
of science fiction.83 Even more so as technological 
advances will imminently provide various devices 




79 Kaku, Michio. The Future of the Mind: The Scientific Quest 
to Understand, Enhance and Empower the Mind. New York: 
Doubleday, 2014, p. 252.
80 Ibid.
81 In the context of engineering, human enhancement can 
be defined as the application of technology to overcome 
physical or mental limitations of the body, resulting in 
the temporary or permanent augmentation of a person’s 
abilities and features (See, Human Enhancement, Dartmouth 
Journal of Undergraduate Science, In Fall 2013).
82 As a naturally (biologically) constituted being with natural 
organs, muscles, bones and bodily fluids.
83 The Guardian: Yes, nano science can enhance humans – but 
ethical guidelines must be agreed, Monday 3 June 2013.
84 Ibid; an article in Science magazine exemplified how 
machines can interact with living brains to allow wireless 
changes in behavior by the implantation of devices 
directly into the brains of mice. These devices could then 
be remotely controlled to activate different parts of the 
brain using light. (Science Magazine, Injectable, Cellular-Scale 
Optoelectronics with Applications for Wireless Optogenetics, 12 
Apr 2013 (www.science.sciencemag.org)).
46 Thirdly, the steadily growing accumulation of 
human biological samples in bio-banks85, and the 
increased deployment of biometric technologies in 
every sector are also ‘informationalizing’ the human 
body by converting features of it in to processable 
digital data.The upsurge in the proliferation, 
coverage, sophistication and uses of bio-banks 
is spurred in large part due to the advances in 
genetic science.86 The need for identification/
verification of persons in both public (like in 
forensic investigations) and private (such as private 
security) is largely the reason for the expansion in 
deployment of biometric technologies. Regardless 
of the reasons for their upsurge they have a clear 
common effect: conversion of particular aspects of 
physical existence into electronic data and digitally 
processable information.
47 All of these developments — from the sequencing of 
our genome, to the future mapping of our neurons, 
to the various human enhancement initiatives, and 
to our continued existence in the form of biometric 
information—undoubtedly challenge the conceptual 
separation between the human body, on the one 
hand, and information about it, on the other.
48 Dr. Irma Ploeg convincingly suggests that this 
should be seen as something more profound than 
constituting yet one more instance of the collection 
of “personal information”, as is more commonly 
done. Rather, the human body is implicated in a 
process of co-evolution with technology, information 
technologies in particular.87 A new conceptualization 
of bodily existence; an emergence of new body 
ontology: body as information.88
II. Pragmatic and Other 
Considerations
49 In the previous section it is argued that the 
conceptual distinction between biological material 
and information can no longer be logically 
defended for all the reasons discussed therein. In 
this section, I will turn to the more pragmatic, and 
more importantly persuasive, reasons for extending 
the definition of ‘personal data’ to have a room for 
biological materials.
85 Bio banks may exist in any forms; be it, tissue, blood, cell 
material, skin, gamete, or embryo banks.
86 Bygrave (2010), p.3.
87 Irma (2007), p. 47.
88 Over the past century developments in the medical 
Sciences have resulted in various body ontologies like ‘the 
endocrinological body’ (in the early twentieth century) 
whereby the body is viewed as just biochemical entity. 
(Irma 2002).




50 If one is concerned about practically preventing 
adverse effects on the right to privacy, what 
matters most is the interpretive potential of data/
source i.e. the ability to generate information that 
can be linked, not just the assumed availability of 
identifiable information. If any concerning, from a 
privacy-related viewpoint, identifiable information 
can easily and readily be generated from a given 
source — which more often is the case for biological 
samples — then that raises as much privacy concerns 
as the information derived from them would.  We 
can consider two important, but related, reasons 
to substantiate this sameness in interpretation 
potential between the two.
51 First, if interpretation90 is the reason for the 
distinction, even recorded information will undergo 
an interpretation before it informs. Taylor observes 
that: it remains the case that data (as recorded 
information) must always be interpreted before its 
meaning can be understood: records must be read. If 
the privacy protection established by the Directive 
extends to include the physical record of information, 
then the viability of any division between (biological) 
sample and information built upon the former’s need 
for subsequent interpretation crumbles.91
52 Secondly, even if recorded information might be said 
to have an imminent and easy potential to inform 
than a biological material before it is interpreted, 
this would not lead to the conclusion that the relative 
ease in accessibility of recorded information puts 
right to privacy any more vulnerable than biological 
materials. It all depends on the availability of the 
necessary interpretive framework to derive readily 
accessible information from the samples. A western 
person, born and raised in the west, may not be able 
to be informed by having access to ‘information’ 
written in an eastern script — say Mandarin. But 
that does not, in any way, mean that the ‘Mandarin 
text’ is not recorded information. It just means that, 
for that text to inform, the necessary framework 
should be in place: the skills to read and understand 
Mandarin.
53 Thus, recorded information and biological samples 
have an indistinguishable potential of putting right 
to privacy in jeopardy. In some situations, however, 
a concern from biological samples could be much 
worse. Interpreted information may be manipulated, 
89 By ‘interpretive potential’ I am referring to the ability to 
generate (potentially) identifiable information.
90 By ‘interpretation’ I mean mechanisms and processes that 
may be employed to derive information from biological 
materials.
91 Taylor (2012), p. 162.
if necessary, to meet certain privacy standards 
while biological materials will always be available 
to give away any information in the open. While 
the manipulation of data may seek to make certain 
information more accessible, it might also seek to 
obscure it (e.g. through coding), and the source data 
may remain interpretable in any event.92 In this 
regard, Taylor argues that even information, not 
just samples, can be subjected to new interpretation, 
thus, sharp distinction should not be drawn between 
recorded information and bio-samples.93
54 While Taylor’s argument is valid, it should be noted, 
however, that bio samples are more susceptible 
to a new form of interpretation, as they are often 
kept for interpretation and only for interpretation. 
That makes, in some situations, biological materials 
even more worrisome in terms of privacy than 
information derived from analysis of such materials.
55 Similarly, the interchangeable usage of the words 
‘information’ and ‘data’ both in the law and policy 
circles — including in the DPD — and in our day-to-
day usage is yet another tribute to similar effects 
that they produce implying absence of a real reason 
to distinguish the two. Two reasons are worth 
mentioning for such interchangeability. The first 
one explains why we, hitherto, use the two words 
interchangeably, and the second pertains to why 
we will, perhaps, continue to do so even more in 
the future.
56 First, information derived from interpretation of 
data can then be recast and used as data for another 
interpretation in a way that we are tempted to use 
the two words interchangeability.94 From a given 
national census, for instance, sex and age ‘data’ can 
be used to derive ‘information’ about the percentage 
of the youth in a relevant population which can, in 
turn, be used as ‘data’ for youth centered policy 
making. In the same token, information derived 
from biological materials can be used for another 
analysis as data.
57 Secondly, pervasive, repeated and systematic 
extraction of information from human biological 
materials would eventually end up making the bio-
samples themselves ‘information’ mainly because 
the extraction is of such extensive nature and the 
sole reason they are stored is for information. This 
trend can be paralleled with the gradual change 
in meaning of the search engine ‘Google’. Because 
of large scale usage of this service, ‘searching’ on 
the web by authoring some key words came to be 
analogous as ‘Googling.’ This development came 
from the repeated and extensive use of ‘Google’ 
92 Ibid, p. 163.
93 Ibid, p. 164.




for indexation even if Google still remains just 
one search engine provider and the term does 
not have any semantics indicating ‘search.’ In a 
similar way, continuous and pervasive derivation 
of information from biological materials means that 
it is more and more tempting to use the two words 
interchangeably. Thus, a time may come when we 
could call ‘bio-sample’ as information and not just 
‘data.’ It all depends on how easily-accessible the 
interpretative frameworks are and how frequently 
we use them.
2. Enhancing Bio-bank Regulation
58 The other major benefit expected from the inclusion 
of biological materials in to the concept of personal 
data is the anticipation of filling the regulatory 
vacuum in bio-banks. What makes this regulatory 
vacuum all the more germane to data protection 
discourse is the fact that it is manifested in the 
incapacity to effectively preserve the fundamental 
rights of privacy and data protection of participants, 
even though such is one of the primary objectives 
of bio-bank regulations. In this regard, an EU 
Commission’s study on Bio-bank governance 
notes ‘one of the main challenges has been, and 
still is, to identify ways to protect the autonomy 
and dignity of patients and research participants 
and their fundamental rights (e.g. private life and 
data protection, especially in case of loss of control 
on personal data/data misuse, discrimination) 
with fostering the public interest in carrying out 
medical research to address the central public 
health challenges (such as cancer, cardiovascular 
and metabolic diseases.)’95 The same study reiterates 
absence of clear legal framework governing bio-
banks as one of the major problems for the imbalance 
against protection of fundamental rights.96 With 
relatively comprehensive rules and well-established 
enforcement mechanisms, data protection laws can 
serve as a better mechanism, even though the latter 
also have their own limitations.97
3. Just ‘About Us’ or but not 
‘Us’ (Moral Plea)
59 As it stands today, the existing data protection 
regime in the EU protects information that relates to 
us but does not, strictly speaking, protect us. Even 
95 EU Commission(2012), Bio-banks for Europe: A challenge for 
governance, P. 45.
96 Ibid, p.46-48.
97 See, Bygrave (2010), p. 21-22, for details and references 
on similar problems of some European national bio-banks 
regulations.
by layman standards, leaving out bio-materials may 
not be considered as the right thing to do. To make 
full sense of how morally questionable the current 
system is, one needs only to consider two facts 
against which this moral claim should be assessed. 
One is the fact that the starting point of discussions 
on the right to privacy has usually been a concern for 
bodily integrity. The division between informational 
privacy and bodily privacy are made fictitious by 
technological development, especially since the 
past decade. In this regard, the Australian Office of 
Federal Privacy Commissioner, back in 2002, rightly 
noted:
“... an attempt to maintain a clear demarcation between 
different types of privacy protection may be problematic in 
light of new technologies which involve the merging of biology, 
mathematics and computer science, namely, biometrics and 
bioinformatics. Such developments give rise to new forms of 
body templates or records which further blur the distinction 
between personal information and its source in individual 
humans, rendering the concepts of information privacy and 
bodily privacy inherently interrelated.”98
60 Secondly, in the face of such division, the regulatory 
landscape pertaining to bio-banks has largely been 
uncoordinated and ineffective, as noted above. 
Therefore, not only does this fact stand in contrast 
to the original conception of privacy, thus failing 
the very essence of its inception, but the human 
body is also failed by the disarray in the regulation 
of bio-banks.
61 Against these two backgrounds alone, is it morally 
indefensible to protect information about individuals 
but not individuals themselves, or a sample taken 
from them. The human body or a sample taken from 
it is one of the most sacred representations of one 
self. To argue that a fingerprint represents the finger 
while a sample doesn’t represent the person is not 
only morally questionable but also logically weak. 
Distinction should also be made between the human 
body/sample as source of data/medium and other 
sources of data as integrity and privacy is often an 
issue when human body is involved.
E. The Consequences of 
Treating Biological Materials 
as Personal Data
62 Despite crumbling conceptual rigor that 
distinguishes human biological materials from data/
information, and various pragmatic considerations 
that increasingly challenge such distinction, 
collapsing differences that were maintained in the 
98 ALRC and AHEC, (2003), Essentially Yours, p.280.
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regulatory discourse for such a long time is not 
without its own drawbacks.
I. Over Stretching the Scope 
of Data Protection Laws
63 The inclusion of a new subject matter in to the scope 
of application of data protection law, to the least, 
demands a closer look at the existing subjects of the 
law to see whether it properly fits with the law’s 
regulatory apparatus. Data protection law already 
suffers from regulatory overreaching in the sense 
that its rules tend to apply prima facie to a wide range 
of activities with relatively scant chance of being 
respected, let alone enforced.99 The Data Protection 
Directive is, for instance, said to have a long arm 
with application to multiple actors based outside 
the European Union.100
64 Article 4(1) (c) of the data protection Directive 
epitomizes one such long arm. This provision 
subjects any controller located anywhere in the 
world to European data privacy regime when it 
utilizes an equipment situated in any member state 
for the purpose of processing personal data.101 The 
General Data Protection Regulation, perhaps, does 
more than the directive in this regard.102
II. Centrality of Consent 
65 The other problem in the inclusion of biological 
materials in to the scope of data protection regime 
comes from the inadequacy of the current rules to 
meet the normative position of consent in the laws 
currently concerned with regulation of biological 
materials. The fundamental principle that underpins 
the governance framework of human biological 
materials in general is the need to obtain voluntary 
and informed consent of participants. The history 
of how biological materials were governed — such 
as by the European Convention on Human Rights 
99 Bygrave(2010), p. 22.
100 See Lokke Moerel, “The long arm of EU data protection 
law: Does the Data Protection Directive apply to processing 
of personal data of EU citizens by websites worldwide?” 
International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2011): 28-46.
101 Bygrave (2014), p. 202.
102 The Regulation applies to controllers not established in 
the Union when they process personal data of European 
residents in relation to the offering of goods and services to 
them and monitoring of their behaviour (Article 3(2)). The 
Parliament’s version of the regulation, which has also made 
to the compromise text, even goes on saying that the goods 
and services need not be offered for consideration (The 
Parliament’s reading and the Compromise text of the GDPR, 
Article 3(2)).
and Biomedicine, and Declaration of Helsinki103 
show  that consent is unequivocally important 
as it occupies a central normative position. The 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
stipulates that an intervention in the health field 
may only be carried out after the person concerned 
has given free and informed consent to it. This person 
shall beforehand be given appropriate information 
as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as 
well as on its consequences and risks.104 The interests 
and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the 
sole interest of society or science.105 In addition to 
securing free and informed consent for the purposes 
of medical research the convention requires other 
safe guards like making sure that there is no 
alternative of comparable effectiveness to research 
on humans.106
66 In this regard, the Data Protection Directive or the 
Regulation are too liberal to accommodate what 
is customarily and legally expected if biological 
materials were to be governed by these regimes. 
That requires the role of consent under the directive 
and the General Data Protection Regulation to be 
seen more closely.
•	 Does Consent Play Central Role under 
the Current EU Data Protection Regime? 
67 Broadly speaking, data subject’s consent is one of 
many control mechanisms107 in which data subjects, 
as active actors in data protection laws108, influence 
the data processing operations of controllers. 
Though there are some non-negligible reasons, 
in particular for sensitive personal data, more 
convincing evidences suggest that consent does not 
play any central role in the existing data protection 
regime. There are, however, more stringent 
requirements for consent of the data subject with 
regard to processing sensitive data. In principle, 
processing sensitive personal data is prohibited. In 
addition, the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) in some of the cases — such 
as Z v Finland and MS v Sweden — suggest normative 
importance of data subjects’ consent regarding 
sensitive data, particularly, medical information. 
103 World Medical Association (WMA), World Medical 
Association Declaration of Helsinki: ethical principles for 
medical research involving human subjects, 2008.
104 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, Article 5.
105 Ibid, Article 2.
106 Ibid, Article 16.
107 Other control mechanisms in which data subjects can 
influence processing of personal data can be: opposing a 
particular processing or withdrawing consent.
108 We have two additional main actors in the operative sphere: 




Thus, the problem can, somehow, be mitigated by 
the fact that consent enjoys relative central role 
under the directive with regard to sensitive data. 
That is because biological materials would most 
probably belong to the category of sensitive data 
as data concerning health under article 8(1) of the 
directive.
68 Generally, however, under articles 7 & 8 of the DPD, 
consent is not only just one precondition among 
the alternatives for legitimate processing, member 
states are also allowed to introduce new grounds for 
reasons of substantial public interest.109 Similarly, 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides: 
personal data can be processed “on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate 
basis laid down by law.”110 While consent is expressly 
mentioned, the Charter makes it clear that personal 
data can be processed on the basis of other legitimate 
grounds laid by law.
69 In addition, from a pragmatic viewpoint, the DPD 
incentivizes data controllers to first utilize other 
preconditions — such as the one under article 7(f) 
— and employ consent when a processing exercise 
can’t be justified under those grounds. This flows 
from the cost and delay involved from securing 
consent and, the desire to avoid the possibility of 
refusal by the data subject.
70 Though all these facts demonstrate absence of 
normative priority, a closer look at at-least some of 
the preconditions tells us that they are framed on the 
assumption that ‘if the data subjects were asked to 
consent, they would have agreed to the processing.’ 
The preconditions like ‘necessary to protect vital 
interests of the data subject’ and ‘necessary for 
performance of contract in which the data subject 
is a party’ are examples in point. Therefore, I 
would argue, that the other preconditions also 
aren’t completely devoid of an element of consent. 
Consent can still be read in to them in its broadest 
and indirect/implied sense.
71 However, what is problematic is not just that consent 
does not play a central role under the existing 
regime; there are also convincing arguments 
against a central role of consent as a precondition 
for data processing. First, there are legal problems 
in properly delineating the requirements of consent, 
for instance, how informed should consent be under 
article 2(h) of the DPD. Secondly, the degree of 
choice presupposed by consent mechanisms will 
often not be present for certain services or products, 
particularly those offered by data controllers in a 
monopoly (or near-monopoly) position.111 Thirdly, 
109 DPD, Article 8(4).
110 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 8(2).
111 Lee Bygrave, & Dag Schartum, (2009), “Consent, 
despite the requirements of informed consent and 
notification (for instance articles 10&11 of DPD) 
controllers will typically have greater knowledge 
about their data processing operations than will the 
subjects.112 The asymmetry will further weaken the 
‘informed’ nature of data subject’s consent. Finally, 
problems of consensual exhaustion, laxity and 
apathy – in addition to ignorance and myopia – can 
reduce the amount of care that data subjects invest 
in their decisions of whether or not to consent.113
72 Therefore, not only is it doubtful that consent plays 
a central role in the processing of personal data — 
including sensitive data — but it is also, arguably, 
not desirable that it plays such a central role. 
Yet, it remains central in other laws traditionally 
concerned with human biological materials. Thus, 
the extension of the DPD or the GDPR114 to biological 
materials only poorly meets the central normative 
position of ‘consent’ in laws currently governing 
biological materials. As indicated earlier, this 
problem can, somehow, be mitigated by the fact 
that consent enjoys relative central role under data 
protection laws when it comes to sensitive data, the 
category to which biological materials would most 
probably belong.
III. Enforcement 
73 Yet another major concern in trying to extend the 
scope of data protection regime is the fear that the 
enforcement of the law, that includes biological 
materials, would require strong data protection 
authorities with additional competence to handle 
the particularities of biological materials. This 
problem gets even more alarming because the ability 
of data protection authorities to ensure effective 
compliance of the law is already under pressure 
as they are chronically under-resourced.115 The 
addition of biological materials in their task sheet, 
thus, fuels the difficulty. Not only will the authorities 
need additional material resources, but they may 
also want personnel with broad and interdisciplinary 
professional background.
Proportionality and Collective Power,” In Serge Gutwirth et 
al. (eds.), Reinventing Data Protection? Springer, p.160.
112 Ibid. p.160-161.
113 Ibid. p.161.
114 With some clarifications on the requirement of ‘consent’ 
the Regulation remains structurally the same with regard to 
the normative position of consent as a ground of processing 
personal data.
115 Bygrave (2010), p. 22.
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F. Conclusion
74 The analysis in this article is made in an endeavor 
to challenge the conceptual predispositions behind 
one of the building blocks of the definition of 
personal data under the current and en route EU data 
protection rules: the terms ‘information/data.’ Despite 
their importance, these terms are often taken for 
granted and insufficiently, if at all, defined in data 
protection discourse. As technology, particularly 
in the field of bio technology develops, however, a 
workable definition is increasingly needed because 
the blurring of the boundary between human body 
and technology may trigger application of laws 
intended for the informational world — such as data 
protection — to the biological world.
75 A close look at the Data Protection Directive, in this 
regard, reveals the absence of a positive intention 
by the architects of the directive to consider 
biological materials as data/information. While it 
makes mention of ‘biological materials,’ it does not 
appear that the General Data Protection Regulation 
is intended to be applicable to such materials. The 
DPD and its preparatory materials indicate that 
the architects did not have the issue of biological 
materials on the table. The same assumption, 
however, can’t be made about the General Data 
Protection Regulation as it introduces numerous 
tempting terminologies. By introducing proper 
terminologies such as — biological materials and 
genetic data — the architects of the regulation tried 
to create an appearance that the regulation applies 
to biological materials without providing any real 
substance in this regard.
76 The question of whether biological materials should 
be treated as personal data is far from consensus. 
Scholars who pay more attention to pragmatic 
considerations have forwarded the view that 
biological materials should be regarded as personal 
data/information. Other scholars, commentators 
and data protection enforcement authorities have 
opposed this view mainly based on conceptual logic, 
arguing that data is a formalized representation 
of objects while information comprises cognitive 
elements involving comprehension of that 
representation.116
77 However, a range of developments in molecular 
biology and nano-technology, largely mediated by 
advances in ICT, are at odds with the conceptual 
distinction between data and information. First, 
proteins — which make up the basis for almost 
everything in the human body — are made as 
per ‘the information’ obtained by reading the 
order of strands of nucleotides in our DNA. Thus, 
information lies at the very origin of life. Secondly, 
116 Bygrave (2015), p. 6-7.
ambitious scientific initiatives such as the BRAIN 
(Brain Research through Advancing Innovative 
Neuroethologies) — which intends to decode 
neurons in our brain much like the Human Genome 
Project did for our genome — may lead to our 
continued existence as information. Thirdly, the 
ongoing human enhancement projects (HEP) are 
clouding the distinction between the human body 
and technology. Moreover, proliferation of bio-
banks and the increasing deployment of biometric 
technologies are converting aspects of our bodies in 
to processable digital data.
78 In addition, multiple pragmatic considerations 
beseech the collapse of the distinction between data, 
as carrier, and information, as a result of processing 
data. First, it is difficult to find distinguishable 
interpretive potential between data and information; 
it all turns on availability of the right interpretive 
framework. Secondly, the lacunae in the regime 
governing bio-banks might be assisted by the more 
comprehensive rules under data protection, which 
also possesses better enforcement mechanisms. And 
finally, considering biological materials only as a 
medium may, sometimes jeopardize our fundamental 
rights even more, thus, making maintenance of the 
distinction morally indefensible.
79 Despite a crumbling conceptual rigor that 
distinguishes human biological materials from data/
information and various pragmatic considerations 
that increasingly challenge such distinction, 
collapsing differences that have been maintained 
in the regulatory discourse for such a long time 
is not without its own drawbacks. First, it will 
overstretch the rules that are already said to have a 
long arm which may be counterproductive for their 
effective enforcement. Secondly, while ‘consent’ 
enjoys a relatively central role under the directive 
when with regard to sensitive data—the category 
to which biological materials would most probably 
belong — it is doubtful that consent plays or would 
play a central role in the processing of personal 
data in general. As consent remains central in other 
laws traditionally concerned with human biological 
materials the extension of the DPD or the GDPR to 
biological materials only poorly meets the normative 
position of consent maintained by these laws. Finally, 
extending biological materials to the data protection 
regime would demand DPAs to have more financial 
and human resources with the requisite skills to 
handle the peculiarities of biological materials.
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ing the reactions to a survey on Big Data from the 
Data Protection Authorities of fourteen European 
countries and a comparative legal research of eleven 
countries. This contribution presents those results, 
addressing 10 challenges for the regulation of Big 
Data.
Abstract:  Much has been written about Big 
Data from a technical, economical, juridical and ethi-
cal perspective. Still, very little empirical and compar-
ative data is available on how Big Data is approached 
and regulated in Europe and beyond. This contribu-
tion makes a first effort to fill that gap by present-
A. Introduction
1 Big Data is a buzzword used frequently in both 
the private and the public sector, the press, and 
online media. Large amounts of money are being 
invested to make companies Big Data-proof, and 
governmental institutions are eager to experiment 
with Big Data applications in the fields of crime 
prevention, intelligence, and fraud, to name but a 
few areas. Though the exact nature and delineation 
of Big Data is still unclear, it seems likely that Big 
Data will have an enormous impact on our daily lives. 
Positively, undoubtedly, but there are also inherent 
risks to Big Data applications, as it might result 
in discrimination, privacy violations, and chilling 
effects. The ideal situation would be to have an 
adequate framework in place that will ensure that 
the beneficial uses of Big Data are promoted and 
facilitated, while the negative effects are mitigated 
or sanctioned. This contribution provides building 
blocks for developing such a framework, by giving an 
overview of the experience in the use and regulation 
of Big Data in 23 countries, aiming in particular at the 
use of Big Data by governments.
2 The research presented in this article was conducted 
in two phases. The first phase involved desk research 
and looked at Big Data policies, legislation and 
regulation in a number of countries. Second, a 
questionnaire was sent to several European DPAs. 
The desk research examined eleven countries. These 
countries were selected on the basis of three criteria. 
The first was global coverage – the research sought 
to be as representative as possible to provide a full 
picture of global developments in relation to Big Data, 
which is by nature an international phenomenon. 
Therefore, at least one country from each continent 
(with the exception of Antarctica) was examined. The 
second criterion was an estimation of the potential 
value of the expected outcomes of the research – 
some countries are more innovative and ambitious 
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than others in terms of technological developments 
such as Big Data. Thirdly, the role a country plays 
in international politics was taken into account; 
on that basis, China rather than South Korea was 
studied, even though the latter country is often in 
the forefront of technological developments. Based 
on these three criteria Australia, Brazil, China, 
France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Africa, 
the United Kingdom and the United States were 
selected. The desk research focused on two issues in 
particular. First, government policy decisions were 
analyzed, as were initiatives related to this topic, 
such as governments using Big Data themselves or 
stimulating the use of Big Data in the private sector, 
either through financial support or by engaging in 
partnerships. Second, research was carried out on 
legislation and case law revolving around Big Data in 
the selected countries. It should, again, be noted that 
this study is not exhaustive – there is, undoubtedly, a 
myriad of relevant laws, court cases and DPA reports 
that are not discussed here.
3 In studying the eleven countries, almost exclusive use 
was made of official sources, especially government 
websites. The reason for this is that it is often difficult 
to establish the reliability of foreign sources. This 
choice does, however, imply that this article mainly 
presents a picture of the governmental view of Big 
Data and of governmental regulation. Criticism of 
those initiatives and autonomous processes in the 
private sector remain largely undiscussed. This bias 
was accepted as a tradeoff in order to guarantee the 
reliability of the sources studied. When discussing 
Israel, however, use was made of online newspaper 
articles from Israeli news sources and a published 
online interview, because this provided vital 
information and because the news-source was 
regarded as reliable. The information from these 
sources was not available on government websites, 
but was nonetheless considered essential.
4 Publications on government websites and in press 
releases about new initiatives were selected by 
using terms related to Big Data, both in the official 
language of the country concerned and in English, 
such as ‘data mining’, ‘data analytics’, ‘data projects’, 
‘Big Data initiatives’, etc. Several countries have a 
Ministry of Science and Technology, or a similar 
ministry. Those ministries were taken as the starting 
point of the research in those countries. General 
search engines were also used to scan government 
initiatives related to Big Data, by limiting the 
search to the national public domain of the country 
concerned. For case law and legislation, the official 
national search engines and general search engines 
were used. The search terms entered here were 
related to Big Data, privacy and data protection, 
such as ‘data protection’, ‘privacy’, ‘surveillance’, etc. 
This process yielded a list of government initiatives, 
legislation and relevant jurisprudence. The sources 
consulted and the full list of references used for 
this article are listed in a working paper published 
earlier.1
5 The results of the comparative desk research can be 
found in Appendix I and the results of the survey in 
Appendix II to this contribution. It has to be stressed 
that not all governments and governmental agencies 
use the term Big Data when creating, operating on, 
or using large scale data bases. That is why  this study 
primarily identifies those initiatives that have been 
identified as Big Data by the government itself, or 
when it has used terms that are related to it. This 
means that many uses of large scale databases by 
governmental agencies are not included in this 
study. When analyzing the countries, six questions 
were kept in mind: ‘Is a specific definition of Big Data 
used?’, ‘Is Big Data used within the government?’, ‘Is 
there a public-private partnership?’, ‘To what goal 
is Big Data used by the government?’, ‘Which laws 
are especially relevant for Big Data?’ and ‘Are there 
judicial decisions relating to Big Data?’
6 A relatively short and simple questionnaire was 
designed for the survey, so as to increase the 
potential response of the DPAs. The accompanying 
email, as well as the introduction to the survey, 
briefly explained the goal of the survey. The survey 
comprised six questions: 1. Are you familiar with 
the debate on Big Data? If so, how would you define 
Big Data? (max. 500 words) 2. Are there prominent 
examples of the use of Big Data in your country, 
especially in the law enforcement sector, by the 
police or by intelligence services? (max. 500 words) 
3. Have you issued any decisions/reports/opinions 
on the use of Big Data? If so, could you provide us 
with a reference and your main argument? (max. 
500 words) 4. Are there any legal cases/judgements 
by a court with regard to (privacy/data protection) 
violations following from Big Data practices in your 
country? If so, could you provide us with a reference 
and the main consideration of the court? (max. 
500 words) 5. Which legal regimes are applied to 
Big Data/ is there a special regime for Big Data in 
your country? Are there any discussions/plans in 
parliament to introduce new legislation to regulate 
Big Data practices? (max. 500 words) 6. Are there any 
final remarks you want to make/suggestions you 
have for further research? (max. 500 words)
7 The reason for choosing these questions for the desk 
research and the survey is that the background of 
this study is a project by the Netherlands Scientific 
Council for Government Policy (WRR). The WRR 
1 <http://www.wrr.nl/fileadmin/en/publicaties/PDF-
Working_Papers/WP_20_International_and_Comparative_
Legal_Study_on_Big_Data.pdf>. The literature studied 
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is an independent advisory body for the Dutch 
government. The task of the WRR is to advise the 
government on issues that are of great importance 
for society in the intermediate and longer term. The 
reports of the WRR are not tied to one policy sector 
but rather touch on various terrains and policy 
sectors; they are concerned with the direction of 
government policy for the longer term. The members 
of the WRR are established university professors 
who have often worked on policy related subjects 
and/or have made tracks in public administration 
themselves. The Dutch government had requested 
the WRR to advise on the regulation of Big Data, 
taking into account how privacy and security 
should be assessed in the deployment of big data 
analytics in security related policies. Questions that 
were suggested to be addressed include whether 
a distinction needs to be made between access to 
and use of data, how transparency and individual 
rights can be guaranteed in Big Data practices and 
what the likely impact of the emergence of quantum 
computing will be. In addition to the policy advice, 
published in the form of a report for the Dutch 
government,2 a scientific book was delivered3 and 
a number of working papers were written to do 
indicative research,4 which were used as building 
blocks for the report to the government. This article 
is based on one of those working papers.5
8 The DPAs in all 28 EU Member States were emailed 
with a request to complete the survey. Requests were 
also sent to the DPAs in three non-EU countries, 
namely Norway, Serbia and Switzerland, because a 
short preliminary study had shown that they might 
have specific expertise in relation to Big Data. DPAs 
that did not respond within the period specified in 
the initial request were sent a reminder; those that 
did not respond to this mail either were sent a final 
reminder. In most cases, the questionnaire was sent 
to the general contact address as posted on DPA’s 
website. However, since the French website lists 
no general email address, personal contacts were 
used to email two specific employees of the CNIL. 
For three other DPAs (Germany, the Netherlands 
and Norway), in addition to an email to the general 
email address, an email was also sent to a specific 
individual employee. For other DPAs, either no such 
personal contacts existed or they existed but it was 
not necessary to use them because a response had 











the survey, 18 responded: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. Four of these (Austria, Denmark, Finland 
and Ireland) were negative responses, stating that 
the DPA in question would not participate in the 
study. Consequently, about half of the DPAs invited 
to join the survey have actually responded. The 
results found in this study can, therefore, not be seen 
as determinative but as indicative of possible trends, 
feelings and attitudes towards Big Data. It should be 
taken into account that those DPAs that have already 
dealt with Big Data projects would be more likely to 
respond to such a survey than those that haven’t.
9 Rather than presenting the bare facts, listing the 
regulatory initiatives in the various countries studied 
and the answers from the DPAs, this article uses the 
insights gained from those results to shine light on 
some of the most difficult questions regulators have 
to answer when deciding on future regulation of 
Big Data. These questions are partly based on those 
asked in the survey and partly follow from the desk 
research. Additional questions have been added in 
order to present the most interesting findings from 
both the desk research and the survey in an orderly 
fashion. Ten issues/questions are discussed in more 
detail: (1) What is the definition of Big Data? (2) Is 
Big Data an independent phenomenon? (3) Big Data: 
fact or fiction? (4) What is the scope of Big Data? (5) 
What are the opportunities for Big Data? (6) What 
are the dangers of Big Data? (7) Are the current laws 
and regulations applicable to Big Data? (8) Is there 
a need for new legislation for Big Data? (9) What 
concept should be central to Big Data regulation? 
(10) How should the responsibilities be distributed? 
These questions will be discussed in the subsequent 
sections. The article will conclude with a short 
summary of the main findings.
B. What is the definition of Big Data?
10 The first choice when it comes to regulating Big 
Data is to determine a definition and delineation 
of Big Data. Three definitions were encountered 
a number of times in both the desk research and 
in the survey. First, the Article 29 Working Party 
holds that Big Data refers to the exponential growth, 
both in the availability and in the automated use 
of information. It refers to gigantic digital datasets 
held by corporations, governments and other large 
organizations, which are then extensively analyzed 
using computer algorithms. Big Data can, according 
to the Working Party, be used to identify more 
general trends and correlations, but it can also be 
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processed in order to directly affect individuals.6 
Second, the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS) suggests that Big Data means large amounts 
of different types of data produced at high speed 
from multiple sources, whose handling and analysis 
require new and more powerful processors and 
algorithms. Not all of these data, the EDPS points 
out, are personal, but many players in the digital 
economy increasingly rely on the large scale 
collection of and trade in personal information. As 
well as benefits, these growing markets pose specific 
risks to individual’s rights to privacy and to data 
protection, the EDPS warns.7 Third, and perhaps 
most well-known, the Gartner Report focusses on 
three matters when describing Big Data: increasing 
volume (amount of data), velocity (speed of data 
processing), and variety (range of data types and 
sources). This is also called the 3V model or 3V 
theory.8
11 The desk research also showed that a number of 
countries apply their own definition of Big Data. 
For example, in Germany, Big Data is defined as ‘das 
Synonym für den intelligenten Umgang mit solchen 
großen oder auch heterogenen Datenmengen’ 
(synonymous with the intelligent use of large or 
heterogeneous datasets).9 The Podesta Report 
(United States) builds on the Gartner definition and 
suggests that there are “many definitions of ‘Big 
Data’ which may differ depending on whether you 
are a computer scientist, a financial analyst, or an 
entrepreneur pitching an idea to a venture capitalist. 
Most definitions reflect the growing technological 
ability to capture, aggregate, and process an ever-
greater volume, velocity, and variety of data. In 
other words, ‘data is now available faster, has 
greater coverage and scope, and includes new types 
of observations and measurements that previously 
were not available.’ More precisely, Big Datasets 
are ‘large, diverse, complex, longitudinal, and/or 
distributed datasets generated from instruments, 
sensors, Internet transactions, email, video, click 
streams, and/or all other digital sources available 
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12 Finally, several DPAs also gave their own definition 
of Big Data when completing the survey, or referred 
to specific definitions used in their country. For 
example, the Estonian DPA describes Big Data as 
collected and processed open datasets, which are 
defined by quantity, plurality of data formats, 
and data origination and processing speed.11 The 
French DPA refers to a definition adopted by the 
French General Commission on terminology and 
neology (Commission générale de terminologie et 
de néologie). The official translation of Big Data in 
French is ‘mégadonnées’, which stands for data, 
structured or otherwise, whose very large volume 
require appropriate analytical tools. The DPA of 
Luxembourg suggests that Big Data stems from 
the collection of large structured or unstructured 
datasets, the possible merger of such datasets, as 
well as the analysis of these data through computer 
algorithms. These datasets can usually not be stored, 
managed and analyzed with average technical means 
due to their size, it also points out. The Dutch DPA 
primarily points to the ‘volume’ aspect of Big Data 
and argues in particular that Big Data is all about 
collecting as much information as possible, storing 
it in ever-larger databases, combining data that 
is collected for different purposes and applying 
algorithms to find correlations and unexpected 
new information. The DPA from Slovenia not only 
refers to the use of different types of data, acquired 
from multiple sources in various formats, but also 
to predictive analytics used in Big Data. Finally, the 
Swedish DPA suggests the concept is particularly 
used for situations where large amounts of data are 
gathered in order to be made available for different 
purposes, not always precisely determined in 
advance.
13 It can be seen from this list of definitions that a 
number of components are regularly mentioned. 
Broadly, they relate to three states of Big Data 
processing, namely the collection, analysis and use 
of data. When it comes to collecting data, Big Data 
is about collecting large amounts of data (volume) 
from varied (variety) and often unstructured data 
sources. With regard to analyzing the collected 
data, Big Data revolves around the speed (velocity) 
of the analyses and the use of certain instruments 
such as algorithms, machine learning and statistic 
correlations. The results are often predictive in 
nature (predictive analytics) and are formulated 
at a general or group level. The results are usually 
applied by means of profiling. Many of the definitions 
contain some of these components; none of the 
definitions used mention all of these components. 
Consequently, none of these elements should be seen 
big_data_privacy_report_5.1.14_final_print.pdf>.
11 References to the answers to the survey might be found 
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as essential – that is, if one or more of these elements 
do not apply, it does not follow that the phenomenon 
being studied is not Big Data. Rather, these elements 
should be seen as parameters; if none of the elements 
apply, the phenomenon is definitely not Big Data; 
if all the elements apply, the phenomenon being 
studied definitely is Big Data. Mostly, however, it 
will somewhere in between. It is impossible to say, 
for example, how big a dataset must be in order to 
qualify as Big Data; although Big Data usually works 
with combined datasets, it is conceivable that one 
enormous dataset could qualify as Big Data; although 
Big Data usually (partially) works with unstructured 
data, this is not a condition sine qua non; etc.
C. Is Big Data an independent 
phenomenon?
14 The overview of definitions already shows that Big 
Data should not be seen as an isolated phenomenon. 
It is a new phenomenon which by its nature is 
strongly connected to a number of technical, 
social and legal developments. This conclusion is 
supported by the desk research, which also found 
that Big Data is intertwined with several other terms. 
For example, lots of Big Data initiatives are linked 
to Open Data. As the name suggests, Open Data is 
the idea that (government) data should be placed in 
the public domain. Traditionally, it has been linked 
to efforts to increase transparency in the public 
sector and give more control over government 
power to media and/or citizens. The Estonian DPA 
is in particular very explicit about the relationship 
between Open Data and Big Data, as it defines Big 
Data as “collected and processed open datasets, 
which are defined by quantity, plurality of data 
formats and data origination and processing speed”. 
The desk research also shows a clear link between 
the two concepts in countries such as Australia, 
France, Japan and the United Kingdom.
15 Linked to Open Data is the idea of re-use of data. Yet, 
there is one important difference. While Open Data 
has traditionally been concerned with transparency 
of and control over government power, the re-use 
of (government) data is specifically intended to 
promote the commercial exploitation of the data 
by businesses and private parties. The re-use of 
Public Sector Information is fostered through the 
PSI Directive of the European Union. More generally, 
re-use refers to the idea that data can be used for 
a purpose other than that for which they were 
originally collected. Obviously, the link between 
Big Data and re-use is often made, as appears both 
from the desk research and from the survey. The 
Norwegian DPA, for example, uses the definition of 
Big Data of the Working Group 29, ‘but also add what 
in our opinion is the key aspect of Big Data, namely 
that it is about the compilation of data from several 
different sources. In other words, it is not just the 
volume in itself that is of interest, but the fact that 
secondary value is derived from the data through 
reuse and analysis.’ The desk research also showed 
a link between the two concepts. In France, for 
example, Big Data is primarily seen as a phenomenon 
based on the re-use of data for new purposes and on 
the combination of different data and datasets.
16 The term ‘Internet of Things’ refers to the idea 
that more and more things are connected to the 
Internet – cars, lampposts, refrigerators, clothing, 
or any kind of object. This opens the way for the 
development of smart devices – for example, a 
refrigerator that records when the milk has run out 
and automatically reorders. By fitting all objects with 
a sensor, large quantities of data can be collected. 
As a consequence, Big Data and the Internet of 
Things are often mentioned in the same breath. An 
example is the DPA of the United Kingdom, which 
notes ‘that Big Data may involve not only data that 
has been consciously provided by data subjects but 
also personal data that has been observed (e.g. from 
Internet of Things devices), derived from other data 
or inferred through analytics and profiling.’
17 Because of the applications of the Internet of Things 
and the constantly communicating devices and 
computers, the development of smart products and 
services has spiraled. Examples of such developments 
are smart cities, smart devices and smart robots. The 
desk research indicates that a number of countries – 
for example, the United States, China and the United 
Kingdom – make a link between such developments 
and Big Data systems. The Luxembourg DPA also 
emphasizes the relationship with smart systems, 
such as smart metering. ‘At a national level, a system 
of smart metering for electricity and gas has been 
launched. The project is, however, still in a testing 
phase. - The CNDP has not issued any decisions, 
reports or opinions that are directly dealing with 
Big Data. The Commission has, however, issued an 
opinion in a related matter, namely with regard to 
the problematic raised by smart metering. In 2013, 
the CNDP issued an opinion on smart metering. 
The main argument of the opinion highlights the 
necessity to clearly define the purposes of the data 
processing, as well as the retention periods of the 
data related to smart metering.’
18 A term that is often associated with Big Data and 
is sometimes included as part of the definition of 
Big Data is ‘profiling’. As increasingly large datasets 
are collected and analyzed, the conclusions and 
correlations are mostly formulated at a general 
or group level. This mainly involves statistical 
correlations, sometimes of a predictive nature. 
Germany is developing new laws on profiling and a 
number of DPAs emphasize the relationship between 
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Big Data and profiling; for example, the DPAs of the 
Netherlands, Slovenia, the UK and Belgium. The latter 
argues that ‘we expect that de new data protection 
regulation will be able to provide a partial answer 
(profiling) to Big Data issues (legal interpretation of 
the EU legal framework).’
19 Similar to the term profiling, ‘algorithms’ is used 
in many definitions of Big Data. This applies to the 
definition by Article 29 Working Party, the EPDS 
and a number of DPAs responding to the survey, 
such as those of Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
the UK. A number of countries also have a special 
focus on algorithms. To provide an example, in 
Australia, a ‘Program Protocol’ has been developed – 
a report may be issued which contains the following 
elements: a description of the data; a specification of 
each matching algorithm; the anticipated risks and 
how they will be addressed; the means of checking 
the integrity of the data; and the security measures 
used.
20 To provide a final example, cloud computing is 
also often associated with Big Data processes. In 
China and Israel, especially, the two terms are often 
connected to each other. For example, the Chinese 
vice-premier stressed that the government wants 
to make better use of technologies such as Big 
Data and cloud computing to support innovation; 
according to the Prime Minister, mobile Internet, 
cloud computing, Big Data and the Internet of 
Things are integrated with production processes, 
and will thus be an important engine for economic 
growth. In Israel, the plan is for the army to have 
a cloud where all data is stored in 2015 – there is 
even talk of a ‘combat computing cloud’, a data 
center that will make different tools available to 
forces on the ground. Some DPAs also suggest a 
relationship between cloud computing and Big Data; 
the Slovenian DPA, for example, states that ‘new 
concepts and paradigms, such as cloud computing or 
Big Data should not lower or undermine the current 
levels of data protection as a fundamental human 
right.’
21 There are other terms that are often mentioned in 
connection with Big Data, such as machine learning, 
commodification of data, datafication, securitization 
and risk society. It goes beyond the scope of this 
article to discuss all these terms in depth. What is 
important to note is that Big Data should be primarily 
viewed in its interrelationship and in conjunction 
with other phenomena. Big Data is a part of and, 
in a certain sense, the umbrella term for many of 
the technological and societal developments that 
are already taking place. This needs to be taken into 
account when regulating Big Data. It seems advisable 
for regulators to take a holistic approach to the 
regulation of Big Data and related phenomena.
D. Big Data: fact or fiction?
22 There is still no clarity about the extent to which Big 
Data processes are already being used in practice. 
The reactions of a number of DPAs seem to suggest 
that Big Data is not yet an established practice. For 
example, the Austrian DPA declined to participate in 
the survey because it had encountered few if any Big 
Data processes; cautious reactions were also received 
from the DPAs of Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia. The 
Belgian DPA suggests that there is currently a lack of 
clarity about Big Data and refers to Gartner’s hype 
cycle.12 It also adds: “Most Belgian projects seem 
to still be in a pilot phase and the visibility of Big 
Data in practice is still low.” However, other DPA 
responses show a different picture – they confirm 
that Big Data is a major trend, and that Big Data is 
playing an increasingly significant role. Some DPAs, 
such as Norway, have written a special report on the 
regulation of Big Data practices. The United Kingdom 
DPA has also issued a discussion paper on this topic. 
Furthermore, it emerged from the desk research that 
projects are under way in most countries that are 
connected to Big Data, although it should be noted 
that a fairly broad approach was taken in the desk 
research to what qualified as ‘Big Data’.
23 The picture that emerges from all of the foregoing 
is one in which Big Data plays a minor role in most 
countries at present but is set to become increasingly 
important. Big Data should, therefore, not be seen 
as either an actual practice or as a fiction, a hype 
that will blow over, but rather as a trend that will 
play a major role in five years’ time and will have 
a significant impact on the government sector, on 
business, and on citizens’ everyday life in the future. 
What is clear from the desk research is that in most 
countries the government feels it is missing out on 
this important trend. While industry is investing 
billions in Big Data projects, many governments are 
– or feel they are – lagging behind. This is why many 
governments are now beginning to invest heavily in 
Big Data projects.
24 To give a few examples, the desk research showed 
that in the United States, more than $200 million was 
reserved for a research and development initiative 
for Big Data, which was to be spent by six federal 
government departments; the army invested the 
most in Big Data projects, namely $250 million; 
$160 million was invested in a smart cities initiative, 
investing in 25 collaborative ventures focused on 
data usage. In the United Kingdom, £159 million 
was spent on high-quality computer and network 
infrastructure, there was £189 million in investments 
to support Big Data and to develop the UK’s data 
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a center for Big Data and space technologies. In 
addition, £42 million will be spent on the Alan 
Turing Institute for the analysis and application 
of Big Data, £50 million will be set aside for the 
‘Digital Catapult’, where researchers and industry 
are brought together to come up with innovative 
products; and lastly, in February 2014 the Minister 
of Universities and Science announced a new 
investment of £73 million in Big Data. This money 
will be used for bioinformatics, open data projects, 
research and the use of environmental data. In 
South Africa, the government has invested 2 billion 
South African Rand, approximately €126.8 million, 
in the Square Kilometre Array (SKA) project, which 
revolves around very large datasets. In France, seven 
research projects related to Big Data were awarded 
a total of €11.5 million. In Germany, the Ministry of 
Education and Research invested €10 million in Big 
Data research institutes and €20 million in Big Data 
research; this Ministry will also invest approximately 
€6.4 million in ABIDA, a four-year interdisciplinary 
research project focusing on the social and economic 
impact of large data sets.
25 These are just a few examples of what is being spent 
by the governmental sector. In the private sector, 
a multiple of these sums is being spent on Big Data 
projects. The expectation is that these Big Data 
projects will develop over the next five or ten years. 
Only then will many of the effects of Big Data become 
apparent. Consequently, when designing Big Data 
regulations, it seems advisable for governments to 
develop future-proof policies that follow and, where 
possible, anticipate this trend. If regulators only 
begin to regulate this phenomenon five or ten years 
from now, many of the projects will have already 
started. The negative impact may already have 
materialized, and it will be difficult to adjust and 
alter projects and developments that have already 
flourished. It should also be remembered that good, 
clear regulation can contribute to innovation and 
the use of Big Data. Since the current framework 
applying to new Big Data projects is not always clear, 
some government agencies and private companies 
are reluctant to use new technologies for fear of 
violating the law. New regulation could provide 
more clarity
E. What is the scope of Big Data?
26 This study, and especially the desk research, 
shows that Big Data projects are initiated for very 
different purposes. In Brazil, for example, the so 
called Data Viva system was initially used mainly 
for the formulation of economic policy. In addition, 
the police in Sao Paulo use a system (Detecta) 
that is based on Big Data technology. Detecta is 
an intelligent system for monitoring crime. In 
the United Kingdom, too, Big Data is used to fight 
crime. The POSTnote about Big Data and crime and 
safety provides an example of the use of Big Data 
by the police. Software has been developed as part 
of a pilot to predict the location of burglaries, and 
two British police forces use software developed for 
predictive policing to predict the locations of crimes. 
The British tax and customs authority, HMRC, also 
uses a Big Data system, ‘Connect’, in which all the 
data held is aggregated and analyzed. This Big Data 
system is used to detect tax fraud and tax evasion, 
and is said to have led to the recovery of £2.6 billion 
since April 2013. The system displays relevant 
information in searches that is otherwise difficult to 
find, allows complex analyses to be performed on the 
development of multiple datasets simultaneously, 
and enables profiles to be constructed which can 
help uncover patterns that may indicate particular 
crimes.
27 In some countries, Big Data is primarily seen as a 
means for the government to increase its own service 
to citizens; prominent examples are Australia and 
China. Reference can also be made in this connection 
to the Aadhaar project that has been developed and 
carried out by the ‘Unique Identification Authority’ 
of India and which involves the collection of 
biometric and demographic data on residents of 
India. One of the uses of Aadhaar is ‘micropayments’, 
a means of identification which should help improve 
access to financial services for people living in rural 
areas. The identification number makes it possible 
to identify people in remote regions from a long 
distance and also reduces costs through economies 
of scale, making it easier for poorer people to obtain 
financial services. Other sectors where Aadhaar 
provides solutions include demographic planning, 
paying security social benefits and improving 
the identification of beneficiaries by eliminating 
duplicate identities. Government administrative 
processes should become more efficient because 
the authorities now have access to all relevant 
information at a glance.
28 Several countries see Big Data mainly as a 
phenomenon that can help the private economy. 
Germany, for example, has launched a funding 
initiative to support the competitiveness of it 
companies, and France also feels that Big Data is set 
to take off, especially in the private sector, through 
the growth of it companies and startups which help 
to stimulate the economy and create jobs. There 
are also countries, such as Japan, Germany and the 
United Kingdom, where Big Data is approached 
primarily in relation to scientific research and 
innovation. Israel, finally, is unique in that it also 
uses new technological systems for facilitating the 
activities of the army. It also has to be borne in 
mind that many intelligence services are involved 
with Big Data-like projects; however, often little is 
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known about these projects, other than what has 
been leaked by whistleblowers.
29 The picture that emerges from this research is that 
Big Data could be used in almost every sector and 
for almost any task. Generally, the use of Big Data 
can be divided into three types. Firstly, the use of 
Big Data for specific government tasks – examples 
include the use of Big Data by intelligence services, 
the police, tax authorities and other public bodies, 
for example in the context of formulating economic 
policies. Second, the use of Big Data by the private 
or semi-public sector, helping or facilitating them in 
achieving their specific tasks and/or goals. Examples 
include the use of Big Data by companies to create 
risk profiles, to find statistical correlations and to 
personalize services and advertisements, and the use 
of Big Data by universities and research institutes for 
research-related purposes. Big Data is also widely 
used in the medical sector; for instance, the United 
Kingdom has heavily promoted the use of Big Data 
in the healthcare sector, and the Israeli Ministry of 
Health has a large dataset containing medical data on 
the citizens of Israel and on the healthcare system. 
According to the Ministry, the potential benefits lie 
in the facilitation of a variety of healthcare functions 
(including assisting in the clinical decision-making 
process, in monitoring diseases and in proactive 
healthcare). Thirdly, Big Data is used by both 
governments and private sector companies to 
improve their service to citizens or customers; 
this might, for example, involve increasing the 
transparency of their activities, strengthening the 
control of citizens over data processing, etc.
30 These three categories should lead to different 
approaches to regulation. The last category 
is relatively unproblematic because it serves 
the interests of the citizen. Here, the current 
legislation on aspects such as the use of personal 
data should suffice. The situation is different when 
Big Data is used by governmental agencies to 
support their goals. It is important to distinguish 
between the different fields in which Big Data is 
used by the government. If Big Data is used for the 
development of economic policies, for routinely 
inspecting fire installations or for epidemiological 
research, this should be relatively unproblematic. 
In these instances, general patterns and statistical 
correlations are used to promote the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public policy. However, if Big Data 
is used by the police, a different picture emerges – 
while Big Data is about processing large amounts of 
data and detecting general patterns, the police need 
to investigate and possibly arrest specific individuals 
on the basis of concrete facts. There is a particular 
danger of mismatches when general profiles are 
applied to specific individuals. When regulating Big 
Data, the potential impact on citizens must be taken 
into account; that impact will be greater when Big 
Data is used by the police, intelligence services and 
the army than when it is used for the development 
of general economic policies. It also appears from 
the survey that several DPAs are skeptical about the 
use of Big Data by the police, both because of the 
possible impact on the citizen and because of the 
potential for mismatches between general profiles 
and specific individuals.
31 Finally, the use of Big Data in the private sector can 
also be problematic. It emerged from this study 
that two things in particular need to be taken into 
account. First, use can be made of data or profiles 
that are based on sensitive information, such a data 
about race, medical conditions or religious beliefs; 
use can also be made of categories that appear 
neutral but are, in fact, based on these types of 
information – a practice known as redlining. Second, 
the consequences of the use of Big Data in the 
private sector may also be substantial, irrespective 
of whether or not sensitive information is used. 
Where advertisements are personalized through 
the use of Big Data-like applications, the impact will, 
of course, be relatively small; however, when Big 
Data is used to develop risk profiles on the basis of 
which banks decide who may be eligible for a loan 
and on what terms, or by health insurers to decide 
who they are prepared to insure and on what terms, 
the consequences can be significant. Factors that 
could be taken into account when regulating Big 
Data are the impact of its use on the individual, the 
types of data and data analysis that are used and 
the potential danger of a mismatch between general 
profiles and specific individuals. A distinction could 
also be made between the type of organization that 
uses Big Data and the specific purpose for which it is 
used. The general interest that is served by the use of 
Big Data naturally also has an impact on what should 
be considered legally admissible.
F. What are the opportunities 
for Big Data?
32 From both the desk research and the results from 
the survey it appears that Big Data represents both 
significant opportunities and significant risks. For 
example, in 2013, ‘France Stratégie’, an advisory 
body to the French Prime Minister, performed an 
analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of Big 
Data. It emphasized that, on the one hand, Big Data 
provides for more knowledge and opportunities, but 
that, on the other, it may cause problems in relation 
to the protection of privacy and confidentiality. John 
Podesta also stressed this duality. He published a 
blog on 1 May, 2014, which discussed the results 
of the Working Group Review. In his blog, Podesta 
describes Big Data as a vital technology. He refers to 
the devastation and suffering caused by tornadoes 
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and, more implicitly, to the predictive powers of Big 
Data in preventing these adverse events. Big Data 
could provide opportunities for virtually every 
sector of the economy, Podesta suggests, and could 
make the government more efficient. The report of 
the US Working Group recognized in addition that 
Big Data carries risks, noting the fact that ‘how we 
protect our privacy and other values in a world 
where data collection is increasingly ubiquitous and 
where analysis is conducted at speeds approaching 
real time.’
33 The opportunities for Big Data can be discussed 
relatively briefly; they follow from the field of 
application as discussed earlier. The first opportunity 
that Big Data offers lies in improving the service to 
the citizen or customer, improving transparency 
in the public or private sector and giving more 
control to individuals. Second, particularly in the 
private sector, it is expected that Big Data will lead 
to substantial growth in the number of companies, 
especially start-ups, the number of jobs and the 
profits generated by those companies. For example, 
according to the roadmap developed by the Comité 
de Pilotage de la Nouvelle France Industrielle 
(Steering Committee of the New Industrial France) 
headed by the French Minister for Industry, Big 
Data activities in France represented €1.5 billion 
in 2014 and would reach approximately €9 billion 
in 2020, with Big Data activities also generating an 
additional 137.000 jobs. The EDPS report on Big Data 
also stresses the economic potential of Big Data. 
‘According to the OECD, ‘Big Data related’ mergers 
and acquisitions rose from 55 in 2008 to 134 in 
2012. The internet sector is hugely successful with 
revenue per employee in 2011, among the top 250 
companies, of over $900 – over twice as high as for 
the ICT industry overall (OECD). Internet companies 
could enjoy ‘economies of scope’, network effects 
of more data attracting more users attracting more 
data, culminating in winner-takes-all markets and 
near monopolies which enjoy increasing returns 
of scale due to the absolute ‘permanence’ of their 
digital assets.’13
34 Finally, Big Data can also be used for achieving the 
specific objectives of organizations, institutions 
and government departments. Yet, the question 
is to what extent Big Data is actually used within 
the public sector. The underlying research for 
this article seems to indicate that most countries 
and DPAs mainly recognize the opportunities 
for Big Data in the private sector, in relation to 
economic growth, stimulating businesses and 
increasing the number of jobs. The use of Big Data 




institutions involved with maintaining public 
order or protecting national security, is viewed 
with skepticism. The Hungarian DPA, for example, 
emphasizes that Big Data is primarily used in the 
business sphere, such by as banks, supermarkets, 
media and telecommunication companies. In similar 
fashion, the Luxembourg DPA states explicitly that it 
has no knowledge of prominent examples of the use 
of Big Data in the law enforcement sector or by police 
or intelligence services in Luxembourg, but points 
out that other actors do engage with Big Data. The 
Norwegian DPA argues along the same line: ‘There 
is, as far as we know, no usage of Big Data within 
the law enforcement sector in Norway. In 2014, the 
intelligence service addressed in a public speech the 
need to use Big Data techniques in order to combat 
terrorism more efficiently. However, politicians 
across all parties reacted very negatively to this 
request and no formal request to use such techniques 
has since been launched by the intelligence service. 
The companies that are most advanced when it 
comes to using Big Data may be found within the 
telecom (e.g. Telenor) and media (e.g. Schibsted and 
Cxence) sectors. The tax and customs authorities 
have also initiated projects in which they look at 
how Big Data can be used to enhance the efficiency 
of their work.’
35 In similar fashion, the Slovenian DPA stresses that it 
has not seen prominent examples of the use of Big 
Data in Slovenia; it suggests that Big Data applications 
are mainly of interest in insurance, banking and 
electronic communications sectors, mostly to 
combat fraud and other illegal practices. Another 
important field is scientific and statistical research. 
‘Law enforcement use is to our knowledge currently 
at development stages (e.g. in the case of processing 
Passenger Name Records), whereas information 
about the use of Big Data at intelligence services is 
either not available or confidential in nature.’ The 
Swedish DPA states that it has not carried out any 
specific supervision related to the concept of Big 
Data and does not have any statistics or specific 
information on how this is used. ‘In our opinion, 
the law enforcement sector does not use Big Data. 
Their personal data processing is strictly regulated 
in terms of collection of data, limited purposes, etc.’ 
Finally, the British DPA indicates that it knows ‘that 
companies are actively investigating the potential of 
Big Data, and there are some examples of Big Data 
in practice, such as the use of telematics in motor 
insurance, the use of mobile phone location data for 
market research, and the availability of data from 
the Twitter ‘firehose’ for analytics. We do not have 
any specific information on the use of Big Data in law 
enforcement or security.’
36 Noteworthy is that many DPAs suggest that Big 
Data is used particularly in the private sector and 
less so in the public sector – in particular, the use 
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of Big Data for security-related activities by the 
government is rejected. Only a few DPAs, such as 
the Dutch DPA, refer to the use of Big Data by the 
government for security purposes. The desk research, 
however, reveals a different picture, showing that 
governments do, indeed, use Big Data technologies, 
including for security purposes. Australia is an 
example of a country that is already quite well-
advanced in using and applying Big Data processes. 
Among other things, it operates a prototype of the 
‘Border Risk Identification System’ (BRIS). This 
system can be used at international airports to better 
estimate which travelers might cause problems. 
Reference can also be made to the ‘Developmental 
Pathways Project’, in which data on children from a 
variety of sources are linked. Among other things, an 
assessment will be made of the influence of factors 
relating to family and the environment on the health 
of children, the risk of juvenile delinquency, and 
education. Finally, there is a data tool, Vizie, which 
has been designed by the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), an 
Australian government corporate entity. This tool 
follows activity on social media and analyses social 
media behaviour. A number of government agencies 
and public sector actors would also like to use this 
tool, at least according to CSIRO. Some examples can 
also be found of trials with Big Data in the area of 
security in the United States. For example, police 
forces used Big Data analytics to predict the odds 
that an individual will become involved in criminal 
activity. An example is Philadelphia, where the 
police used a tool to predict the chance of repeated 
offences. In addition, as indicated in the previous 
paragraph, countries such as Brazil, Israel and the 
United Kingdom promote the use of Big Data by the 
police, the intelligence and security services, and 
the military.
37 All in all, no clear picture has yet emerged as to 
where the opportunities for the use of Big Data 
lie. It seems clear that both the public and private 
sectors agree that Big Data will be used in the 
private sector and will lead to economic and jobs 
growth. There is less certainty about both the 
desirability and effectiveness of the use of Big Data 
by the government, particularly for security-related 
purposes. This also relates to the questions that have 
already been raised regarding the effectiveness 
of Big Data-type data collections by intelligence 
services such as the NSA in the United States in the 
fight against terrorism. Yet, a number of countries 
have actually implemented such projects involving 
the intelligence services, the armed forces and the 
police; for example, in connection with predictive 
policing. In conclusion, it seems advisable that 
regulators make an explicit assessment of the 
desirability and effectiveness of the use of Big Data 
in the public sector, especially when used for the 
promotion of national security or public order.
G. What are the dangers of Big Data?
38 This study shows that the dangers of Big Data are 
mainly assessed along two lines: first, a possible 
violation of the right to privacy and/or the right 
to data protection, and second, the danger of 
discrimination and stigmatization. With regards 
to the first point, most countries appear to be well 
aware of the risks that Big Data might pose for the 
privacy of citizens. For example, the current legal 
framework is based on the principles of purpose 
and purpose limitation. Article 7 of the EU Data 
Protection Directive contains an exhaustive list 
of the legitimate grounds for processing ordinary 
personal data; Article 8 does the same with regard to 
the processing of sensitive personal data (e.g. about 
race, religion, sexual orientation, etc.). Article 6 
states that personal data must be processed fairly and 
lawfully, and must be collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes, and not further processed 
in a way that is incompatible with those purposes. 
The prohibition on further processing for different 
purposes is also known as the ‘purpose limitation 
principle’, from which it follows that ‘secondary 
use’ is in principle not permitted. The results of 
both the desk research and the survey show that it 
is this principle (along with the data minimization 
principle) that is cited the most when it comes to 
the tension between Big Data and data protection. 
Big Data processes often have no fixed purpose – 
large amounts of data are simply collected and it may 
only become clear what the value or potential use 
of that data is after it has been collected. Moreover, 
in Big Data analysis, different kinds of databases 
with different types of data are often linked or 
merged. The original purpose for which the data 
was collected is then lost. For example, the Swedish 
DPA argues that the concept of Big Data ‘is used for 
situations where large amounts of data are gathered 
in order to be made available for different purposes, 
not always precisely determined in advance.’
39 The second principle that is often mentioned is 
the principle of data minimization. This principle 
requires that as little data as possible should be 
collected, and that the amount of data should, 
in any event, not be excessive in relation to the 
purposes for which it is collected. Additionally, 
personal data must be removed once the goal for 
which they were gathered has been achieved, and 
data should be rendered anonymous when possible. 
This principle, which mainly follows from Article 6 
of the Data Protection Directive, obviously clashes 
with Big Data. The core idea behind Big Data is 
that as much data as possible is collected and that 
new purposes can always be found for data already 
gathered. Data can always be given a second life. This 
also challenges the requirement that data should be 
deleted or anonymized when it is no longer needed 
for achieving the purpose for which it was collected. 
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Almost all DPAs mention this principle when it 
comes to the dangers of Big Data. The Luxembourg 
DPA, among others, refers to a decision in which it 
stressed the importance of a retention period for 
data storage. The Dutch DPA summarizes the tension 
between Big Data and data minimization in very 
clear terms: ‘Big Data is all about collecting as much 
information as possible.’
40 Articles 16 and 17 of the Data Protection Directive 
espouse the principle that data should be treated 
confidentially and should be stored in a secure 
manner. Many DPAs also mention this principle 
when discussing the dangers of Big Data; this holds 
especially for countries and DPAs that establish a 
link between Big Data and Open Data. The Slovenian 
DPA, for example, argues that the ‘principles of 
personal data accuracy and personal data being 
kept up to date may also be under pressure in Big 
Data processing. Data may be processed by several 
entities and merged from different sources without 
proper transparency and legal ground. Processing 
vast quantities of personal data also brings along 
higher data security concerns and calls for strict and 
effective technical and organizational data security 
measures.’
41 The current framework also requires that the data 
that is accurate and kept up-to-date. This ensures 
that profiles created of or applied to an individual 
person, and any decisions taken on the basis of them, 
are appropriate and accurate. This study shows that 
many countries are aware of this tension and that 
DPAs are concerned about how this principle can 
be maintained in Big Data processes. Often, Big 
Data applications do not revolve around individual 
profiles, but around group profiles; not around 
retrospective analyses, but around probability 
and predictive applications with a certain margin 
of error. Moreover, it is supposedly becoming less 
and less important for data processors to work with 
correct and accurate data about specific individuals, 
as long as a high percentage of the data on which the 
analysis is based provides a generally correct picture. 
‘Quantity over quality of data’, so the saying goes, as 
more and more organizations become accustomed 
to working with ‘dirty data’. In the public sector, 
too, it seems that working with contaminated data 
or unreliable sources is becoming more common. 
Examples include the use by government agencies 
of open sources on the Internet, such as Facebook, 
websites and discussion forums. The Dutch DPA, for 
example, refers to the fact that in Holland, there ‘has 
been a lot of media attention for Big Data use by 
the Tax administration scraping websites such as 
Marktplaats [an eBay-like website] to detect sales, 
mass collection of data about parking and driving in 
leased cars, including use of ANPR data, and profiling 
people to detect potentially fraudulent tax filings.’
42 An important principle of the Data Protection 
Directive and the upcoming General Data Protection 
Regulation is transparency. It includes a right of the 
data subject to request information about whether 
data relating to him/her are processed, how and by 
whom; the controller has a duty to provide the data 
subject with this information on its own initiative. 
This principle is also at odds with the rise of Big 
Data, partly because data subjects often simply 
do not know that their data is being collected and 
are therefore not likely to invoke their right to 
information. This applies equally to the flipside 
of the coin: the transparency obligation for data 
controllers. For them, it is often unclear to whom 
the information relates, where the information came 
from and how they could contact the data subjects, 
especially when the processes entail the linking of 
different databases and the re-use of information. As 
the Slovenian DPA puts it: ‘Big Data has important 
information privacy implications. Information on 
personal data processing may not be known to the 
individual or poorly described for the individual, 
personal data may be used for purposes previously 
unknown to the individual. The individual may be 
profiled and decisions may be adopted in automated 
and non-transparent fashion having more or less 
severe consequences for the individual.’
43 The current legal system also puts much emphasis 
on subjective individual rights and does so to an 
increasing degree. For example, the forthcoming 
Regulation gives data subjects additional individual 
rights, such as the right to be forgotten and the right 
to data portability. In their response to the survey, 
DPAs also frequently referred to the principle of 
informed consent. Individual rights traditionally 
also come with individual responsibility, namely 
to protect individual rights and to invoke them if 
they are undermined. The question is whether this 
focus can be maintained in the age of Big Data. It 
is often difficult for individuals to demonstrate 
personal injury or an individual interest in a case; 
individuals are often unaware that their rights 
are being violated, even if they do know that their 
data has been gathered. In the Big Data era, data 
collection will presumably be so widespread that it is 
impossible for individuals to assess each data process 
to determine whether it includes their personal data; 
if so, to determine whether or not the processing is 
lawful; and, if that is not the case, to go to court or 
file a complaint. This tension appears both from the 
desk research and from the output of the survey. 
The British DPA holds, for example, that it ‘may be 
difficult to provide meaningful privacy information 
to data subjects, because of the complexity of the 
analytics and people’s reluctance to read terms and 
conditions, and because it may not be possible to 
identify at the outset all the purposes for which 
the data will be used. It may be difficult to obtain 
valid consent, particularly in circumstances where 
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data is being collected through being observed or 
gathered from connected devices, rather than being 
consciously provided by data subjects.’
44 Finally, the current system is primarily based on 
the legal regulation of rights and obligations. Big 
Data challenges this basis in several ways. Data 
processing is becoming increasingly transnational. 
This implies that more and more agreements must be 
made between jurisdictions and states. Making this 
legally binding is often difficult due to the different 
traditions and legal systems. Rapidly changing 
technology means that specific legal provisions can 
easily be circumvented and that unforeseen problems 
and challenges arise. The legal reality is often 
overtaken by events and technical developments. 
The fact that many of the problems resulting from 
Big Data processes, as also highlighted by a number 
of DPAs, predominantly revolve about more general 
social and societal issues makes it difficult to address 
all the Big Data issues within specific legal doctrines, 
which are often aimed at protecting the interests 
of individuals, of legal subjects. That is why more 
and more national governments are looking for 
alternatives or additions to traditional black letter 
law when regulating Big Data – for example, self-
regulation, codes of conduct and ethical guidelines. 
The DPA of the United Kingdom states, for example, 
that it is notable ‘that there is some evidence of a 
move towards self-regulation, in the sense that some 
companies are developing what can be described 
as an ‘ethical’ approach to Big Data, based on 
understanding the customer’s perspective, being 
transparent about the processing and building trust.’
45 Besides privacy and data protection principles, DPAs 
also place a good deal of emphasis on profiling and the 
risk of discrimination, stigmatization and inequality 
of power resulting from Big Data. The desk research 
shows that a number of countries specifically 
acknowledge this danger. The best overview of 
these types of dangers is provided in the Working 
Paper ‘Big Data and Privacy: Privacy principles 
under pressure in the age of Big Data analytics’ by 
the International Working Group on Data Protection 
in Telecommunications. Four points are made in the 
working paper in this respect. First, there is a risk 
of power imbalance between those that gather the 
data (multinationals and states) and citizens. Second, 
there is a risk of determinism and discrimination, 
because algorithms are not neutral, but reflect 
choices, among others, about data, connections, 
inferences, interpretations, and thresholds for 
inclusion that advances a specific purpose. Big Data 
may, the Working Group makes clear, consolidate 
existing prejudices and stereotyping, as well as 
reinforce social exclusion and stratification. Third, 
there is the risk of chilling effects, which is the effect 
that people will restrict and limit their behavior if 
they know or think that they might be surveilled. 
Fourth and finally, the Working groups signal the 
chance of echo chambers, which may result from 
personalized advertising, search results and news 
items. ‘The danger associated with so-called ‘echo 
chambers’ or ‘filter bubbles’ is that the population 
will only be exposed to content which confirms their 
own attitudes and values. The exchange of ideas and 
viewpoints may be curbed when individuals are 
more rarely exposed to viewpoints different from 
their own.’14
46 It, therefore, appears that in addition to 
opportunities, there are significant risks associated 
with Big Data processes. It should be emphasized 
that these threats again vary with respect to their 
impact on citizens according to their application. 
Instances of discrimination are always problematic, 
but if the police discriminates, this may obviously 
be more serious than in the case of personalized 
advertisements. Consequently, when regulating 
Big Data, account should be taken of the likelihood 
and the magnitude of potential problems relating 
to privacy and/or discrimination, and this must be 
weighed against the potential benefits.
H. Are the current laws and 
regulations applicable to Big Data?
47 Both the desk research and the results of the survey 
show that in most countries, the current rules in the 
area of privacy and data protection, as developed 
in their respective jurisdictions, are applied to Big 
Data processes. There is Germany with its distinctive 
personality right, the United States without an 
umbrella law for the regulation of privacy, but with 
sectoral legislation, and most other countries with 
relatively similar rules concerning privacy and data 
protection. In addition, a number of countries have 
specific laws on telecommunications and special 
rules for organizations such as the intelligence 
services and archives. In Australia, for example, 
there is specific regulation covering data matching 
in terms of tax records by governmental agencies, in 
which protocols are established for linking this data. 
Government departments working with files from 
the tax department must fulfill the requirements of 
the ‘Data-matching Program (Assistance and Tax) 
Act 1990’. There are also mandatory guidelines for 
the implementation of the data-matching program.
48 It appears that current legislation is generally 
applied to Big Data projects, including in several 
court cases. In July 2015, for example, the French 
Constitutional Court, the Conseil Constitutionnel, 




Bart van der Sloot and Sascha van Schendel
122 2
intelligence and security services. In this ruling, 
the court specifically stated which provisions of 
this law are in line with the French Constitution 
and which parts or provisions of the law are not. 
Some provisions were declared unconstitutional, 
including a provision regarding the permission given 
by the Minister to monitor communications sent 
from abroad or received from abroad. In the United 
States, the case of the United States v Jones from 
2011 may be of importance because this lawsuit had 
a limiting effect on the large-scale data gathering 
of location data by the police. In ACLU v Clapper, 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the 
mass collection of metadata about phone records 
by the NSA is illegal – this activity is not covered by 
section 215 of the Patriot Act. Meanwhile, however, 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court has ruled 
that the collection of metadata may continue. In the 
United Kingdom, in the case of Google Inc. v Vidal-
Hall & Others, the Court of Appeal was asked to rule 
on the interpretation of the Data Protection Act 
1998. The case revolved around the complaint by 
users of Apple’s Safari browser, who believed that 
Google was gathering data through that browser in 
violation of the Data Protection Act 1998. The Court 
ruled that browsing information may be personal 
information and abuse of personal information 
should be considered as a tort.
49 From the survey among the DPAs, it also appears 
that current legislation is considered to be generally 
applicable to Big Data. They mostly refer to the 
national implementation of the Data Protection 
Directive. Yet, there are a number of countries with 
specific laws. Because the Estonian DPA sees Big Data 
as part of the Open Data movement, it refers to the 
Open Data legislation, namely the Public Information 
Act, which is currently pending in Parliament. In 
Hungary, the Information Self-Determination and 
Freedom of Information (‘Privacy Act’) applies. 
The Swedish DPA refers to special legislation for 
public services, such as the tax authorities, and to 
telecommunications law which partially constitutes 
an implementation of the European e-Privacy 
Directive. The survey also shows that the current 
legislation is applied in legal cases by national 
courts and in the opinions of the DPAs. The Belgian 
DPA refers to its advice on profiling, the DPA of 
Luxembourg to a report on smart metering and the 
Dutch DPA to lawsuits regarding the Tax Authorities 
and the use of data collected by the police through 
traffic cameras operated by the Tax Authorities.
50 In conclusion, it seems that the current legislation 
is generally declared to be applicable to Big Data; 
both courts and DPAs have successfully applied 
current principles when assessing Big Data-related 
projects. This should be taken into account when 
regulating Big Data. Replacing the current regulation 
with new ‘Big Data’ regulation would be to throw the 
baby out with the bathwater. If additional regulation 
is required, it seems more logical to develop new 
rules that could be applied in addition to the current 
regulatory framework. Whether, and to what extent, 
there is a need for such additional legislation will be 
discussed next.
I. Is there a need for new 
legislation for Big Data?
51 It is evident from the foregoing sections that in 
most countries, Big Data initiatives are treated 
under existing legislation with regard to issues such 
as privacy and data protection. Furthermore, the 
DPAs are agreed that the current data protection 
principles must be maintained. The Slovenian DPA, 
for example, explicitly points out that Big Data brings 
substantial challenges ‘for personal data protection 
and these challenges must firstly be well understood 
and adequately addressed. In our view, new concepts 
and paradigms, such as cloud computing or Big Data 
should not lower or undermine the current levels 
of data protection as a fundamental human right. 
Existing central data protection principles, such 
lawfulness, fairness, proportionality, rights of the 
data subjects and finality should not be undermined 
with the advent of Big Data. The rights of the 
individuals to informational self-determination 
should be cornerstone in modern information 
society, protected by modern data protection 
framework delivering efficient data protection for 
the individual, while allowing lawful and legitimate 
interests, often also in the interest of the individual, 
to be attained.’ Yet, most DPAs are also aware of 
the fundamental clash between Big Data and data 
protection principles, as discussed previously.
52 It is remarkable from the survey it appears that 
despite this fact, as of yet, little new legislation seems 
to be being developed that specifically addresses the 
new dangers posed by Big Data. Some DPAs refer to 
the forthcoming General Data Protection Regulation 
and indicate that they hope that those rules will help 
them to adequately curb the dangers of Big Data. For 
example, the British DPA suggests ‘that the proposals 
for the new EU General Data Protection regulation 
incorporate some of the measures we have identified 
as being important in ensuring compliance in Big 
Data e.g. clearer privacy notices, privacy impact 
assessments and privacy by design. We welcome the 
fact that these measures are being foregrounded, 
although we are concerned that that they should not 
be seen as simply a bureaucratic exercise.’ Moreover, 
the Estonian parliament is discussing new legislation 
on Open Data (including Big Data). Also, a number of 
DPAs refer to co-regulation and self-regulation as a 
possible solution.
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53 Yet, the desk research supports the idea that 
governments are, in fact, actively thinking about 
new legislation, partly because current laws are 
seen as hindering technological innovation. Japan 
may be a case in point here. In 2013, the Strategic 
Headquarters for IT produced an amendment to 
various statutory provisions on privacy and data 
protection: ‘Directions on Institutional Revision 
for Protection and Utilization of Personal Data’. A 
summary containing the main points of its policy, 
issued in 2014, discusses technological developments, 
including Big Data, that have occurred since the 
introduction of the Data Protection Act of 2003. 
According to the Strategic Headquarters for IT, there 
are now several barriers to the use of personal data. 
Furthermore, even organizations that respect the 
law and do not infringe rights are worried about 
criticism over potential privacy violations and the use 
of personal data; as a consequence, data are not used 
optimally. The growth envisaged by the Japanese 
government can only be achieved if personal data 
is used optimally and if Big Data flourishes. That is 
why the government wants to remove these barriers. 
An environment must be created in which violations 
of rights are prevented and in which personal 
information and privacy are protected, but in which, 
at the same time, personal information can be used 
for innovation. Furthermore, the UK Parliament has 
commissioned a study on the legislative framework 
for sharing data between public authorities. In July 
2014, a commission published a report with three 
recommendations, suggesting among other things 
that the legal reform should go beyond simply 
stipulating rules for the sharing of data between 
public authorities; it should also regard the sharing 
of information between government agencies and 
organizations with public tasks. Finally, reference 
can be made to Germany. The Minister of the Interior 
has proposed a new principle for forthcoming 
legislation: the minimization of risk. He has also 
announced that Germany will propose the inclusion 
of provisions about pseudonymisation and profiling.
54 Consequently, when answering the question of 
whether it is desirable to formulate new rules for Big 
Data processes, three specific issues seem important. 
First, almost all countries and DPAs acknowledge 
that Big Data poses new and fairly fundamental 
risks to the current regulatory framework, and in 
particular the underlying principles. Second, the 
current regulatory framework is perceived as being 
(too) restrictive in relation to the deployment of 
new technologies and technological innovation, 
particularly in the private sector. Thirdly, many 
stakeholders are unsure how the current regulatory 
framework should actually be applied and interpreted 
in relation to Big Data. Two dangers might follow 
from this: on the one hand stakeholders, for fear of 
breaking the law, might forgo many technological 
innovations and data uses that would in fact be 
legitimate. On the other hand, parties might use – 
or rather, abuse – the existing grey area to deploy 
certain technologies that would not be in accordance 
with the current regulatory framework. Whether 
and how a new regulatory framework might provide 
a solution for these challenges needs to be assessed 
carefully by regulators.
J. What concept should be central 
to Big Data regulation?
55 In short, a diffuse picture emerges, with respect to 
the extent to which developing a special regulatory 
Big Data regime is necessary or even desirable. What 
is evident is that regulating Big Data will be especially 
difficult for two reasons. First, it is difficult to choose 
a good starting point for the regulation of Big Data; 
this will be discussed in this section. Second, it will be 
difficult to pinpoint a specific person or institution to 
serve as data controller or, more generally, a natural 
or legal person that is responsible for compliance 
with the regulatory principles in Big Data processes. 
This will be discussed in the next section. Regarding 
the starting point, it should be noted that the current 
regulation is primarily based on the individual and 
their interests – this holds for human rights such as 
privacy and for data protection, which is based on 
the concept of ‘personal data’, i.e. data that enables 
someone to identify or individualize a natural 
person. However, Big Data processes do not so much 
revolve around the storage and processing of data 
at an individual level – rather, the trend is to work 
increasingly with aggregated data, general patterns 
and group profiles. Consequently, it is questionable 
whether the focus on the individual, on personal 
data, can still be maintained in the Big Data era. 
The statistical correlations and group profiles do 
not qualify personal data, but can be used inter alia 
to alter, shape or influence the living environment 
of people to a great extent. Furthermore, the 
trend towards the use of metadata also ties into 
this problem, because it is unclear to what extent 
metadata will always qualify as personal data.
56 In addition, many DPAs point out that in Big Data 
processes, personal data or profiles may be created 
through the use, combination or analysis of data 
that do not qualify as personal data. The EPDS states 
explicitly that a lot of data is gathered in Big Data 
processes, but also suggests: ‘Not all of these data are 
personal, but many players in the digital economy 
increasingly rely on the large scale collection of and 
trade in personal information.’ The Working Party 
29 states that: ‘In addition, Big Data processing 
operations do not always involve personal data. 
Nevertheless, the retention and analysis of huge 
amounts of personal data in Big Data environments 
require particular attention and care. Patterns 
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relating to specific individuals may be identified, also 
by means of the increased availability of computer 
processing power and data mining capabilities.’ The 
DPA from Luxembourg suggests that Big Data ‘allows 
for the correlation of information which previously 
could not be linked. From a data protection point of 
view it can raise many concerns, when it contains 
personal data, such as the respect of data subjects’ 
rights – for example in the context of data mining 
– and their ability to exercise control over the 
personal data or the respect fundamental principles 
of data protection such as that of data minimization 
or purpose limitation. Moreover practices such as 
linking separate databases or computer analytics can 
turn anonymous data or any kind of non-identifiable 
information into personal data which would need to 
be protected under data protection law.’ As a final 
example, reference can be made to the DPA from 
Slovakia, which argues: ‘As a research topic, we 
would like to suggest examining boundaries between 
personal and non-personal information. In the Big 
Data environment, you are able to connect non-
personal information and, based on this information, 
identify the data subject which represents potential 
risk to rights of the data subjects.’
57 Consequently, it is questionable whether the 
individual, individual interests and concepts such 
as personal data, which are explicitly linked to 
individual natural persons, still serve as a good 
starting point for building a regulatory framework 
in the Big Data era. Irrespective of whether the 
regulator chooses to leave the current legislation 
largely intact, whether it opts to amend current 
legislation or chooses to develop a new Big Data 
framework, it seems that at a certain point in time 
it will be necessary to address the fact that it is 
increasingly difficult to take ‘personal data’, or a 
related concept, as the basis for rules and obligations. 
It should finally be noted that the nature of the data 
is also becoming less and less static; rather, data 
increasingly goes through a lifecycle in which its 
nature might change constantly. While the current 
legal system is focused on relatively static stages of 
data, and linked to them specific forms of protection 
(e.g. for personal data, sensitive data, private data, 
statistical data, anonymous data, non-identifying 
information, metadata, etc.), in reality, data go 
through a circular process: data is linked, aggregated 
and anonymized and then again de-anonymized, 
enriched with other data and profiles, so that it 
becomes personally identifying information again, 
and potentially even sensitive data, and is then once 
again pseudonymised, used for statistical analysis 
and group profiles, etc.
K. How should the responsibilities 
be distributed?
58 A final question that needs to be answered when 
regulating Big Data is who should bear responsibility 
for enforcing the rights and obligations; or, in data 
protection terms, who should be the data controller. 
This issue exists irrespective of whether the 
regulator chooses to leave the existing legislation 
untouched, seeks to amend current legislation or 
opts to develop new Big Data legislation. The problem 
of allocating responsibility was prominent both in 
the desk research and the survey and, in general, 
manifests itself on three different levels. Firstly, 
there was already a fair degree of awareness of the 
increasingly transnational nature of data processing 
activities. The problem is that different countries 
have different levels of data protection. The danger 
is that private parties will settle in those countries 
where the regulatory pressure is low. But public 
sector organisations might act in similar ways as 
well. For example, in the Netherlands, there is a court 
case pending on the cooperation between the Dutch 
intelligence services and their counterparts abroad. 
Although the Netherlands limits the capacities of its 
intelligence services to collecting information about 
Dutch citizens, the US intelligence services, which 
are less constrained regarding the collection of data 
on Dutch nationals, might collect such data and then 
pass it on to the Dutch intelligence services. This 
might work the other way around, too. Consequently, 
intelligence services might effectively circumvent 
the rules that apply to them, by cooperating with 
other international actors that are not bound by 
those rules.
59 Secondly, it is also apparent from the desk research 
that there is increasing cooperation between 
the public and the private sectors, voluntary or 
otherwise. For example, in Australia, there is 
collaboration between industry and academia; the 
Brazilian police use a system that was originally 
developed by Microsoft and the New York police; 
China stresses the need for cooperation between the 
public and the private sector; and the Estonian DPA 
refers to the cooperation between public and private 
parties with respect to the development of regional 
policies. Again, the question is which responsibilities 
should be borne by which party. Often, it is not clear 
at first sight what role an organization has played in 
the value chain of the data processing activity. Also, 
very different regulatory frameworks often apply 
to public sector and private sector institutions, as 
also noted by a number of DPAs in their response 
to the survey.
60 Thirdly and finally, there is also a trend towards 
sharing data and linking databases between 
governmental organisations. This implies that 
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governmental agencies that have a limited legal 
capacity to gather and store data may still obtain 
a wealth of information from other governmental 
organisations that have a greater legal capacity to 
gather and store such data. For example, the Dutch 
DPA refers to a lawsuit that revolves around the use 
by the Tax Authorities of information gathered by 
the police. Again, the question is which party should 
bear responsibility for enforcing the legal regime and 
the restrictions it imposes. More generally, it should 
be noted that data flows are becoming more fluid and 
elusive, meaning that more and more organizations 
are involved and more and more parties share partial 
responsibility. This complicates the attribution of 
responsibilities.
61 Just as the lifecycle of data is becoming increasingly 
circular, so the division of responsibilities is a clearly 
shifting from a rather static reality, in which one 
party collects and processes data, is the main 
controller of the data and should therefore enforce 
the different rules and obligations encapsulated 
in the legislative framework, to a world in which 
different parties collect, share and link data; in 
which parties from the private and the public 
sectors cooperate; in which different governmental 
institutions share data and databases; and in which 
international data flows are becoming increasingly 
common. Consequently, when regulating Big Data, 
it seems logical to make a choice regarding the 
distribution and attribution of responsibility. The 
regulator may, despite these developments, opt for 
a relatively static model in which one party is the 
main controller and is responsible for enforcing the 
legal obligations; or it could opt for a more dynamic 
model, in which the distribution and attribution of 
responsibilities is shared and might change as the 
nature of the data processing activities change. The 
Data Protection Directive could provide a basis for 
the latter option, as it defines the controller as ‘the 
natural or legal person, public authority, agency 
or any other body which alone or jointly with 
others determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data.’
L. Summary of main findings
1. What is the definition of Big Data? It is impossible 
to give an exact definition of Big Data. From the 
research conducted for this report, it follows 
that a number of different phases must be taken 
into account when defining Big Data, namely 
the collection, analysis and use of data. Big Data 
revolves around collecting large amounts of 
data (volume), from varied (variety) and often 
unstructured data sources. Big Data refers to the 
speed (velocity) of the analyses, often with the 
use algorithms, machine learning and statistical 
correlations. The results are often predictive in 
nature (predictive analytics) and are formulated 
on a general or group level. The use of the results 
is usually carried out through profiling. Many of 
the definitions used in the field contain some 
of these concepts; none of them mentions all 
of them. It therefore seems premature to give 
an exact and precise definition. Two things 
must be taken into account when regulating 
Big Data. First, the fact that Big Data cannot be 
easily defined; this will complicate the making 
of specific Big Data regulations or laws. Second, 
the fact that the Big Data process occurs at three 
levels: collection, analysis and use. These are 
communicating vessels and must be treated and 
possibly regulated in connection to each other.
2. Is Big Data an independent phenomenon? Big Data 
should be viewed in its interrelationship and in 
conjunction with other phenomena. Big Data is 
part of and in some sense the umbrella term for 
many of the technological developments that 
are taking place right now. Terms that are often 
mentioned as part of the definition of Big Data 
or as related to Big Data are: Open Data, Re-Use, 
Internet of Things, smart applications, Profiling, 
Algorithms and Cloud Computing. Also, machine 
learning, commodification, datafication, 
securitization and risk society are sometimes 
brought up. If the government chooses to 
regulate Big Data, it should take into account 
that Big Data is not an isolated phenomenon, 
but is a development which by its nature very 
strongly correlates with a number of technical, 
social and legal developments that are already 
taking place. The government will have to take a 
holistic approach when regulating Big Data and 
related phenomena.
3. Big Data: fact or fiction? Right now, Big Data plays 
a small role, but it will, nevertheless, become 
increasingly important as time progresses. 
Consequently, Big Data should not be seen as 
either an actual practice or fiction, a hype that 
will blow over, but mainly as a trend that will 
play a major role of significance in 5 or 10 years 
from now and will have a significant impact on 
the operations of governments and businesses 
and will significantly affect the everyday life of 
citizens. Only then will many of the effects of 
Big Data become clear. The government should 
develop future-oriented policies that follow and 
preferably anticipate this trend. If it starts to 
regulate Big Data only in about 5 or 10 years, 
many of the projects will already have started. 
The potential negative consequences will have 
materialized, and it will be difficult to adjust or 
cancel the projects that have already started. 
It should also be remembered that good and 
clear regulation can contribute to innovation 
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and the use of Big Data. Because the frameworks 
for Big Data projects are not always clear at 
the moment, some government agencies and 
companies are reluctant to use new technologies 
for fear of breaking the law. New regulation may 
give more clarity on this point.
4. What is the scope of Big Data? Generally speaking, 
the use of Big Data can be divided into three 
types. First, the use of Big Data for specific 
government tasks - examples include the use of 
Big Data by intelligence services, the police, tax 
authorities and other public bodies; for example, 
in the context of formulating economic policies. 
Second, the use of Big Data by the private or 
semi-public sector for achieving their tasks and/
or goals. Examples include the use of Big Data 
by companies to create risk profiles, the use of 
Big Data in the healthcare sector and the use of 
Big Data in scientific projects. Thirdly, Big Data 
is used by both governments and companies to 
improve their service to citizens and customers 
- for example, this could involve increasing the 
transparency of activities, strengthening the 
control citizens have on data processing, etc. 
The regulation of Big Data will have to take 
into account the impact the use of Big Data 
has on the individual, the type of data and data 
analysis that is used, and the possible danger 
of a mismatch between a general profile and a 
specific individual. A distinction must be made 
between the type of body that executes Big Data 
projects and the specific purpose for which it is 
used - the general interest served by the use of 
Big Data should also have an impact on what is 
legally permissible.
5. What are the opportunities for Big Data? The first 
opportunity that Big Data offers is to improve 
the service to the citizen or customer, to improve 
transparency in the public or private sector, and 
to give more control to individuals. This practice 
is generally unproblematic as it serves the 
interests of the citizen. The second possibility 
is the use of Big Data in the private and semi-
public sector. Big Data is expected to provide a 
substantial growth in the number of companies, 
especially start-ups, the number of jobs and 
the profits generated by these companies. 
Both the public and the private sector see the 
biggest opportunities for Big Data in this field 
of application. However, the use of Big Data in 
the private sector is not unproblematic. When 
advertisements or services are personalized 
through the use of Big Data, the impact on the 
individual will be relatively small, but this may 
be different when risk profiles are created by 
banks or health insurers when deciding who 
may get a loan or insurance, and on what 
condition. There exists controversy about the 
question whether governments should make use 
of Big Data, especially with respect to security-
related purposes. On the one hand, some 
countries already use Big Data, also for security-
related purposes. On the other hand, there are 
considerable doubts about both the efficacy and 
the desirability of these projects. The regulator 
should particularly assess the efficacy and the 
desirability of the use of Big Data by the public 
sector institutions when used for security-
related purposes. With regard to the use of Big 
Data by the private sector, a distinction should 
be made between the type of application. 
6. What are the dangers of Big Data? This study shows 
that the dangers of Big Data are assessed mainly 
along two lines. First, a possible violation of the 
right to privacy or the right to data protection. 
Second, the danger of discrimination and 
stigmatization. Regarding the first point, it 
appears from underlying research that most 
countries are well aware of the risks to the 
privacy of citizens. With regard to the risk of 
discrimination and stigmatization, this appears 
to be true to a lesser extent. Consequently, the 
government will have to weigh the dangers 
of a breach of privacy and of discrimination 
against the potential benefits. It should be 
stressed that both the right to privacy, the right 
to data protection and the right to freedom 
from discrimination are fundamental human 
rights that may be limited only in exceptional 
circumstances, if necessary in a democratic 
society.
7. Are the current laws and regulations applicable to 
Big Data? From both the desk research and the 
results of the survey, it appears that, in most 
countries, the current regulations in the area of 
privacy and data protection are applied to Big 
Data processes. Germany with the distinctive 
personality right, the United States without 
an umbrella law for the regulation of privacy, 
but with sectoral legislation, and most other 
countries with relatively similar rules concerning 
privacy and data protection. In addition, a 
number of countries has specific legislation in 
the field of telecommunications; also, there are 
often special rules for organizations such as 
the intelligence services and archives. Current 
legislation is generally applicable to Big Data; 
both courts of law and DPAs are not empty-
handed when confronted with Big Data-like 
processes. This should be taken into account 
by the government when regulating Big Data. 
Replacing the current regulation by new ‘Big 
Data’ regulation would be to throw the baby out 
with the bathwater. Rather, it should consider 
formulating new rules in addition to the current 
regulatory framework.
Ten Questions for Future Regulation of Big Data
2016127 2
8. Is there a need for new legislation for Big Data? In 
most countries, the existing laws are applied 
to Big Data initiatives. Also, the DPAs are in 
agreement that the current privacy and data 
protection principles must be safeguarded. Yet, 
most DPAs are also aware of the fundamental 
tension between Big Data and data protection 
principles. It is remarkable that despite this 
fact, little new legislation seems to be developed 
that specifically addresses the new dangers 
posed by Big Data. Some DPAs refer to the 
upcoming General Data Protection Regulation 
and hope it will contain new rules that could 
help to tackle the dangers posed by Big Data. A 
number of DPAs refer to co- and self-regulation 
as a possible solution. Still, some countries seem 
to be thinking about new regulations for data 
processing techniques, such as Estonia, France, 
Japan and Great-Britain. This is partly motivated 
by concerns over the protection of privacy, but 
also by the thought that the current laws hinder 
technological innovation. When answering the 
question whether it is desirable to formulate new 
rules for Big Data processes, the government 
will need to take into account three issues. 
First, almost all countries and DPAs see new and 
fundamental risks for the current regulatory 
framework and, in particular, its underlying 
principles in the Big Data era. Second, it appears 
that the current regulatory framework is 
regarded by some to be too restrictive, muffling 
the use of new technologies and technological 
innovation, particularly in the private sector. 
Third, many parties are unsure how the 
current rules and laws should be applied to and 
interpreted in the light of Big Data processes. 
There are roughly two dangers: on the one hand, 
for fear of breaking the law, parties may forgo 
many technological innovations that would be 
legitimate to use; on the other hand, parties 
may abuse the existing gray area and take steps 
that circumvent basic constitutional principles. 
Whether and how a new regulatory framework 
can solve these problems needs to be considered 
by the government.
9. What concept should be central to Big Data regulation? 
Current regulations are often based on the 
individual and his interests - this applies to 
individual human rights and to data protection, 
which regulates the processing of personal data, 
that is, data that can identify or individualize 
a natural person. Since increasingly, data are 
not collected and processed at an individual 
level, and rather, use is made of aggregated 
data, which lead to general patterns or group 
profiles, the question is whether the focus on 
the individual can still be maintained. This ties 
up to the use of metadata – it is often unclear to 
what extent metadata can qualify as personal 
data. Finally, it should be noted that the nature 
of the data is less and less static and that data 
increasingly go through a circular life. While 
the current legal system is focused on relatively 
static stages of data and attaches to these 
stages a specific protection regime (such as for 
personal data, sensitive data, statistical data, 
private data, anonymous data, metadata, etc.), 
in practice, data go through a circular process: 
data are linked, aggregated and anonymized and 
then again de-anonymized, enriched with other 
data for the making of personal or even sensitive 
profiles, and then again pseudonymised, used 
for statistical analysis and group profiles, etc. It 
seems to go too far to simply regulate ‘data’, but 
the direct connection to a specific individual, 
such as is the case with ‘personal data’, also 
seems difficult to sustain in the Big Data era. 
The government will have to determine whether 
‘personal data’ as a concept is still adequate to 
serve as a basis for data regulation in the Big 
Data era.
10. How should the responsibilities be distributed? 
Like the life cycle of data that is increasingly 
circular, with regard to the attribution of 
responsibilities, a clear shift may be seen from a 
world in which one controller collects, processes 
and uses the data and is, therefore, the party 
solely or primarily responsible for respecting 
the legal principles, to a world in which data 
are increasingly shared between governmental 
organizations, between the private and the 
public sector and between international public 
and private sector parties. With regard to the 
attribution and distribution of responsibilities 
in the Big Data era, the government has to make 
a principled choice. Will it, despite the observed 
trend, maintain the model in which one party 
has the sole or primary responsibility, and if 
so, who will bear the burden, or will it choose 
for a more dynamic model, and if so, how will 
the responsibility of the parties be divided and 
established?
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Is there a public-private 
partnership?
Australia For the purpose of the Big Data Strategy, 
the following definition is used: 
“1. The data analysis being undertaken 
uses a high volume of data from a variety 
of sources including structured, semi-
structured, unstructured or even incomplete 
data; and
2. The size (volume) of the data sets within 
the data analysis and velocity with which 
they need to be analysed has outpaced 
the current abilities of standard business 
intelligence tools and methods of analysis”. 
The Australian Public Service Big 
Data Strategy is one of the most 
prominent examples. This strategy, 
and accompanying documents, were 
drafted by the Australian Department 
of Finance. Parallel to this, a center 
for the entire the government was 
set up, headed by the Department 
of Finance, for improving the data 
analytics capacity of the government. 
In the Strategy, several current Big Data 
projects or pilots of Big Data projects are 
listed, such as: Border Risk Identification 
System (BRIS) and the Development 
Pathways Project.
There is a law that facilitates the use of 
data from the private sector for the tax 
authorities, called the Data-matching 
Program. This law can facilitate a public-
private partnership.
Brazil - One of the most prominent examples 
from Brazil is the Big Data tool, 
‘DataViva’, used by the government of 
the province of Minas
Gerais. DataViva combines data 
from databases belonging to three 
Ministries and an U.N. database on 
trade, concerning exports and imports, 
labour and education, from all over the 
country. Another prominent example is 
the system that is used by the Sao Paulo 
police, ‘Detecta’. Detecta is an intelligent 
system for monitoring crime. Large 
datasets held by the Sao Paulo police are 
combined in this tool and subsequently, 
Detecta makes connections between the 
data. The system gives of warning signals 
to relevant authorities and reveals 
patterns in the crimes committed in 
the region.
-
China - According to the State Council, Big Data 
is used to make the government more 
efficient. This entails more personalized 
service delivery by the government, 
greater efficiency in the administrative 
approvals process, with preference 
being given to companies with a good 
credit score and those with a poor credit 
rating being restricted. The premier of 
the State Council also announced that 
the government is working on Big Data. 
An example can be found in the new 
credit system that will be introduced in 
China. Another example is the judicial 
Big Data center, linking all China’s 
judicial bodies.
-
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France - This is unclear. The French government 
considered the future challenges for 
2025 for the national mail delivery 
system. The research suggests that 
the government has five options for 
resolving these problems. One possible 
strategy is to focus the service delivery 
more on e-commerce and to use Big 
Data analytics to improve the chain of 
production.
It is not yet clear which of these five 
directions is preferred
- 
Germany The Federal Ministry for Education and 
Research is the Ministry that is most 
concerned with Big Data in Germany. 
According to this Ministry, Big Data 
is synonymous with: “den intelligenten 
Umgang mit solchen großen oder auch 
heterogenen Datenmengen” (intelligent 
use of large or heterogeneous datasets).
This is unclear. There are investments 
and research projects concerning Big 
Data. In 2014, the Ministry announced 
that it would be providing financial 
support for the construction of two 
Big Data centers: the Berlin Big Data 
Centre and the Competence Center for 
Scalable Data Services in Dresden. In 
addition to building the two centers, the 
Ministry will promote further research 
in support of Big Data, as illustrated by 
the funding initiative launched in 2013. 
Specifically, the Ministry will focus 
attention on ‘Industry 4.0’ projects 
and on the bio- and geosciences. A 
research project focusing on Big Data 
is ABIDA (‘Interdisziplinäre Analyse 
der gesamtgesellschaftlichen und 
wirtschaftlichen Folgen beim Umgang 
mit großen Datenmengen’), funded by 
the Ministry of Education and Research.
-
India - The Indian Ministry of Science and 
Technology has started a Big Data 
initiative. The Ministry lists four 
focus areas for the development of 
a sustainable data analysis system. 
Aadhaar is a government-wide project 
being implemented by the Unique 
Identification Authority of India. It 
involves the collection of biometric 
and demographic data of the Indian 
population. The Indian Government 
has not specifically labelled this as a Big 
Data project.
Not in the sense of a partnership, but the 
Indian government does make datasets 
publicly available online to make large 
amounts of non-sensitive data available 
to society.
Israel - C4i is the department of the IDF that is 
specifically engaged in information and 
computer technology. An interview with 
the commander of this unit makes clear 
that it is no longer just about passing on 
information to divisions of the armed 
forces. Rather, C4i should be seen as a 
tool which can be deployed in the area of 
Big Data analytics. The IDF makes use of 
several Big Data systems such a ‘Crystal
The Israeli Ministry of Health sent out 
a tender in August 2015 for a partner 
in Big Data analytics. The Ministry has 
an enormous dataset containing all the 
medical data on the Israeli population as 
well as data on the health care system. 
The Ministry wants to put this dataset 
to good use and to be able to translate it 
into specific recommendations.
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Ball’ and a GPS system to direct the 
troops.
Japan - The Japan Science and Technology 
Agency (JST) is the body responsible for 
implementing the technology policy 
of the Japanese government. One of 
JST’s research programmes, ‘CREST’, 
involves team-based research to achieve 
the strategic goals of the government. 
The programme involves research on 
Big Data, under the auspices of two 
main projects: ‘Advanced Application 
Technologies to Boost Big Data 
Utilization for Multiple-Field Scientific 
Discovery and Social Problem Solving’ 
and ‘Advanced Core Technologies for Big 
Data Integration’.
There is not a specific partnership, 
but the sharing of data between the 
two sectors is encouraged by the 
government, especially data relating to 
earthquakes.
South-Africa - With the Square Kilometre Array (SKA), 
a large multi-radio telescope project, 
South Africa is seeking to put itself on 
the map as a Big Data hub. The data 
science capacity that comes with the SKA 
project must be provided by a network 
of universities, grouped together in the 
‘Inter-University Institute for Data-
Intensive Astronomy (IDIA)’.
-
United Kingdom - The British government published a 
strategy for Big Data: ‘Seizing the data 
opportunity. A strategy for uk data 
capability’, and made several large 
investments in Big Data Research 
Councils. One of the projects funded 
by a Council is the ‘Big Data for Law’ 
initiative, allowing Big Data research 
on legislation. There are several Big 
Data projects scattered over various 
sectors, these projects are described in 
‘POSTnotes’ by the Parliamentary Office 
of Science and Technology.
The government has founded several 
Big Data centers which are used by the 
private sector, in which data from the 
government sector and private sector 
is used, or in which researchers and 
the business sector work together. The 
British government also makes use of 
said data.
Unites States The Podesta report refers to the 
definition given by Gartner and adds 
that: “More precisely, Big Datasets are 
‘large, diverse, complex, longitudinal, 
and/or distributed datasets generated 
from instruments, sensors, Internet 
transactions, email, video, click streams, 
and/or all other digital sources available 
today and in the future”.
In March 2012, the Obama 
Administration launched the ‘Big Data 
Research and Development Initiative’. 
Under this initiative, six federal 
government departments and agencies 
announced the investment of 200 million 
dollars in additional improvements to 
the processing of enormous volumes of 
data. In the fact sheet dated 29 March 
2012, ‘Big Data Across the Federal 
Government’, dozens of ongoing 
government projects and partnerships 
related to Big Data are mapped, in all 
sectors. Some examples can also be 
found of trials with Big Data in the area 
of security in the United States.
The US government appeals to the 
private sector to “join with the 
Administration to make the most of 
the opportunities created by Big Data. 
Clearly, the government can’t do this 
on its own”. Whether this should take 
the form of a partnership between both 
sectors remains unclear.




Which laws are especially relevant 
for	Big	Data?
Are there judicial decisions relating 
to	Big	Data?
Australia According to the Australian Public 
Service Big Data Strategy, the strategy 
is intended to advance the possibilities 
of Big Data while safeguarding the 
privacy of the individual. Improving 
the possibilities for Big Data analytics 
for the government should lead to 
improved services and better policy 
advice. In this Strategy, the mission of 
the Australian government in relation to 
Big Data is described as: “The Australian 
Government will be a world leader in 
the use of Big Data analytics to drive 
efficiency, collaboration and innovation 
in the public sector”.
The Freedom of Information Act 
1982,  the Archives Act 1983, the 
Telecommunications Act 1997,  the 
Electronic Transactions Act 1999, the 
Data-matching Program (Assistance 
and Tax) Act 1990, the Privacy Act 1988, 
the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing 
Privacy Protection) Act 2012, the Privacy 
Regulation 2013.
-
Brazil At first, the aim of the DataViva tool 
was to help in drafting economic policy, 
but it became clear that it offered 
opportunities as a Big Data tool as such; 
the relationships and dynamics that 
the tool exposes provide an insight into 
the economy for public and private 
actors and support them in their 
decision-making. 
The Detecta system is used to combat 
and prevent crime.
An amendment to the legislation on data 
protection is currently being developed. 
The government has released a draft 
bill for this law, entitled: “On the 
processing of personal data to protect 
the personality and dignity of natural 
persons”.
-
China There is an emphasis on the use of Big 
Data to make government services more 
efficient and to stimulate economic 
growth.
China does not have overarching 
privacy legislation such as is present in 
many European countries. At the end of 
2012, the Chinese parliament drafted a 
resolution consisting of 12 articles and 
regulating privacy and data protection: 
the ‘Decision of the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress to 
Strengthen the Protection of Internet 
Data’.
-
France Big Data is highlighted by the French 
government as one of the key 
developments for modern reforms in 
French industry.
The ‘Loi Informatique et libertés’1978, 
which has been amended several times 
since its introduction.
The highest French constitutional court, 
the Conseil Constitutionnel, issued 
a ruling in July 2015 regarding the 
French law governing the intelligence 
and security agencies. In this ruling, 
the court declared specifically which 
provisions of this law are in accordance 
with the French Constitution and which 
provisions or parts of provisions are 
not. What is for example permitted, 
subject to certain conditions, is the 
collection of data in real time in order to 
prevent terrorism, and obliging service 
providers to identify connections (the 
parameters of which are set out in the 
order) which suggest a terrorist threat.
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Germany Several research initiatives for Big Data 
are aimed at researching how Big Data 
can be used sensibly and how to handle 
Big Data. Big Data is seen as a great 
opportunity for the ICT sector and can 
improve the competitive position of the 
German business and science sector, 
but is also seen as “one of the major 
challenges” of our time.
The central data protection 




India The Indian government uses its Big Data 
strategy to focus on a sustainable system 
of data analysis.
The “Information Technology 
(Reasonable security practices and 
procedures and sensitive personal data 
or information) Rules, 2011. A new bill 
is in the making, the ‘Privacy Bill 2014’. 
In 2012 the Ministry of Science and 
Technology developed a national policy 
for data sharing and accessibility.
-
Israel The focus of Big Data initiatives in Israel 
lies on making the best use possible of 
the government’s data and using Big 
Data to protect the country and make 
the military system more efficient.
The right to privacy is enshrined 
in Section 7 of the Basic Law on 
Human Dignity and Liberty. In 1981 
a law was also introduced which is 
tailored specifically to this right, the 
Protection of Privacy Law 5741 – 1981. 
To implement this this law, special 
legislation was drafted governing data 
flows from Israel to other countries. 
In 2010 an amendment to the privacy 
legislation was introduced, adding 
provisions relating to the security of 
databases.
-
Japan The Japanese Prime Minister stated 
that in order to achieve its economic 
goals the Japanese government was 
among other things making changes 
to optimize the it sector. The law on 
the protection of personal data would 
be changed to make it easier to use 
personal information as part of Big 
Data. The ‘it Strategic Headquarters’, 
established within the Japanese Cabinet, 
published an open data strategy for the 
government, in which it argued that 
government data is a public asset and 
that the sharing and use of that asset 
should be encouraged.
The Act on the Protection of Personal 
Information from 2003, in 2013 
amendments were made to this law, 
inter alia because of Big Data.
-
South-Africa South Africa is seeking to put itself on 
the map as a Big Data hub, further goals 
of the Big Data project are to reduce 
poverty and improve the country’s 
economic competitiveness.
The right to privacy is explicitly 
enshrined in Article 14 of the South 
African Constitution. The Protection 
of Personal Information Act 2013 is 
relevant.
-
United Kingdom Big Data is used for various purposes, 
such as: creating efficient motorways 
and traffic flows, predicting crime, 
researching diseases and facilitating Big 
Data research on legislation. There is no
The Data Protection Act 1998, the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (section 8), the 
2000 Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act and the Intelligence Services Act 
1994.
In 2015, the case of Google Inc v Vidal-
Hall & Others was heard by the Court 
of Appeal. The case related to data 
protection and the Data Protection Act 
1998. The Court ruled that browser
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focus on one specific goal. The Minister 
for Universities and Science and the 
Minister for Skills and Enterprise state 
the following about data: Governments 
around the world must change the way 
they engage with citizens, the way they 
develop policy and deliver services, 
and the way they are held to account 
(…) The UK government is determined 
to position the UK to make the most of 
the data revolution.”
information can be regarded personal 
data and that abuse of personal data 
should be regarded as a tort.
With regard to data protection, the High 
Court pronounced a verdict in July 2015 
in the case of Davis & Others v SSHD 
in relation to the Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Act 2014. In this 
case the Court declared this law partially 
invalid due to conflicts with European 
law, and specifically the section in which 
the competence is established to request 
telecommunications service providers 
to retain communications data.
Unites States The Big Data review produced five 
overarching conclusions which can 
be seen as goals the government can 
aim for in following the report: First, 
more research must be carried out on 
the protection of privacy, and action 
should be taken in the area of legislation 
on the protection of privacy. Second, 
there should be more attention for the 
responsible handling of data collected 
in the context of education, especially 
data regarding children. Third, the 
federal government is advised to be 
on its guard for discrimination of 
citizens, which can be caused by Big 
Data analytics. Fourth, the authorities 
responsible for enforcement and safety 
are advised to make maximum use of the 
legal possibilities for Big Data analytics.
The Big Data initiatives that are already 
in place focus on several goals, varying 
with the sector of the government that 
they are used within.
The United States does not have an 
overarching law for the regulation 
of privacy, and certainly not for the 
specific regulation of Big Data. Besides 
the constitutional protection, the 
United States has a system of sector-
specific regulation of privacy risks. The 
Consumer Bill of Privacy Rights was 
introduced in 2012. This is not legislation 
in the sense of being enforceable, but 
more of a guideline for the business 
sector. 
A court case on limiting the effects on 
large-scale location data collection by 
the police was The United States v. Jones 
from 2011.
Another interesting case is Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., which was also heard 
by the Supreme Court in 2011. In this 
case, involving the commercial use of 
medical data, the Court ruled that there 
is a limited scope for datamining when 
in breach of the freedom of expression.
On 7 May 2015, the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled in ACLU v. Clapper that 
the large-scale collection of metadata 
concerning telephone records by the 
NSA is unlawful. However, the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled 
that the collection of metadata could 
continue.
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Appendix II Responses from the DPAs to the survey
 
1. Are you familiar with the debate on 
Big	Data?	If	so,	how	would	you	define	
Big	Data?
2. Are there prominent examples of 
the	use	of	Big	Data	 in	your	country,	
especially in the law enforcement 
sector, by the police or by intelligence 
services?
3. Have you issued any decisions/ 
reports/opinions	 on	 the	 use	 of	 Big	
Data? If so, could you provide us with 
a reference and your main argument?
Belgium We have no official national definition. 
However we follow closely the definitions; 
The EDPS states on its website “Big Data 
means large amounts of different types of data 
produced at high speed from multiple sources, 
whose handling and analysis require new and 
more powerful processors and algorithms. Not 
all of these data are personal, but many players 
in the digital economy increasingly rely on the 
large scale collection of and trade in personal 
information. As well as benefits, these growing 
markets pose specific risks to individual’s rights 
to privacy and to data protection” (<https://
secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/
Consultation/big_data>)
Also, the Working Party 29 has issued 





The Consultative Committee of the 
Convention 108 has appointed an expert 
that has to write a report on Big Data, 




Not to our knowledge for the indicated 
sectors in the strict meaning (there is 
no obligation to notify our DPA of such 
projects in these sectors). However, in the 
approach of the fiscal and social fraud, the 
projects and discussion on the use of Big 
Data or the steps in this process (profiling, 
data mining,…) exist since 2012. We have 
addressed several opinions since 2012 
that address a part of the Big Data issue 
(mainly data mining and profiling)
On profiling by facebook : Aanbeveling 
04/2015 van 13 mei 2015 uit eigen 
beweging met betrekking tot 1) 
Facebook, 2) de gebruikers van internet 
en/of Facebook alsook 3) de gebruikers 
en aanbieders van Facebook diensten, 
inzonderheid social plug-ins, gepubliceerd 
op <www.privacycommission.be/sites/
privacycommission/files/documents/
aanbeveling_04_2015.pdf> At the request 
of our Commission the inter-university 




conducted a detailed study into the way in 
which Facebook deals with its members’ 
personal data. And that of citizens who 
do not use Facebook or who explicitly 
opted out of its service. On profiling of 
energy and water clients: Advies nr. /2015 
van 17 juni 2015 betreffende Hoofdstuk 
II van het Ontwerp van wet houdende 
diverse bepalingen, betreffende de 
verbruiksgegevens van nutsbedrijven en 
distributiebeheerders
Croatia The Republic of Croatia is familiar with 
the concept of Big Data, and a definition 
/explanation with which we most agree 
is from the text “What is really Big Data 
and where is it used?” By Luka Stepinac 
from 12. May 2014. published at the 
www.ictbusiness.info in which stands 
„Definition that we can find the most 
often refers to “3V”: Volume - a large 
amount of data collected, processed and 
made available for analysis; Velocity - 
continuous collection of large amounts 
of data in real time; Variety - the data are 
available in various forms and sources, 
and in fact are usually unstructured, or, 
in one sentence, Big Data is a technology 
that enables the collection and processing 
of large amounts of structured and 
unstructured data in real time.“It is
At this moment we do not have an 
appropriate/adequate information.
No.
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necessary to point out that the Republic of 
Croatia regularly monitors technological 
innovations which in most cases allows 
the use of information from the field of 
Big Data, and most often in commercial 
purposes.
Estonia Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate is 
familiar with the debate on Big Data. In 
our opinion Big Data could be defined as 
collected and processed open datasets, 
which are defined by quantity, plurality 
of data formats and data origination and 
processing speed.
Yes, some public sector authorities in 
cooperation with the private sector (e.g. 
mobile operators) and universities have 
applied Big Data to their analysis. For 
example, Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank) and 
Statistics Estonia on tourism statistics, 
Ministry of the Interior with municipalities 
have used Big Data in the development of 
regional policy. Based on open datasets, 
private company Big Data Scoring 
provides background information to loan 
companies.
No.
France The CNIL is familiar with the debate on 
Big Data and is actively working on the 
subject. In August 2014, a definition 
of the term ‘Big Data’ was adopted by 
the French General Commission on 
terminology and neology (Commission 
générale de terminologie et de néologie). The 
official translation of this term in French 
is ‘mégadonnées’ and the definition is 
‘structured data or not whose very large 
volume require appropriate analytical 
tools’. The Gartner definition is also 
a reference: ‘Big Data is high-volume, 
high-velocity and/or high-variety 
information assets that demand cost-
effective, innovative forms of information 
processing that enable enhanced insight, 
decision making and process automation’. 
With reference to this definition, three 
‘Vs’ are generally associated with Big 
Data: volume, variety and velocity. Our 
Data protection authority (DPA), as other 
actors, considers that other ‘Vs’ are also 
relevant, in particular value and veracity. 
Many examples of Big Data operations 
involve processing of personal data, in 
various business sectors. The projects 
have different goals and use different 
categories of data. But, beyond this 
diversity of projects and objectives, 
the notion of ‘Big Data’ reveals a new 
approach of the data, appeared with the 
development of new storage and analytical 
capacities. And privacy challenges are 
associated to Big Data because, thanks 
to sophisticated algorithms, Big Data can 
ultimately be used to identify profiles, 
predict the behavior of individuals or 
groups of individuals, and take decision 
affecting them.
There are various examples of the use 
of Big Data in France, for instance in the 
fields of marketing, insurance, credit 
scoring, anti-fraud mechanisms, tourism 
or research. Data controllers can use 
specific compliance tools i.e. simplified 
standards or single authorizations that 
allow interconnecting databases (See 
AU39 fraud detection in insurance 
sector for a recent example <www.
cnil.fr/documentation/deliberations/
deliberation/delib/318/>). Regarding 
the law enforcement sector, different data 
processing operations can be considered 
as Big Data analysis. For example, opinions 
of the CNIL on such processing operations 






At this stage, there is no report on the use 
of Big Data drafted by our DPA. However, 
different presentations were made 
during conferences on this topic as well 
as analytical articles (see, for example, 
the article ‘Big Data et protection des données 
personnelles : quels enjeux ?’, Sophie Vulliet-
Tavernier, Revue Statistique et société 
<www.statistique-et-societe.fr>). The CNIL 
also participated in the elaboration of 
International opinions (Statement of the 
WP29 on the impact of the development of 
Big Data on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of the 
personal data in the EU; Working paper on 
Big Data and Privacy of the International 
Working Group on Data Protection in 
Telecommunications, Berlin
Group). Besides, in 2011, the CNIL issued 
a warning against the company Pages 
Jaunes (deliberation n° 2011-203, September 
21, 2011), for having obtained personal 
data contained in profiles available 
on different social media websites, 
without data subjects’ knowing. This 
online directory proposed a ‘webcrawl’ 
function on its website enabling to add 
information from the accounts of web 
users to the search results provided by 
the directory. About 25 million people 
were concerned and the captured data 
included the names and first names, 
pseudonyms, photographs, the names of 
their school, the names of their employer, 
their geographical location… In particular, 
the CNIL considered that the fact that 
the data were public on the internet did 
not authorize a third party to massively, 
repetitively and indiscriminately collect
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such data without informing the data 
subjects before posting these information 
on its website. Consequently, the 
collection of the personal data was 
unfair. Moreover, it was difficult for the 
data subjects to exercise their rights. 
Pages Jaunes (Solocal Group) introduced 
an appeal before the Conseil d’ État 
against the warning of the CNIL but the 
Supreme Court for administrative justice 
confirmed the analysis of the CNIL (Conseil 
d’État, 10ème et 9ème sous-sections réunies, 
12/03/2014, 353193).
Hungary The Hungarian National Authority for Data 
Protection and Freedom of Information 
accepts the Big Data definition of the 
International Working Group on Data 
Protection and Telecommunications. 
According to the Working Group’s 
Working Paper on Big Data and Privacy: 
“Big Data is a term which refers to the 
enormous increase in access to and 
automated use of information. It refers 
to the gigantic amounts of digital data 
controlled by companies, authorities 
and other large organizations which are 
subjected to extensive analysis based on 
the use of algorithms.” Big Data is, to a 
certain extent, used to analyze data in 
order to identify and predict trends and 
correlations.
As far as we know, there are no prominent 
examples in Hungary for the use of Big 
Data in law enforcement sector, by the 
police or intelligence services.
The Hungarian National Authority 
for Data Protection and Freedom of 
Information has not issued any decision, 
report or opinion on the use of Big 
Data so far. Besides that our Authority 
participated in the drafting of the working 
paper on Big Data by the International 
Working Group on Data Protection and 
Telecommunications. It is available online 




i n - t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s - i w g d p t /
working-papers-and-common-positions-
adopted-by-the-working-group/>
Latvia We do not have a specifically determined 
definition for Big Data, even though we 
are familiar with the debate on it.
No, there aren’t. No, we have not.
Lithuania The State Data Protection Inspectorate 
is involved in discussions on Big Data, 
insofar as regards the performance of 
supervisory functions.
In Lithuania there is a Home Affairs 
Information System, which is a system 
performing data processing in which 
on the basis of the joint infrastructure 
of information technology and 
telecommunications operates the 
state and institutional registers and 
information systems (Criminal Offences 
register, Police information systems and 
etc.) managed by the MI and institutions 
under the MI.
Not yet.
Luxembourg Big Data stems from the collection of large 
structured or unstructured datasets, the 
possible merger of such datasets as well 
as the analysis of these data through 
computer algorithms. It usually refers to 
datasets which cannot be stored, managed 
and analysed with average technical 
means, due to their size. Personal data 
can also be a part of Big Data but Big Data 
usually extends beyond that, containing 
aggregated and anonymous data. It allows
To our knowledge, there are no prominent 
examples of the use of Big Data in the 
law enforcement sector or by police or 
intelligence services in Luxembourg. 
There are however other actors which 
deal with Big Data. At a national level, a 
system of smart metering for electricity 
and gas has been launched. The project 
is, however, still in a testing phase. At the 
level of the University of Luxembourg, the 
Luxembourg Centre for Systems
The CNPD has not issued any decisions, 
reports or opinions that are directly 
dealing with Big Data. The Commission 
has however issued an opinion in a 
related matter, namely with regard to 
the problematic raised by smart metering. 
In 2013, the CNPD issued an opinion on 
smart metering (Avis de la Commission 
nationale pour la protection des données 
relatif au projet de règlement grand-ducal 
relatif aux modalités du comptage de
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for the correlation of information which 
previously could not be linked. From 
a data protection point of view it can 
raise many concerns, when it contains 
personal data, such as the respect of 
data subjects’ rights – for example, in 
the context of data mining – and their 
ability to exercise control over the 
personal data or the respect fundamental 
principles of data protection such as 
that of data minimization or purpose 
limitation. Moreover, practices such as 
linking separate databases or computer 
analytics can turn anonymous data or 
any kind of non-identifiable information 
into personal data which would need to 
be protected under data protection law.
Biomedicine uses Big Data in the health 
sector. The Interdisciplinary Center for 
Security, Reliability and Trust (SnT) 
is also involved in Big Data projects. A 
partnership with Choice Technologies 
allows the SnT to conduct research 
into the new analytical methods in the 
domain of “Big Data”. Moreover there 
are private companies that use Big Data. 
NeXus for example is, a company “which 
surfs the wave of Big Data and security by 
developing services that fall in the pure 
concept of “Industry 4.0”. “With objects, 
people and data in constant move, nexus 
creates a dynamic identity for each end 
point and keeps track, connects and 
provides security to the information 
shared.”200
l’énergie électrique et du gaz 
naturel, Délibération n° 566/2013 





gaz-naturel.pdf>). The main argument of 
the opinion highlights the necessity to 
clearly define the purposes of the data 
processing as well as the retention periods 
of the data related to smart metering.
Netherlands Yes, we are familiar with the broad concept 
of Big Data. Big Data is all about collecting 
as much information as possible; storing 
it in ever larger databases; combining 
data that is collected for different 
purposes; and applying algorithms to 
find correlations and unexpected new 
information. We refer to the speech of our 




Yes, there are examples of the use of 
Big Data in the Netherlands. There has 
been a lot of media attention for Big 
Data use by the Tax administration 
(scraping websites such as Marktplaats 
to detect sales, mass collection of data 
about parking and driving in leased 
cars, including use of ANPR-data, and 
profiling people to detect potentially 
fraudulent tax filings, see for example 
the interview with the general manager 
of the IRS, at <https://decorrespondent.
nl/2720/Baas-Belastingdienstover-Big-
Data-Mijn-missie-is-gedragsverander
ing/83656320f6e78aaf>). Next to that, 
there are many pilots currently being 
conducted by different municipalities to 
combine different statistical, social care 
and medical care data, related to a shift 
in financial responsibility for social care 
duties. Recently, an interview was given 
by high ranking police officers describing 
the introduction of datamining tools for 
preventive policing. See URL: <www.
politieacademie.nl/kennisenonderzoek/
kennis/mediatheek/pdf/89539.pdf>
Next to the speech of our chairman, 
we refer to international opinions and 
resolutions from The International 
Working Group on Data Protection and 
Telecommunications (<www.datenschutz-
berlin.de/attachments/1052/WP_
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wp221_en.pdf>) and The resolution 
from the International Commissioners 
conference (<https://cbpweb.nl/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/resolution_
big_data.pdf>). Our key concern is that 
data protection should be about surprise 
minimisation, while Big Data entails the 
risk of surprise maximization. There is 
a real risk that those who are involved 
in the development and use of Big Data 
are ignoring the basic principles of 
purpose limitation, data minimisation 
and transparency. And an additional 
frightening fact is that the statistical 
information, even if the data used 
is properly anonymised, can lead to 
such precise results that it essentially 
constitutes re-identification. When 
Big Data are used to profile people, it 
has the potential of leading us on to a - 
predetermined and maybe sometimes 
dangerous - path. A path that may in the 
end undermine the values that underpin 
our democratic societies, by depriving 
people of their free choice, of their right 
to personal development and equal 
treatment.
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Norway The Norwegian DPA issued a report on 
Big Data in 2013. The report was very well 
received and we have been giving talks 
on this topics for representatives from 
all sectors, covering finance, health, law 
enforcement, marketing, telecom etc. In 
the report we use the definition of Big 
Data as it was phrased by the the Article 
29 Group:201 Big Data is a term that refers 
to the enormous increase in access to and 
automated use of information: It refers to the 
gigantic amounts of digital data controlled 
by companies, authorities and other large 
organisations which are subjected to extensive 
analysis based on the use of algorithms. Big 
Data may be used to identify general trends 
and correlations, but it can also be used such 
that it affects individuals directly. We use this 
definition as a basis, but also add what in 
our opinion is the key aspect of Big Data, 
namely that it is about the compilation 
of data from several different sources. In 
other words, it is not just the volume in 
itself that is of interest, but the fact that 
secondary value is derived from the data 
through reuse and analysis. This aspect of 
Big Data, and the consequences it has, is in 
our opinion the most challenging aspect 
from a privacy perspective.
There are, as far as we know, no usage 
of Big Data within the law enforcement 
sector in Norway. In 2014, the intelligence 
service addressed in a public speech the 
need to use Big Data techniques in order 
to combat terrorism more efficiently. 
However, politicians across all parties 
reacted very negatively to this request 
and no formal request to use such 
techniques has since been launched by the 
intelligence service. The companies that 
are most advanced when it comes to using 
Big Data may be found within the telecom 
(eg. Telenor) and media (eg. Schibsted 
and Cxence) sector. The tax and customs 
authorities have also initiated projects in 
which they look at how Big Data can be 
used to enhance the efficiency of their 
work.
The Norwegian DPA published a report 
on Big Data in 2013. In 2014 we drafted 
a working paper on Big Data for the 
International Working Group on Data 
Protection in Telecommunications (aka 
the Berlin Group). Following on from 
this work we were later responsible for 
drafting a Resolution on Big Data for 
the 36th International Conference of 
Data Protection Authorities and Privacy 
Commissioners. Report on Big Data: 
<www.datatilsynet.no/Global/04_planer_
rapporter/big-dataengelsk-web.pdf> 






bythe-working-group Resolution> on Big 
Data: <http://privacyconference2014.
org/media/16602/Resolution-Big-Data.
pdf> Our main argument in the report 
can be summarized as follows: “Big Data 
is challenging key privacy principles, 
in particular the principles of purpose 
limitation and data minimisation. The 
protection provided by these privacy 
principles is more important than ever 
at a time when an increasing amount of 
information is collected about us. The 
principles provide the foundation for 
safeguards against extensive profiling 
in an ever increasing array of new 
contexts. A watering down of key privacy 
principles, in combination with more 
extensive use of Big Data, is likely to have 
adverse consequences for the protection 
of privacy and other fundamental rights.”
Slovakia We are following the debate, but we have 
not adopted any definition yet.
We are not aware of special example of 
the use of Big Data in Slovakia.
No, we have not issued any documents 
about the use of Big Data yet.
Slovenia The Information Commissioner is closely 
following the debate on Big Data. In 
terms of definitions of Big Data, we 
believe that established definitions and 
descriptions (e.g. Wikipedia) adequately 
describe the issue. Big Data is a broad 
term for processing of large amounts 
of different types of data, including 
personal data, acquired from multiple 
sources in various formats. Big Data 
revolves around predictive analytics – 
acquiring new knowledge from large 
data sets which requires new and more 
powerful processing applications.\ Big 
Data has important information privacy 
implications. Information on personal 
data processing may not be known to the
We have thus far not seen prominent 
examples of the use of Big Data in our 
country. To our knowledge, Big Data 
applications are particularly of interest 
in insurance, banking and electronic 
communications sector, mostly to battle 
fraud and other illegal practices. Another 
important field is scientific and statistical 
research. Law enforcement use is to our 
knowledge currently at development 
stages (e.g. in the case of processing 
Passenger Name Records), whereas 
information about the use of Big Data at 
intelligence services is either not available 
or of confidential nature.
So far, given that the use of Big Data 
in our country has not attained 
greater acceptance, we have not 
issued particular papers on Big Data at 
national level. On the other hand, we co-
operate in international fora of privacy 
advocates and supervisory authorities, 
such as Article 29 Working Party202, 
International Working Group on Data 
Protection in Telecommunications203, 
European and International Privacy 
Commissioners conference204, which 
have already provided their views on the 
issues surrounding Big Data in resolutions, 
working papers and opinions.
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individual or poorly described for the 
individual, personal data may be used 
for purposes previously unknown to 
the individual. The individual may be 
profiled and decisions may be adopted in 
automated and non-transparent fashion 
having more or less severe consequences 
for the individual. Decisions about the 
individual may be biased, discriminatory 
and even adopted on grounds of 
statistics, averages and predictions that 
could have little or even nothing to do 
with individual’s actual data. Such uses 
could have severe consequences for the 
individual particular when used by law 
enforcement, but also in other sensitive 
fields, such as health services and health 
insurance, social transfers, employment 
and in particularly situations where 
processing of sensitive personal data 
may be involved. The principles of 
personal data accuracy and personal data 
being kept up-to-date may also be under 
pressure in Big Data processing. Data 
may be processed by several entities and 
merged from different sources without 
proper transparency and legal ground. 
Processing vast quantities of personal 
data also brings along higher data security 
concerns and calls for strict and effective 
technical and organisational data security 
measures.
Sweden We are familiar with the debate on Big 
Data, but we have not produced any 
definition of this concept ourselves. As we 
see it, the concept is used for situations 
where large amounts of data are gathered 
in order to be made available for 
different purposes, not always precisely 
determined in advance.
We have not carried out any specific 
supervision related to the concept Big 
Data and do not have any statistics or 
specific information on how this is used. In 
our opinion, the law enforcement sector 
does not use Big Data. Their personal data 
processing is strictly regulated in terms of 




We are familiar with current debates on 
Big Data and have contributed to them. 
We consider that the accepted Gartner 
definition based on the “three V’s” 
(volume, variety and velocity) provides 
a useful starting point for defining Big 
Data. We also consider that other key 
characteristics of Big Data analytics 
include: repurposing data; using 
algorithms to find correlations in datasets 
rather than constructing traditional 
queries; and bringing together data from 
a variety of sources, including structured 
and unstructured data. Furthermore, we 
note that Big Data may involve not only 
data that has been consciously provided 
by data subjects, but also personal data 
that has been observed (eg from Internet
We have not carried out a comprehensive 
market assessment of Big Data but, from 
our contacts with business and our desk 
research, our impression is that the take 
up of Big Data is still at a relatively early 
stage in the UK. Nevertheless, we know 
that companies are actively investigating 
the potential of Big Data, and there are 
some examples of Big Data in practice, 
such as the use of telematics in motor 
insurance, the use of mobile phone 
location data for market research, and 
the availability of data from the Twitter 
‘firehose’ for analytics. We do not have 
any specific information on the use of Big 
Data in law enforcement or security. The 
UK Data Protection Act includes a wide-
ranging exemption from the data
In July 2014, we published a discussion 
paper on Big Data and data protection. We 
invited feedback on this and in April 2015, 
we published a summary of feedback, 
together with our response. In our work 
we have noted that Big Data poses a 
number of challenges to data protection, 
in particular: It may be difficult to provide 
meaningful privacy information to data 
subjects, because of the complexity of the 
analytics and people’s reluctance to read 
terms and conditions, and because it may 
not be possible to identify at the outset 
all the purposes for which the data will 
be used. It may be difficult to obtain valid 
consent, particularly in circumstances 
where data is being collected through 
being observed or gathered from
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of Things devices), derived from other 
data or inferred through analytics and 
profiling. Given the range of features 
listed here, we think that it is difficult to 
produce a comprehensive definition of Big 
Data which fits all use cases. It is better to 
see Big Data as a phenomenon, rather than 
a specific technology. In our discussions 
with companies about Big Data, they have 
tended to see the defining characteristics 
of Big Data as the use of new data sources 
(eg social media data) and the use of 
existing data for new purposes, rather 
than simply the volume of data.
protection principles where it is required 
for safeguarding national security.
connected devices, rather than being 
consciously provided by data subjects. 
Big Data tends to use data for new and 
unexpected purposes, which may conflict 
with the purpose limitation principle. Big 
Data tends to use “all the data”, which 
may conflict with the data minimization 
principle. Nevertheless, we have stressed 
that the data protection principles still 
apply in the world of Big Data; it is not a 
game that is played by different rules. We 
have said that organisations need to carry 
out a realistic assessment of what they are 
trying to achieve, and balance the benefits 
of the analytics to the organisation, to 
the individual and to society against the 
impact on data privacy. They also need 
to be innovative in seeking new ways to 
provide privacy notices. We think that 
privacy impact assessments (PIAs) have 
an important role to play in helping to 
ensure that Big Data analytics meets data 
protection requirements. We are currently 
doing further work with organisations 
to explore how PIAs can be used in the 
context of Big Data as part of privacy by 
design approach. We also advocate that, 
wherever possible and appropriate, the 
data used for the analytics should be 
anonymised, so that it can no longer be 
considered to be personal data. We are 
planning to publish a new version of our 
Big Data paper later this year.
4. Are there any legal cases/judgements 
by a court with regard to (privacy/data 
protection) violations following from 
Big	 Data	 practices	 in	 your	 country?	
If so, could you provide us with a 
reference and the main consideration 
of the court?
5. Which legal regimes are applied to 
Big	Data/	is	there	a	special	regime	for	
Big	Data	 in	your	country?	Are	 there	
any discussions/plans in parliament to 
introduce new legislation to regulate 
Big	Data	practices?
6.	 Are	 there	 any	 final	 remarks	 you	
want to make/suggestions you have 
for further research?
Belgium We have no judgment, yet, in the Facebook 
case. We expect that the main discussion 
will be on the competence of our DPA. 




No. The general data protection law 
applies, and we expect that the new 
data protection regulation will be able 
to provide a partial answer (profiling) to 
Big Data issues (legal interpretation of the 
EU legal framework)
Most Belgian projects seem to be still 
in a pilot phase and the visibility of Big 
Data in practice is still low (competition 
issue). Often, the practice is still labeled 
differently (data mining, profiling,…) 
Conclusions seem to be premature at this 
stage until more experience has been 
obtained on the practical uses of this new 
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Croatia At this moment, we do not have an 
appropriate/adequate information.
At the moment, in Republic of Croatia, 
there is no separate regulations governing 
the area of the Big Data, but certainly 
the part referring to the personal data 
of natural persons applies the Law on 
Protection of Personal Data.
No.
Estonia Inspectorate is not aware of legal cases/
judgements by a court, related to Big Data 
practices in Estonia.
Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate 
consider Open Data as a part of Big Data. 
General requirements of Open Data 
processing are described in the Public 
Information Act, which new draft bill is 
in the parliament.
No additional comments.
France Please refer to the aforementioned case. Like the WP29, the CNIL considers that 
the EU and national legal framework 
for data protection is applicable to the 
processing of personal data in Big Data 
operations, even if the challenges of 
Big Data might require, in some cases, 
innovative thinking on how some of 
the key data protection principles 
are applied in practice. Regarding the 
discussions at the national level to 
introduce new legislation to regulate 
Big Data operations, we can mention the 
works relating to a new law for a ‘Digital 
Republic’ and a report published by the 
French Digital Council. At present, the 
French government is preparing a new 
law for a ‘Digital Republic’. An online 
consultation was launched on the draft 
bill on September 2015, and the public 
was invited to suggest amendments to 
30 proposed measures, ranging from 
net neutrality to open data (until 17 
October 2015, < http://www.economie.
gouv.fr/projet-loi-numerique>). The 
draft bill proposes, in particular, an 
open-data policy for the French state 
that would make official documents 
and public-sector research accessible to 
all online. The bill should be submitted 
to the parliament at the beginning of 
2016. The French Digital Council (Conseil 
national du numérique, CNNum) is an 
independent advisory commission. The 
Council issues independent opinions 
and recommendations on any question 
relating to the impact of digital 
technologies on economy and society. 
The government can consult the Council 
on new legislation or draft regulations. 
The Council’s thirty members come from 
across the digital spectrum, and include 
researchers and activists. In its report 
handed over on 13 June 2014 to Arnaud 
MONTEBOURG (Minister of Economy, of 
Productive Recovery and of the Digital) 
and to Axelle LEMAIRE, (Secretary
- 
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of State charged of the Digital), the 
French Digital Council held an expanded 
approach to the neutrality principle: 
consecrate Internet neutrality and take 
into account the digital platforms that 
became the new entrance doors of the 
digital society. The report recommends 
to establish guidelines on transparency 
in the way services operate, particularly 
algorithms. The relevance criteria and 
governing principles of algorithms should 
be explained to users as part of a digital 
literacy effort. The report is available 




Hungary As far as we know, there hasn’t been any 
legal cases or judgments by Hungarian 
court with regard to violation following 
from Big Data practices so far.
In Hungary Act CXII of 2011 on 
Information Self-Determination and 
Freedom of Information (“Privacy Act”) 
should be applied to any data protection 
issues including data protection 
problems concerning Big Data. Neither 
the aforementioned act nor other laws 
includes special regulation on Big Data, 
so the general legal regulation on data 
protection and privacy should be applied. 
There aren’t any plans or discussions now 
in the parliament to introduce special 
legislation for Big Data practices.
We would like to raise to attention that 
according to the working paper on Big Data 
by the International Working Group on 
Data Protection and Telecommunications 
the application of Privacy-by-Design 
principles are crucial for legitimate Big 
Data practices in most cases. Furthermore, 
a Privacy Impact Assessment could be 
also recommended and effective before 
the installation and use of Big Data 
services in order to avoid future privacy 
incidents. Furthermore, we would like 
to point out that in Hungarian business 
sphere more and more enterprises, 
such as banks, supermarkets, media and 
telecommunication companies use and 
take advantage of the possibilities in Big 
Data. Moreover, several international 
conferences are being organized in 
Budapest in the topic.
Latvia We do not have such information. We do not have information on this issue 
at this point.
No. But we would like to be informed on 
the outcome of this survey.
Lithuania Not yet. Not yet. -
Luxembourg No There is no legislation directly addressing 
Big Data. The general data protection 
legislation applies (Amended Act of 2 
August 2002 concerning the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data). To our knowledge, there 
are no plans in Parliament to introduce 
new legislation to regulate Big Data 
practices.
-
Netherlands Yes, there has been a court procedure 
in two instances about access to parking 
data for the IRS (case number HD 
200.139.173/01, URL: <http://uitspraken. 
rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:
NL:GHSHE:2014:2803>). Furthermore,
The current data protection regime 
also applies to the use of Big Data, but 
enforcement of the key values cannot be 
solely made dependent of the supervisory 
authority. Our chairman has called for a 
fierce social dialogue, to make people
-
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complaints about the use of police data 
from traffic cameras for the investigation 
of road vehicle usage in compliance 
with tax law have led to complaints and 
court cases. In March 2015, the Court of 
Appeal in Den Bosch ruled that the data 
that is collected with road surveillance 
camera’s of the police that are installed 
for safety purposes, may be used by the 
tax authorities to monitor compliance 
with the law on road vehicle tax. (The 
ANPR data case, See: <http://uitspraken.
rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:
NL:GHSHE:2015:1087>)
aware of the risks to our intrinsic values 
that is posed by Big Data and to think 
together about how we can effectively 
address these risks and unwanted 
consequences. With regard to the 
security and intelligence services, a Bill 
has been consulted publicly and will be 
introduced to parliament soon to extend 
powers to allow for mass interception of 
communications data.
With regard to scientific and academic 
research, sector- specific rules apply. For 
example, the law on higher education and 
scientific research.
Norway There are no legal cases There are no special regimes for Big 
Data in Norway or plans to introduce 
new legislation. We rely on the national 
“Personal Data Act” which builds on the 
European Data Protection Directive.
Knowledge and awareness of the privacy 
challenges associated with Big Data are 
important among the enterprises that 
implement the technology. We urge 
the trade organisations to place these 
challenges on their agendas, and provide 
training in how they can be handled, for 
example through the use of privacy by 
design. Knowledge of data protection and 
the privacy challenges associated with 
the use of Big Data should be part of the 
curriculum for universities and colleges 
where data analysis or data science are 
taught. It is also crucial that supervisory 
authorities possess the necessary 
knowledge and awareness of the potential 
that lies in Big Data. This is important so 
that they can function as efficient and 
effective enforcers of the regulations 
that have been established to protect key 
societal assets. Research on the social 
and privacy consequences of Big Data is 
also of great importance. Big Data is still 
a relatively new phenomenon. It will be 
important to research how access to ever- 
increasing volumes and additional types 
of data will affect how we make decisions 
and organise our society in the future. 
At the Norwegian DPA we are currently 
looking into how it affects our privacy 
when personal data is more and more 
turning into a valuable commodity in all 
sectors of the economy. We are writing 
a report on how Big Data is used within 
the advertising industry, and how the use 
of automated, personalised marketing 
triggers an enormous appetite for and 
exchange of personal data.
Slovakia We have no knowledge about the case 
or judgements about the Big Data in our 
country to this date.
We have no special regime for Big Data so 
far. General data protection law will apply 
when the personal data will be processed 
within the Big Data. We are not planning 
to issue a new legislation connected with
We think that the issue of Big Data is a 
very challenging topic. Finding the right 
balance between protection of personal 
data and the business models based on Big 
Data will need to be examined and
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Big Data practices yet. legislated. As a research topic we 
would like to suggest examining 
boundaries between personal and non-
personal information. In the Big Data 
environment, you are able to connect 
non-personal information and based on 
this information identify the data subject 
which represents potential risk to rights 
of the data subjects.
Slovenia Not to our knowledge. There is no special regime for Big 
Data. If processing of personal data is 
involved, then Personal Data Protection 
Act applies with its existing provisions. 
To our knowledge, there are no plans 
to introduce new legislation to regulate 
Big Data practices. The Information 
Commissioner has the competence to 
issue non-binding decisions regarding 
proposals for new legislation and will 
and would be able to comment on such 
proposals.
Big Data brings substantial challenges 
for personal data protection and these 
challenges must, firstly, be well understood 
and adequately addressed. In our view, 
new concepts and paradigms, such as 
cloud computing or Big Data should not 
lower or undermine the current levels of 
data protection as a fundamental human 
right. Existing central data protection 
principles, such lawfulness, fairness, 
proportionality, rights of the data subjects 
and finality should not be undermined 
with the advent of Big Data. The rights 
of the individuals to informational self – 
determination should be cornerstone in 
modern information society, protected 
by modern data protection framework 
delivering efficient data protection for 
the individual while allowing lawful and 
legitimate interests, often also in the 
interest of the individual, to be attained.
Further research issues could cover the 
following topics: Understanding and 
managing privacy risks arising from 
the concept of Big Data. Adequacy and 
effectiveness of the notion of consent in 
the age of Big Data. Benefits and pitfalls 
of the notion of “legitimate interests” as 
legal ground for processing personal data 
in Big Data environments. The principle 
of finality vis a vis exploiting the benefits 
offered by Big Data. Privacy by design 
and privacy enhancing technologies in 
connection with Big Data. Accountability 
and other notions of demonstrative and 
effective data protection vis a vis Big Data. 
Automated decision making and profiling 
– which privacy safeguards are needed?
Sweden No Personal data processing in general is 
regulated in the Personal Data Act, which 
in principle applies to all sectors of 
society. However, many public agencies 
have their own personal data legislation 
which is specifically adapted to each 
agency’s particular activity and needs. 
To the extent that public agencies collect 
large amounts of data, this is therefore 
usually specifically regulated (e.g. the Tax
- 
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authority which processes data for 
taxation purposes but also for population 
register purposes). Telecom and Internet 
service providers’ collection of data may 
involve collection of large amounts of 
data and this is specifically regulated 
in an act that implements the e-Privacy 
directive. This personal data processing 
does not fall under our supervision but, 
instead, under supervision of the National 
Post and Telecom Agency. It might also 
be worth noting that further to the aim 
to strengthen the right to privacy, the 
Swedish Constitution was amended 
in 2010 and now explicitly mentions 
the right to protection against privacy 
infringements by surveillance or mapping 
of the individual’s personal circumstances 
without his/her consent. This means that 
the creation of large databases which 
contain information that provides a 
comprehensive image of an individual 
person, must be specifically permitted 
in an Act by the Parliament. We are not 




We are not aware of any cases specifically 
to do with Big Data. This may be due to the 
fact that Big Data analytics can be opaque 
to the data subject, and so people do not 
necessarily realise how their data is being 
used.
There is no specific legal regime for Big 
Data, other than the Data Protection 
Act. It is notable, however, that there 
is some evidence of a move towards 
self-regulation, in the sense that some 
companies are developing what can be 
described as an ‘ethical’ approach to 
Big Data, based on understanding the 
customer’s perspective, being transparent 
about the processing and building trust.
We note that the proposals for the new 
EU General Data Protection regulation 
incorporate some of the measures we 
have identified as being important in 
ensuring compliance in Big Data, eg. 
clearer privacy notices, privacy impact 
assessments and privacy by design. We 
welcome the fact that these measures 
are being foregrounded, although we are 
concerned that that they should not be 
seen as simply a bureaucratic exercise.
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ital representations of designs. The enquiry goes on 
to illustrate the implications that the making of a CAD 
file available online might have. It suggests that the 
act of uploading a CAD file onto a 3D printing plat-
form may be tantamount to a disclosure for the pur-
poses of triggering unregistered design protection, 
and for appraising the state of the prior art. It also ar-
gues that, when measuring the individual character 
requirement, the notion of “informed user” and “the 
designer’s degree of freedom” may need to be recon-
sidered in the future. The following part touches on 
the exceptions to design protection, with a special fo-
cus on the repairs clause set forth in Article 110 CDR. 
The concluding part explores different measures that 
may be implemented to prohibit the unauthorised 
creation and sharing of CAD files embedding design-
protected products.
Abstract:  Three-dimensional printing (“3DP”) 
is an additive manufacturing technology that starts 
with a virtual 3D model of the object to be printed, the 
so-called Computer-Aided-Design (“CAD”) file. This 
file, when sent to the printer, gives instructions to the 
device on how to build the object layer-by-layer. This 
paper explores whether design protection is available 
under the current European regulatory framework 
for designs that are computer-created by means of 
CAD software, and, if so, under what circumstances. 
The key point is whether the appearance of a product, 
embedded in a CAD file, could be regarded as a pro-
tectable element under existing legislation. To this 
end, it begins with an inquiry into the concepts of “de-
sign” and “product”, set forth in Article 3 of the Com-
munity Design Regulation No. 6/2002 (“CDR”). Then, 
it considers the EUIPO’s practice of accepting 3D dig-
A. What is three-dimensional 
printing and what is a CAD file?
1 The term “three-dimensional printing” (“3DP”) 
can be considered as an umbrella term that stands 
for a set of related technologies building physical 
objects by the consecutive addition of liquids, 
sheet or powdered materials in ultra-thin layers. 
Hence, in contrast with traditional “subtractive 
manufacturing” technologies, which mostly rely 
on the removal of material (e.g. cutting, drilling 
and milling), 3DP is an “additive manufacturing” 
technology. The peculiarity about 3DP is that every 
physical object is created directly from a digital 
file, the so-called Computer-Aided Design (CAD) 
file. The latter is a virtual 3D model that serves to 
send information to the printer on how to build the 
object.
2 A CAD file can be obtained in different ways. First, 
it can be created from scratch, by using modelling 
software (“CAD software”). A number of open-source 
software tools are freely available online. They enable 
individuals with no prior experience in 3D modelling 
to create their own designs, with some programs 
providing pre-rendered shapes1. Furthermore, many 
websites offer tutorials on modelling best practices 
to assist users who are not design professionals2.
3 Second, an existing object could be turned quickly 
into a virtual 3D model by using a 3D scanner. The 
latter is a device that collects a huge amount of 
data from a real-world object, by means of lasers 
1 E.g. FreeCAD, Sketchup or ThinkerCad.
2 For example, Sculpteo provides a tutorial for users of the 
“Sketchup” 3D modelling software, available at: <http://
www.sculpteo.com/en/tutorial/prepare-your-model-3d-
printing-ketchup/.>
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or x-rays. Hence, it reproduces a high-resolution 
and accurate digital model of the scanned object 
(“3D visualization”). Third, photogrammetry is a 
valid alternative to 3D scanning. It is a photography 
technique that uses software tools for stitching a 
series of 2D photographs – taken from different 
angles – together into a 3D model.
4 A CAD file can be saved in different formats, such as 
the .stl format (“STereoLithography”) or the .amf 
format (“Additive Manufacturing Format”). The .stl 
format merely describes the surface geometry of a 
three-dimensional object as a set of triangular faces, 
whereas the .amf format is an XML-based format 
inclusive of information about the volumetric 
structure of the interior, composition, colour, 
geometry and material.
5 At a second stage, CAD files need to be processed, 
in order to become printable. Hence, a (CAD or 
scanned) 3D model has to be segmented into a 
number of layers by specialized software, so-called 
“Computer-Aided Manufacturing” software or 
“slicer”. The latter generates a G-code for each layer, 
which contains commands to tell the printer how to 
manufacture the object3. The slicing programs are 
usually included with the printer or available online 
for download4.
6 It emerges from the above considerations that three 
consecutive steps have to be followed in an ordinary 
3DP process: the creation of a virtual 3D model; the 
deconstruction of the 3D model into a series of 
slices (“slicing”), which are sent to the 3D printer 
through a computer code; the final print, consisting 
in a layer-by-layer deposition of suitable materials.
7 3DP has gained a wider distribution among the 
general public in recent years. The launch of Open 
Source Hardware initiatives, such as the “Replicating 
Rapid Prototyping” (“RepRap”) project5, together 
with the expiration of a number of key patents on 3D 
printing technologies, have contributed to a steady 
improvement in the quality of personal 3D printers 
and to a considerable reduction in hardware costs6. 
The technology has, therefore, crossed over into 
3 The CAD and CAM functions could also be integrated into a 
single CAD/CAM program.
4 E.g. Slic3r, Cura and Skeinforge.
5 This project was launched by a research team at the 
University of Bath. The idea was to create an open source 
3D printer capable of reproducing its own spare parts. The 
specifications of the hardware (e.g. CAD files, mechanical 
drawings, diagrams, etc.) were made freely available online 
for anyone to use, modify and update. The RepRap project 
could be realised because key patents, covering the fused 
deposition modelling technique, had expired.
6 Before 2009 the cheapest personal 3D printer on the market 
was offered for around €15.000. Today, the price for a 
personal 3D printer ranges from €500 to € 2000.
the consumer sphere, with over 100,000 desktop 3D 
printers having been sold so far7.
8 Furthermore, online platforms dedicated to the 
dissemination of CAD files (“digital-design-file-
sharing”) have grown in popularity. These platforms 
have contributed to the creation of a communication 
infrastructure that is a powerful tool for co-creation. 
They enable individuals to connect to a vast and 
distributed network, where they can upload, 
download, edit, remix, share or indeed sell a CAD 
file, from which a 3D printed product will emerge.
9 Some recent studies, conducted by Rayna et 
al.8, Moilanen et al.9, and Mendis et al.10, provide 
examples of the diversity of existing 3DP platforms. 
The latter include platforms, such as Thingiverse, 
where users license their CAD files – rather than 
selling them – under Creative Commons licences 
(CC) or General Public Licence (GPL). By using CC 
licences, the CAD file’s proprietor can withhold 
certain rights (e.g. the right of attribution and the 
right to make derivative works), and impose that 
derivatives should be licensed under the same terms 
as the licence of the original CAD file (the “Share 
Alike” clause). Furthermore, the “Non Commercial 
Use” clause restricts the possibility for the licensee 
to use the CAD file for commercial purposes.
10 Other platforms, such as Cuboyo, offer paid 
downloads to users’ CAD files (i.e. the 30% of the sale 
price goes to the website, whereas the remaining 
70% goes to the seller)11. Moreover, online platforms, 
such as Shapeways and Sculpteo, offer printing and 
delivery services on demand. Taking as an example 
the architecture of Sculpteo, the 3DP process takes 
place in the following way: individual users upload 
their CAD files onto Sculpteo website; Sculpteo 
automatically repairs any defect and optimizes the 
digital blueprint, with its own 3D tools; then, it prints 
the object and delivers it to costumers in finished 
form, charging a price for its activities.
11 Whether personal 3DP will reach its full potential in 
7 Mendis, Secchi, report commissioned by the UK Intellectual 
Property Office, A Legal and Empirical Study of 3D Printing 
Online Platforms and an Analysis of User Behaviour (March 
2015), p. 2.
8 Ranya, Striukova, Darlington, Open Innovation, Co-Creation 
and Mass Customisation: What Role for 3D Printing Platfroms?, 
T. D. Brunoe et al. (eds.), Proceedings of the 7th World 
Conference on Mass Customization, Personalization, and 
Co-Creation (MCPC 2014), Aalborg, Springer (2014).
9 Moilanen, Daly, Lobato, Allen, Cultures of Sharing in 3D 
Printing: What Can we Learn From the Licence Choices of 
Thingiverse Users?, Journal of Peer Production (6), Disruption 
and the Law (2015), available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2440027>. 
10 Supra note 7.




the near future is not altogether clear yet. For the 
time being, 3D printing by individual makers reveals 
major technical limitations to seriously hinder the 
market for quality products. The 3DP community 
is still a small niche, and the dissemination of CAD 
files on the Internet is not a mass phenomenon yet. 
So far, digital-design-file-sharing shows a high level 
of participation by 3DP enthusiasts12. Furthermore, 
to date, there is only evidence of IP infringement 
occurring on a small scale, on online platforms such 
as Thingiverse13.
12 Having noted that, the speed of technical 
developments in consumer 3D printing is undeniable. 
The level of precision and accuracy attainable by a 
desktop 3D printer is steadily rising. The price of 
printing material has dropped drastically, and the 
technology has also become faster, more reliable 
and cheaper.
13 Furthermore, there are continuous attempts to make 
3D printing more easily accessible and affordable for 
the average consumer. To give a recent example, 
an Italian company specialized in rapid prototyping 
and digital fabrication, called Solido 3D, came up with 
one of the latest innovation in 3DP. It developed a 
device, named “OLO”, which enables printing 3D 
objects directly from a smartphone14. Because of its 
size, weight, and battery power source, this device is 
considered as the first portable 3D printer, available 
for sale at the price of $ 9915.
14 It is therefore maintained that, although personal 
3D printers are still far from being ubiquitous, it 
is just a matter of time until ordinary people will 
manufacture – directly from a digital file – an 
increasing number of items at the comfort of their 
home. Furthermore, in the event that products are 
not capable of being printed by means of personal 
3D printer, it is possible to outsource the actual 
manufacture to bureau services, such as Sculpteo 
and Shapeways. Users can create online shopfronts, 
where they display their own CAD files for products. 
The Internet operator will then 3D print the product 
on demand and deliver it worldwide. 
12 Based on data extracted from 17 online platforms, the total 
number of downloads, for the time-period 2008-2014, is 
around 40.000. See Mendis, Secchi, UK Intellectual Property 
Office (2015), supra note 7, p. 28.
13 See Hamdi, IP Law vs 3D Printing: the 5 Worst Examples, Trinckle 
blog (September 18, 2015). Retrieved February 7, 2016 from 
<https://www.trinckle.com/blog/ip-vs-3dp/>. 
14 See <www.olo3d.net>.
15 OLO is a crowd-funded project, launched on kickstarter on 
March 21, 2016. The aim of the developers of this portable 
3D printer was to raise $ 80.000 in one month, whereas they 
reached this goal in just thirty-three minutes. At the end of 
the fundraising campaign, they collected $ 2,321,811 with 
16,180 backers from all over the world.
I. Is a CAD file a computer program?
15 An emerging body of literature has addressed the 
question of whether CAD files warrant copyright 
protection16. Some scholars have suggested that 
the definition of computer programs is perfectly 
compatible with CAD files17. The present writer, 
however, rejects former existing assumptions on 
the application of this analogy.
16 As noted above, a CAD file simultaneously 
encompasses both a “design drawing component” 
and a “code component”. The latter serves to give 
a series of instructions to the printer (i.e. where to 
move the print head and how fast to deposit the 
material). Even if a CAD file embeds a code, it is not 
the equivalent of a computer program. This in light 
of the fact that the designer of a CAD model does not 
write the code herself, at least not directly.
17 As noted by Dolinsky, “the CAD designer ... “creates” 
the code necessary to print the object only by 
creating the design”, whereas the CAD software 
programmer has already predetermined the code 
associated with a pre-made shape or a free-hand 
drawing18. It is therefore only the CAD software 
that finds protection under the Software Directive 
2009/24/EC, not the CAD file itself.
18 Although an enquiry on the copyright status of 
CAD files goes beyond the purposes of the present 
analysis, it is here suggested that a CAD file merely 
serves as the medium in which a copyright protected 
work (i.e. artistic work) is recorded. To the extent 
that the design drawing component of the CAD file 
is the expression of the author’s creativity, and is not 
dictated by purely functional considerations, it may 
qualify as a copyright protected work. By contrast, 
the file itself is just the medium in which the work is 
recorded. The fact that the work exists in digital file 
format does not change its nature. In this respect, 
a CAD file bears a certain similarity to other files, 
16 Among others: Rideout, Printing the Impossible Triangle: 
The Copyright Implications of Three-Dimensional Printing, The 
Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law (2011), 
5(1); Simon, When Copyright Can Kill: How 3D Printers Are 
Breaking the Barriers Between “Intellectual” Property and the 
Physical World, PIPSELF (2013), 3; Weinberg, What’s the Deal 
with Copyright and 3D Printing, available at <https://www.
publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/whats-the-deal-
with-copyright-and-3d-printing> (2013); Dolinsky, CAD’s 
Cradle: Untangling Copyrightability, Derivative Works, and Fair 
Use in 3D Printing, Washington and Lee Law Review (2014), 
71(1); Mendis, Clone Wars Episode II – The Next Generation: The 
Copyright Implications Relating to 3D Printing and Computer-
Aided Design (CAD) Files,  Law, Innovation and Technology 
(2014), 6(2).
17 See, among others, Bradshaw, Bowyer, Haufe, The Intellectual 
Property Implications of Low-Cost 3D Printing, SCRIPTed (2010), 
7(1), p. 24.
18 Dolinsky, supra note 16, p. 641.
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such as JPG or PDF files, which respectively embed 
a photograph or a literary work.
19 Therefore, the distinction between what is the 
work of authorship, as opposed to the medium of its 
expression, takes on a particular significance when 
claiming copyright protection of CAD files.
II. Aim of the present analysis
20 This paper explores whether design protection is 
available under the current European regulatory 
framework for designs that are computer-created 
by means of CAD software, and, if so, under what 
circumstances. The key point is whether the 
appearance of a product, embedded in a CAD 
file, could be regarded as a protectable element 
under existing legislation. To this end, it begins 
with an inquiry into the concepts of “design” and 
“product”, set forth in Article 3 of the Community 
Design Regulation No. 6/2002 (“CDR”). Then, it 
considers the EUIPO’s practice of accepting 3D digital 
representations of designs. The enquiry goes on to 
illustrate the implications that the making of a CAD 
file available online might have. It suggests that the 
act of uploading a CAD file onto a 3D printing platform 
may be tantamount to a disclosure for the purposes 
of triggering unregistered design protection, and for 
appraising the state of the prior art. It also argues 
that, when measuring the individual character 
requirement, the notion of “informed user” and 
“the designer’s degree of freedom” may need to 
be reconsidered in the future. The following part 
touches on the exceptions to design protection, 
with a special focus on the repairs clause set forth 
in Article 110 CDR. The concluding part explores 
different measures that may be implemented to 
prohibit the unauthorised creation and sharing of 
CAD files embedding design-protected products.
B. Designs in the European Union
21 For the purposes of the Community Design 
Regulation (“CDR”), “design” means “the appearance 
of the whole or a part of a product”19. While there 
is no definition of appearance, Article 3(a) CDR 
provides a non-exhaustive list of elements that one 
may have to consider, for appraising the external 
aspect of a product. These elements include the lines, 
contours, colours, shape, texture and/or materials of 
the product itself and/or its ornamentation. These 
features are all perceivable by the human eye or by 
the sense of touch, whereas sounds and smells are 
19 Article 3(a) CDR.
not contemplated20. Yet the CDR does not make the 
eye appeal a necessary prerequisite for registration.
22 Furthermore, as noted by the European Commission 
in the 1991 “Green Paper on the Legal Protection of 
Industrial Design”21, the external aspect of a product 
is of considerable economic importance. The notion 
of appearance, therefore, should be broad enough 
to encompass any economic value attached to the 
aspect of a product.
23 Article 3(b) CDR goes on to define a product as “any 
industrial or handicraft item other than computer 
programs”. It then offers some guidance as to the 
type of designs that are eligible for protection. The 
latter include both three-dimensional designs, such 
as packaging and get-up, and two-dimensional 
designs, such as graphic symbols and typefaces22. 
Designs of parts of products, for which no assembly 
is required, and designs of component parts, which 
are intended to be assembled in a larger complex 
product, can also be protected23.
24 The concept of product, therefore, is central to the 
whole structure of the CDR. The essence of a design 
is the appearance of a product. Furthermore, as 
explained below in more detail, there should be a 
product, to which the design is applied, in order to 
commit an infringement.
25 The following enquiry aims at analysing whether the 
appearance of a product that is represented digitally 
as a CAD file may attract design protection under 
existing EU legislation.
I. The visual element of a CAD file
26 The ultimate generation of designs created by 
means of CAD software embed all information that is 
needed to define the outer appearance of a product. 
Embedded data can describe the geometry, as well 
as the colours and materials of the product. In this 
respect, the design-drawing component of a CAD 
file differs from traditional blueprints or technical 
drawings. In most cases, blueprints only define the 
geometrical aspect of an object. They may be seen as 
graphical abstractions of the intended product that 
need to be interpreted by a human being.
27 CAD files, instead, may define all the properties 
20 See Suthersanen, Design Law: European Union and United States 
of America, 2nd edn., Sweet and Maxwell (2010), p. 95.
21 European Commission, Green Paper on the Legal Protection 
of Industrial Design, June 1991, at 2.1.2.
22 The list of products enumerated in this provision is not 
intended to be exhaustive.




and attributes of the product to be printed. They 
may contain the entire product design that, when 
printed, will be a finished 3D product. In such a case, 
in parallel with a photograph, the visual element of a 
CAD file – i.e. the image of the product stored therein 
– may be regarded as a view of the appearance of 
the finished product, for which protection is sought.
28 The CAD file can be seen as the medium in which the 
design is first recorded. Hence, as noted below, the 
appearance of the product embodied therein may 
enjoy Community design protection, irrespective of 
whether the product comes into existence or not.
29 By contrast, in case where a CAD model does not 
clearly reveal the outer appearance of the product, it 
may be allegedly considered as a blueprint protected 
in class 19-08 of the Locarno classification (i.e. “other 
printed matters”)24.
II. Digital item embedded in a 
CAD file: design protection?
30 The issue at stake is whether a digital item, which 
is computer created by means of CAD software and 
recorded in a CAD file, may attract design protection 
in its own right, as a graphic symbol.
31 At first reading, the notion of a “design” seems to be 
confined to the appearance of products having some 
physical form, insofar as the CDR makes express 
reference to “industrial or handicraft items”, and 
expressly excludes computer programs.
32 Hence, the definition of “product” set forth in the 
CDR may give rise to a certain degree of uncertainty 
as to whether a design, that is not applied to a 
product in the sense of a physical, tangible object, 
should likewise be considered as a protectable 
element under existing regulation. The inclusion 
of graphic symbols in the meaning of products 
indicates that protectable designs need not be 
tied to a physical dimension. The European Union 
Intellectual Property Office (“EUIPO”) guidelines 
provide some assistance in this respect. The Office’s 
practice allows registration of screen displays, icons, 
and other visible elements of a computer program, 
such as graphical user interfaces (“GUIs”), in Locarno 
class 14, Subclass 04 (“screen displays and icons”)25.
24 See EUIPO Guidelines for Examination of Registered 
Community Designs, version of 01/08/2016, at 4.1.1.
25 Id., EUIPO Guidelines, at 4.1.3. Also, the Explanatory 
Memorandum clarifies that the exclusion provided in the 
CDR for computer programs does not extend to “specific 
graphic designs as applied, for example, to icons or menus”. 
See EU Commission, Explanatory Memorandum on the 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation 
on the Community Design, 3 December 1993, p. 11.
33 Therefore, design protection appears to cover all 
digital items – with the sole exclusion of sounds and 
animated images – that appear on electronic devices, 
such as computer screens or mobile phones.
34 By contrast, computer programs as such are excluded 
from design protection. The reason for inserting 
this exclusion is explained in the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the first proposal of the CDR. 
The rationale was mainly to avoid any potential 
interference with the Software Directive which 
might arise whenever copyright protection provided 
under the aforementioned Directive is supplemented 
or reinforced by a protection of the “look and feel” of 
a computer program by way of design protection26.
35 In theory, if a computer item is eligible for 
protection, the digital item represented in a CAD file 
could likewise enjoy Community design protection. 
One may argue that, in parallel with other computer 
icons, the item embodied in a CAD file is a graphic 
symbol that appears on a computer screen when 
the file is loaded. Since the CDR enumerates graphic 
symbols as a category of product of their own, their 
appearance can be protected under the title of 
Community designs.
36 This analogy appears questionable, however. There 
is a substantial difference between a computer icon 
and a product embedded in a CAD file. The former 
fulfils its function exclusively once it is displayed on 
a computer screen. As noted by Margoni, it does not 
even possess the characteristics to be manufactured 
or printed into an industrial or handicraft item27. It 
is “intangible” by its very nature. On the contrary, 
not only can an item embedded in a CAD file become 
tangible once it is shown on a computer screen, but 
it could also be turned into a physical product at the 
click of a button.
37 In other terms, the reason why a person creates a 
CAD file is to enable the manufacturing of the object 
embodied therein. Design rights are vested in the 
appearance of the product to be made from that file.
38 Having noted that, an applicant may also wish to 
protect the virtual product per se under the scope 
of European design law in order to avoid the risk 
that no protection will be available, should a third 
party make a digital copy of its design, i.e. creates 
a CAD file depicting the design-protected product 
and uploads such CAD file on the Internet. In fact, 
as discussed below in more detail, Article 19 CDR 
seems to confine infringing use of a design to use in 
relation to physical goods or corporeal movables28.
26 Id., Explanatory Memorandum, p. 11.
27 Margoni, Not for Designers: On the Inadequacies of EU Design Law 
and How to Fix It, JIPITEC, (2013), 4(3), p. 232.
28 See below, part G.
CAD Files and European Design Law
2016151 2
39 For the sake of clarity, it seems rather unrealistic 
to assume, in the absence of a specific provision, 
that digital items represented in the form of CAD 
files could be seen as “products”, whose appearance 
deserves protection in its own right. The definition 
of “design” would need to be broadened in future 
legislation in order to cover a wider range of 
“immaterial” protectable elements.
III. CAD drawings as graphical 
representations
40 Under current practice, the drawing component of 
a CAD file may serve as a “graphic representation” 
of the design for which protection is sought. The 
following analysis attempts to clarify this point.
41 A person seeking protection for their design at 
the EU level has the option to either apply for a 
Registered Community Design (“RCD”) through the 
EUIPO, before disclosing it, or, alternatively, opt 
for an anti-copying right, relying on Unregistered 
Community Design (“UCD”) protection.
42 In the former case, in order to have a valid 
application for a RCD, Article 36 CDR requires to 
include “a representation of the design that is 
suitable for reproduction”. There are several ways 
in which a design can be represented. The EUIPO 
accepts drawings, photographs and computer-made 
representations (i.e. CAD representations), either in 
black or in colour, provided that they are of quality, 
permitting all details of the design to be clearly 
distinguished29.
43 Hence, it may well be that, in parallel with a 
photograph, a CAD representation is used to disclose 
the features of the design for which protection is 
sought. By way of explanation, if the applicant 
wishes to register the design of a table knife, rather 
than affixing a photograph of such a knife, she can 
affix the 3D representation, created by CAD software, 
of the same household good. The applicant will then 
have to indicate “knives” as the relevant product 
category (class 7-03 of the Locarno classification)30. 
44 However, in order to be of quality, a CAD 
representation should enable to determine, with 
clarity, the subject matter of the protection afforded 
by the RCD to its holder. Hence, it should contain 
clear and intelligible information about the sizes, 
dimensions, and colours of the item in which the 
29 EUIPO Guidelines, supra note 25, at 3.3.1.
30 The EUIPO has recently released an e-filing tool, called “3D 
image uploader”, that allows the applicant to upload and 
store its CAD files.  The applicant can move the 3D image, 
zoom in and out, take some pictures from different views, 
and select between a maximum of 7 static views.
design is incorporated or to which the design is 
applied.
45 Interestingly, a recent decision from the UK Supreme 
Court, PMS International Group Plc31, is notable for 
stressing the importance of the images affixed in 
the application form, for determining the scope of 
Community design protection. As noted by Lord 
Neurberger, when it comes to deciding the extent 
of protection afforded by a RCD, the question “must 
ultimately depend on the proper interpretation of 
the registration in issue, and in particular of the 
images included in the registration”32. Therefore, it 
will almost always be the images that “exclusively 
identify the nature and extent of the monopoly” 
which the applicant is claiming33.
46 The case concerned an alleged infringement of a 
RCD, which consisted of six images prepared by CAD 
software of an item (a ride-on animal suitcase) whose 
main body appeared as a uniform grey, but which 
had black strips in the front, a black strap on the 
top and black wheels.  After analysing these images, 
it was not clear whether the two-tone colouring 
on the CAD images – i.e. the contrast in colour 
between grey and black – was simply an artefact 
of the computer-generated process or a visual cue 
to indicate that the wheels and the strap should be 
considered as separate components. The problem, 
therefore, was whether the RCD was to be considered 
as protection for the shape only, or for the shape in 
two contrasting colours. Only in the latter case, the 
overall impression created by this contrast in colour 
could be considered.
47 It might be, therefore, that CAD representations 
depict some unnecessary tonal contrast. This, in 
turn, could generate confusion and be understood 
as limiting the scope of design protection to certain 
colours only.
48 The application for a RCD should also indicate the 
products in which the design in intended to be 
incorporated or to which it is intended to be applied. 
In this respect, it is worth noting that product 
classification mainly serves administrative purposes 
and does not affect the scope of design protection34. 
Once the design is registered, it is protected against 
any use in relation to any product that does not 
produce a different overall impression on the 
informed user.
49 Once the request for registration is filed, the EUIPO 
carries out an ex officio examination of the two 
absolute grounds for non-registrability, set forth in 
31 PMS International Group Plc v Magmatic Ltd [2016] UKSC 12.
32 Id., at 30.
33 Id., at 31.




Article 47 CDR. Namely, the Office verifies whether 
the subject matter of the application corresponds to 
the definition of a design foreseen in Article 3(a) CDR, 
and whether or not it is contrary to public policy 
and accepted principles of morality. Therefore, 
the registration procedure is kept to a minimum. 
Compliance with the novelty and individual 
character requirements will only be examined at a 
second stage if a third party submits an application 
for a declaration of invalidity.
50 It should also be noted that the EUIPO examines 
whether the appearance of the “product” is disclosed 
in the light of the design itself. Whether the product 
is actually made or used, or can be made or used, in 
an industrial or handicraft fashion, is not taken into 
consideration35. In fact, there is no requirement to 
submit a specimen of the claimed RCD.
51 This, in turn, implies that a person can: create a CAD 
file for a product by means of CAD software; include 
in the application for a RCD an image taken from 
such a CAD file; obtain a design registration covering 
the product design represented therein, irrespective 
of whether the product is actually manufactured or 
not.
52 This leads to the outcome that, although the entire 
regulatory framework in EU design law is structured 
on the concept of “product”, a design is protectable 
regardless of whether a product comes into existence 
or not. Accordingly, legal protection does not depend 
on whether designs represented as CAD models exist 
as tangible articles or not.
C. Unregistered design 
protection of CAD files
53 An Unregistered Community Design (“UCD”) is based 
on the same substantive provisions postulating the 
validity requirements for a RCD.  The meaning of 
“design”, “appearance” and “product” are the same 
for both RCD and UCD. As a general matter, any 
design capable of being registered at the EU level 
could also benefit from the protection granted to 
UCD.
54 There are, however, substantial differences between 
RCD and UCD. A RCD confers a true monopoly, 
whereas an UCD grants the right to prevent any 
commercial use of a design that is an intentional 
copy of the protected one. Yet, it should not be 
demonstrated that the alleged infringer acted in 
bad faith. Furthermore, a RCD confers protection 
for up to 25 years, subject to renewal each five years, 
whereas an UCD affords protection for only three 
35 Id., at 4.1.
years.
55 Protection of the UCD commences from the date 
on which the design has been “made available to 
the public” within the EU. As Recital 16 CDR puts 
forth, there is no need to register products having 
a short market life. A designer can introduce a new 
design testing the market and file an application for 
registration at a second stage. In fact, the designer 
is entitled to register her design within a 12-month 
period (“grace period”) from the date of the first 
disclosure. In other words, in the event that the 
designer files an application for a RCD, disclosure 
during the year preceding the date of filing shall not 
be taken into consideration when appraising novelty 
and individual character of the design in question, 
pursuant to Article 7(2) CDR.
56 Let us now assume that a CAD file for a product to 
which a design is applied is uploaded onto a website 
which is a 3DP marketplace or repository. This, in 
turn, raises a number of questions. Should the act 
of uploading a CAD file onto an online 3DP platform 
be tantamount to a disclosure of the design to the 
public, which triggers UCD protection? Has the 
design been “made available to the public”, and 
become known in the normal course of trade? Has 
the 12-month grace period commenced?
57 The following part of this paper detects the 
circumstances under which a design shall be 
deemed to have been made available to the public. 
The phrase “made available to the public”, for the 
purposes of identifying the date on which UCD 
protection commences, is defined under Article 
11(2) CDR. This provision mirrors Article 7(1) CDR, 
which clarifies when a design has been disclosed 
for considering questions of novelty and individual 
character, for both registered and unregistered 
designs. In fact, all designs made available to the 
public, prior to the relevant date (indicated at Article 
5(1)(a)&(b) and 6(1)(a)&(b)), are to be taken into 
account to determine whether a design is new and 
if it has individual character. This, in turn, raises an 
additional question: should we consider all the CAD 
models that have been previously uploaded onto 
3DP online platforms as antecedent designs in the 
prior art?
58 It should also be noted that a disclosure should take 
place within the territory of the European Union 
in order to create an UCD. Hence, UCD protection 
is not afforded to designs that have first been 
made available outside the EU. On the contrary, 
this requirement is not imposed under Article 7 
CDR, which defines the notion of disclosure that is 
relevant for determining the state of the prior art.
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D. The concept of “made 
available to the public” 
59 Articles 7(1) and 11(2) CDR provide some guidance to 
assess whether a design has been ‘made available to 
the public’. This is the case if “it has been published 
following registration or otherwise, or exhibited, 
used in trade or otherwise disclosed”. The following 
part of these provisions set forth the so-called “safe-
guard” clause, stipulating that a disclosure shall 
not be taken into consideration if these events 
(publication, exhibition, and use in trade) could 
not have become known “in the normal course 
of business to the circles specialised in the sector 
concerned”, operating within the Community.
60 The EUIPO36’s case law from 2004 onwards allows 
enough clearance on which acts constitute a 
disclosure of a design to the public, which could also 
become known in the normal course of business to 
specialised circles.
61 A remarkable ruling that helps us to understand 
better whether the publication of a CAD file on 
an online platform would amount to a disclosure 
to the public is the Board’s decision in Crocs, Inc. v 
Holey Soles Holdings Ltd37. The holder of a RCD for 
Crocs clogs, which was published in the Bulletin 
of 8 February, 2005, conceded that the design had 
already been published on www.crocs.com before 
28 May, 2003. Nonetheless, the right owner argued 
that such disclosure on the website did not destroy 
novelty of the design in question, since it could not 
have reasonably become known in the Community.
62 At that time, the website was unsophisticated and 
virtually impossible to access. The website merely 
functioned as an information tool for persons “who 
might have learnt about the clogs from people 
who had already bought them” and was not used 
as a large mail order service. Websites that will be 
regarded as a source of inspiration for developing 
new designs are those of the established footwear 
companies, such as Nike or Adidas, whereas Crocs Inc. 
was not an established manufacturer at the relevant 
date38.
63 The Third Board of Appeal dismissed the appellant’s 
findings. In the first place, the Board found that the 
Internet is a formidable information tool and is used 
by designers in footwear as well as in other fields 
as a resource in the development of their designs. 
Moreover, Crocs website was an active website 
36 Formerly called Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market (“OHIM”).
37 OHIM Third Board of Appeal, decision of 26 March 2010 – R 
9/2008-3.
38 Id., at 10(d). 
already at that date and was configured to function 
as a sales channel. Henceforth, the audience targeted 
by the website was not only composed by those who 
knew Crocs from before39.
64 Accordingly, when a design is published on a website, 
it will per se be publicly disclosed and reasonably 
become known in the normal course of business, 
even if the circles specialised in the sector were not 
aware of the website owner at that date40. This is 
further confirmed in recent case law from the EUIPO. 
As a matter of principle, information disclosed on 
the Internet or in online databases forms part of the 
prior art and is considered to be publicly available as 
of the date the information was posted41.
65 Moreover, neither restricting access to a limited 
circle of people (for example, by using password 
protection) nor requiring payment for access (in the 
same way as requiring a payment for subscribing to 
a journal or purchasing a book) prevent a webpage 
from being part of the prior art. The European circles 
specialised in the sector concerned could reasonably 
meet the accessibility requirement42.
66 A disclosure shall be deemed to be obscure and 
irretrievable only in situations in which a design 
disappears from mankind’s memory over time 
and is available only in a local museum or traded 
on a remote local market. This is not the case for 
prior designs made available online. Users – either 
the broad public or experts in a particular field of 
industry – use the service of web browsers, such as 
Google or Yahoo, to search on the Internet. By using 
keywords, they can easily find websites dealing with 
a particular subject matter. Therefore, once a design 
is published on the Internet it becomes automatically 
accessible and retrievable43.
67 For the purposes of applying Articles 5 and 6 CDR, 
a disclosure could also take place outside the EU, 
insofar as the design has become known in the 
trade circles in the European Union. The question 
of whether events taking place outside the EU could 
reasonably have become known to persons forming 
part of specialized circles in the EU is a question of 
fact, dependent on the particular circumstances of 
each individual case44. In theory, even where the 
39 Id., at 85-92.
40 Suthersanen, supra note 20, p. 126.
41 OHIM Invalidity Division, Mariusz Adamski Adams Group 
v Abakus Direct Ltd, decision of 10 July 2014, at 13. In the 
present case the holder had disclosed its design on eBay 
prior to the RCD’s filing.
42 OHIM Invalidity Division, Napco Beds B.V. v Leopold Meijnen 
Oosterbaan, decision of 24 February 2015, at 13.
43 OHIM, Invalidity Division, Samsung Electronics CO. Limited et 
al. v Apple Inc., decision of 05 July 2013, at 70-71.
44 See the CJEU’s ruling in H. Gautzsch GroBhanden GmbH & Co. 




design has been disclosed to a single undertaking 
within the EU, a disclosure of that kind may, indeed, 
be sufficient for that purpose45.
68 Making a design available overseas, therefore, 
may destroy novelty on the basis that Article 7(1) 
CDR is not geographically restricted to the EU. 
On the contrary, the same disclosure taking place 
outside the EU may not be sufficient to commence 
UCD protection, given the territorial qualification 
contained in Article 11(1) CDR46.
69 It is therefore maintained that, in principle, the act of 
uploading a CAD file onto an online platform should 
be a sufficient ground for “disclosing” the design 
represented therein, for the purposes of applying 
Articles 5 and 6 CDR. A CAD file is retrievable and 
easily accessible by Internet users, including experts 
in the field. This might be the case for both CAD files 
that have been made available to the public, subject 
to a Creative Commons licence, and those offered for 
sale in 3DP marketplaces.
70 It follows that whether the design is new and has 
individual character would need to be considered, 
taking into account the already-available body of 
designs, including all antecedent CAD files that have 
been previously disclosed. In other words, product 
designs embedded in CAD files that have already 
been distributed online will form part of the state 
of the prior art47.
71 The publication of the CAD file on a EU website can 
also trigger UCD protection from the date of the 
first online publication, if the criteria for protection 
(i.e. novelty and individual character) are met. The 
designer would then have the option to register the 
design within one year.
72 An unsettled issue is whether UCD protection is 
activated if the CAD file is first uploaded onto a website 
that is hosted outside the EU (such as Thingiverse). If 
the website is easily accessible by European users, 
a positive answer may appear as more appropriate 
in light of the above-mentioned case law, which 
focuses on the retrievability of Internet publications, 
whereas a literal interpretation of Article 110a (5) 
CDR may suggest the opposite.
at 34. See also OHIM Board of Appeal, Kirschenhofer GmbH v 
WS Teleshop International Handles-GmbH, decision of 11 July 
2007.
45 Id., H. Gautzsch GroBhanden GmbH, at 15.
46 See the decision of the German Federal Supreme Court of 
October 9, 2008, Gebackpresse I ZR 126/06, [2009] GRUR 79.
47 More precisely, in order to pass the novelty and individual 
character test, the design embedded in the CAD file shall 
differ from all the designs made available before: the date 
on which the file itself was published on the 3DP website, 
with respect to UCD; the date of filing or validly claimed 
priority, with respect to RCD.
73 It should also be noted that the CAD file made 
available online should clearly reveal the outer 
appearance of the product for which protection is 
sought. Lacking a clear representation of the product 
design, the act of publishing the CAD file on a website 
will not constitute a relevant disclosure for the 
purposes of Articles 7 and 11 CDR.
74 The option of making CAD files available online, 
therefore, constitutes an interesting possibility 
for those designers that want to prevent third-
parties from using their 3D models to obtain design 
protection48. When the CAD file is disclosed, all later 
designs will have to produce a different overall 
impression on the informed user.
E. Requirements that a design has to 
meet towards design protection
75 Articles 5 and 6 CDR state that a design has to be new, 
has to have individual character, and must not fall 
foul of any of the stipulated exceptions, in order to 
enjoy design protection. These requirements will be 
analysed in turn, focusing on the implications that 
3DP carries.
I. Novelty and individual character
76 A design is new only when it differs materially from 
everything that has been produced before. In fact, 
Article 5(2) CDR states that differences between 
two designs are irrelevant whenever they relate 
to mere “immaterial details”. In this regard, the 
novelty requirement is much closer to that for utility 
patents, rather than the originality requirement 
for copyright protection. It follows that users who 
download already-existing CAD models from a 3DP 
platform will have to modify them substantially in 
order for their designs to be new.
77 In this respect, a critical issue that 3DP poses is 
whether customized designs differ materially from 
other designs that have been made available before. 
Today, many companies, such as eMachineShop.com or 
Shapeways, manufacture customized products based 
on consumers’ CAD files. From an IP perspective, a 
key issue is whether customized products provide 
“added value” because they imprint true novelty, 
or because they just enhance the value inherent in 
the design of the core product. It may well be that 
customized designs lack in novelty, since they differ 
from the core product design in details that are 
immaterial, banal or commonplace.
48 Margoni (2013), supra note 27, p. 241, at 113.
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78 Novelty and individual character overlap to a certain 
extent. The main difference between these criteria 
lies in the kind of examination carried out by the 
EUIPO. When assessing novelty, the EUIPO makes a 
comparison between the overall appearances of the 
two designs. In contrast, when measuring individual 
character, the EUIPO considers the overall impression 
that the design produces on the “informed user”. 
Therefore, any reference to the informed user is not 
justified when assessing novelty. It is the Board’s 
task to measure the differences between the designs 
under examination on the basis of their overall 
appearance49.
79 The test for individual character is less 
straightforward and is likely to give rise to slightly 
more subjective appraisals50. In Karen Millen 
Fashions51, the CJEU held that, in order for a design 
to be considered to have individual character, the 
overall impression which that design produces 
on the informed user must be different from that 
produced on such a user “not by a combination of 
features taken in isolation and drawn from a number 
of earlier designs, but by one or more earlier designs, 
taken individually”.
80 Therefore, the assessment as to whether the 
product design embedded in a CAD file has 
individual character must be conduced in relation 
to individualised, defined and identified designs that 
have been made available to the public previously.
81 Furthermore, in its recent decision in H&M Hennes & 
Mauritz BV52, the CJEU held that the assessment of the 
individual character of a Community design is the 
result of a four-stage examination, which consists in 
deciding upon: first, the sector to which the products 
belong; second, the identity of the informed user 
of those products; third, the designer’s degree 
of freedom in developing his design; fourth, the 
outcome of the comparison of the designs at issue. 
The designer’s degree of freedom cannot, on its own, 
give rise to an outcome as regards the assessment of 
individual character, but can only “reinforce” this 
evaluation. The starting point should always be the 
perception of the informed user.
82 The problem is how to carry out the four-stage 
examination of the individual character requirement 
with respect to CAD files. In order to be protectable, 
a product design in the form of a CAD file should 
49 OHIM Third Board of Appeal, Imperial International Limited v 
Handl Cookware Limited, decision of 2 September 2008, at 11-
12.
50 OHIM Third Board of Appeal, Daka Research Inc. v Ampel 24 
Vertiebs-GmbH & Co. KG, decision of 22 November 2006, at 20.
51 Karen Millen Fashions Ltd v Dunnes stores et al. C-345/13 ECDR 
17, at 35.
52 H&M Hennes & Mauritz BV & Co. KG v OHIM – Yves Saint Laurent 
(handbags) T-526/13, at 32-34.
produce an overall impression on the informed user 
that differs from the impression produced by all 
previous designs. Therefore, such a design will only 
pass the individual character test if it differs from: a) 
any CAD file for a product that has been previously 
uploaded onto a 3DP platform; b) any product that 
has already been marketed.
83 The situation is further complicated by the contention 
that the informed user of an item represented as 
a CAD file might need to be distinguished from 
the informed user of the corresponding physical 
product. Arguably, the former should be the user 
of a 3DP platform, who wants to 3D print the item, 
rather than the person who purchases the product 
in a retail store.
84 Let us assume that a CAD file represents a bottle 
opener, and that a later CAD file depicts a similar bottle 
opener. In potential litigation, the informed user for 
assessing the individual character requirement of 
the disputed design could be: a private individual 
who drinks wine; a professional (e.g. waiter or 
sommelier); the user of a 3DP platform, who wants 
to manufacture the bottle opener at home.
85 Therefore, a number of issues need to be addressed. 
Who is the informed user of CAD files? How should 
we evaluate the degree of freedom of the CAD file’s 
designer? Will the individual character threshold 
become less strict in the future if the market sectors 
become overcrowded? The next paragraph suggests 
some possible answers to these questions.
II. The “informed user” in the 
3D printing landscape
86 For the purposes of this analysis, it is worth asking, in 
the first place, who would be the notional informed 
user, if an increasing number of individuals engage 
in the creation of CAD models and in digital-design-
file-sharing. Everyone can now design a product 
from scratch by using CAD software. Users can also 
download third parties’ CAD files and use online 
tools to transform, adapt or recast the pre-existing 
designs. Individual makers are both users and 
designers. Hence, the following analysis suggests 
that, if it becomes common practice that people 
not only print but also design their own product at 
home, the notion of informed user might need to be 
revisited in the future. It argues that informed users 
would tend to belong to the circles specialised in the 
sector concerned, and resemble the “person skilled 
in the art” in patent law.
87 The legal concept of “informed user” differs from 
that of “average consumer” in EU trademark law. 




part of the average consumer plays a vital role 
in trademark law, which is aimed at preventing 
consumer confusion or deception. To the contrary, 
design law protects the appearance of a product. 
This implies that the informed user should not 
merely half-remembering the articles but also have 
a certain degree of familiarity with the item goods 
in which the design is incorporated53.
88 Hence, according to established case law, the 
informed user shall be particularly observant, aware 
of the state of the art in the sector concerned, and 
use the product related to the RCD in accordance 
with the purpose for which the product is intended54. 
The background knowledge of the items is certainly 
higher than average, but not even too specific. She is 
more than a mere consumer, but is less than a design 
expert. Moreover, Lord Justice Jacob, in Procter & 
Gamble Company v Reckitt Benckiser (UK) Limited55, 
highlighted that the informed user is not the same 
sort of person as the ‘person skilled in the art’ of 
patent law. The equivalent to that person in the field 
of design would be some sort of average “designer”, 
not a “user”.
89 Originally, the EUIPO’s Invalidity Division adopted 
a rather different approach. The informed user was 
found to be a person aware of the prior art known 
in the normal course of business to “the circles 
specialised in the sector concerned”. She does not 
ignore the specific methods and techniques of 
production56. For example, in a case concerning an 
application for a declaration of invalidity of a RCD for 
“wheels for bicycles”, the Invalidity Division found 
that the informed user is aware of the requirements 
that bicycle wheels must fulfil in order to perform 
their function. Therefore, the informed user also 
“takes into account whether the degree of freedom 
of the designer is limited by the requirement that a 
wheel has to be laced with the spokes between the 
hub and the rim and to transfer the weight of the 
rider to the rim”57.
90 It thus seems that the notion of informed user was 
once much closer to that of a design expert. The 
Invalidity Division used to consider the informed 
user as belonging the “circles specialised in the 
53 Procter & Gamble Co v. Reckitt Benckiser (UK), Ltd [2007] EWCA 
Civ 936, per LJ Jacob at 27.
54 Judgement of the General Court (First Chamber), 9 
September 2011, in Case T-10/08, Kwang Yang Motor Co. Ltd. v 
OHIM, at 23.
55 Supra note 53, at 16.
56 OHIM Invalidity Division, Eredu S. Coop v Arrmet S.r.l., 
decision of 27 April 2004, at 18: “in particolare, l’utilizzatore 
informato non ignora lo stato della tecnica quale è 
conosciuta nel corso della normale attività commerciale 
negli ambienti specializzati del settore considerate”.
57 OHIM Invalidity Division, Rodi Commercial S.A. v ISCA S.p.A., 
decision of 30 August 2005, at 27.
sector concerned”. Nonetheless, as noted above, this 
criterion should only apply when establishing what 
is a relevant disclosure to the public, and potential 
conflicts with an already-existing design corpus, 
under Article 7 CDR. The person of the informed 
user, who is the reference for evaluating individual 
character, shall not be part of any specialised circle, 
lacking this sort or requirement in Article 6 CDR.
91 A correct interpretation of these two provisions 
should be that a design is considered to have 
individual character if the overall impression it 
produces on the informed user differs from that of 
an earlier design, which has already been disclosed 
to the public. However, a design shall not be deemed 
part of the prior art if not even the circles specialised 
in sector concerned, operating in the territory of the 
EU, are aware of its existence58.
92 Therefore, in a recent ruling, the Board of Appeal 
found that the informed user of clogs is “neither the 
manufacturer nor a seller of clogs, but the person who 
wears clogs. Without being a designer or a technical 
expert, the informed user knows the various designs 
for clogs as a result of the relevant product range 
offered in retail shops or over the Internet”59. In the 
present context, footwear designers and footwear 
industry, operating in the EU, represent the circles 
specialised in the sector concerned.
93 This paper argues that 3DP may blur the distinction 
between the notions of informed user and that of 
design expert. Users may become more and more 
aware of the specific methods and techniques of 
production. If this is the case, one will have look at 
early case law from the EUIPO in order to detect who 
should be considered the informed user, in a new 
ecosystem where the person of the designer and that 
of the user conflate to a greater extent.
III. How to evaluate the designer’s 
degree of freedom
94 Following established case law from the EUIPO, the 
designer’s degree of freedom is likely to be lower 
if she has to comply with technical constraints. 
Similarly, if a field of application is already very 
crowded, minor advances from the prior art might 
produce a different overall impression on the 
informed user60.
58 See, inter alia, opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, 5 
September 2013, in case H. Gautzsch GroBhanden, supra note, 
at 44.
59 OHIM third Board of Appeal, Hessy s.r.o. v Crocs, Inc., decision 
of 14 September 2015, at 16.
60 By way of example, the OHIM third Board of Appeal, in 
Mafin S.p.A. v Leng-D’Or S.A., decision of 4 November 2010, 
at 20-21, found that the presence of so many shapes for 
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95 On the one hand, when applying this reasoning to 
3DP, one could maintain that the designer’s degree 
of freedom will be gradually reduced. Assuming 
that an increasing number of users and companies 
will start producing and distributing their own 
versions of CAD files, and that such files form 
prior art, many market sectors will be thoroughly 
soaked. If a specific sector is saturated, it inevitably 
entails compromises, since minor differences in 
the appearance of products might be enough to 
lead to a different overall impression on the part of 
the informed user. The appearance of a contested 
design, therefore, might be very similar to that of an 
earlier design and, nonetheless, lead to a different 
overall impression.
96 Besides, it is worth considering that the designer 
has to work within certain constraints in order to 
make a 3D model suitable for printing. In the first 
place, there are some dimensional constraints. 
The designer has to comply with height and size 
requirements in order for the 3D printer to be used. 
In other words, when designing the 3D model using 
modelling software, the designer should take into 
account that printed objects are limited by the 
printers’ size61. Furthermore, a 3D model should have 
a minimum thickness, at any given point (“minimum 
wall thickness”), which depends on the material 
used. Arguably, all of these technical constraints 
limit the designer’s freedom.
97 On the other hand, one may argue that 3DP enhances 
the designer’s freedom, since it enables the creation 
of much more complex geometries, as opposed to 
traditional manufacturing processes. Furthermore, 
individuals have gained the capacity to design all 
sorts of products with a relatively low experience. 
It is also possible to find tutorials on the Internet on 
how to use modelling software, such as CAD software. 
3D scanners enable the designer to digitize without 
difficulty any physical object. The newly-created 3D 
model can then be modified, adapted and optimized.
98 Thus, it is questionable whether the designer’s 
degree of freedom should be considered lower in 3DP 
than in other design processes. This issue, however, 
is dependant on whether the technology will or will 
not become widespread. As noted above, for the time 
being, individual users engaging in the creation and 
“snacks items” is evidence of the broad possibilities open to 
the designer and, at the same time, the limits thereof. The 
designer freedom is not limitless, since the overcrowding 
of the market sector and industrial feasibility of the goods 
item determine much more constraint on a competing 
company operating in the same market sector. Accordingly, 
the designer’s degree of freedom was found to be average, 
rather than broad or limitless, and implying a gradual 
decline in the shapes that are still available.
61 It is however likely that in the future it will be possible to 
produce 3D printed products in larger sizes.
sharing of CAD files mainly include 3DP enthusiasts.
F. Exceptions to Community Design 
protection: the non-harmonisation 
of the repairs clause
99 The scope of design protection for the appearance 
of items represented as CAD files – and the 
corresponding 3D-printed products – is narrowed 
by a series of exceptions, set forth in the CDR. The 
first functionality exclusion, provided in Article 
8(1) CDR, states that a Community design shall not 
subsist in features of appearance of a product, which 
are solely dictated by its technical function. Such 
features shall not only be necessary, but essential 
to obtain a technical result. Thus, the level of 
functionality required is higher than that provided 
under trademark law.
100 In a way, such exclusion emulates the idea and 
expression dichotomy in copyright law. In fact, 
in the 1991 Green Paper on the Legal Protection 
of Industrial Design62, the European Commission 
made clear that if the designer has a choice among 
various forms, in order to arrive at the technical 
effect, the features in question could be protected. 
This, in turn, means that features of appearance 
of a product, represented as a CAD file, will not be 
granted protection if they are only indispensable 
for achieving a specific technical result. It does 
not follow, however, that the whole design will 
automatically be denied protection.
101 Over and above the general exclusion of “technical 
function”, Article 8(2) CDR provides the so-called 
“must-fit” exception or “interface” exclusion. This 
exclusion is aimed at enabling technical replacement 
products and ensuring mechanical interoperability. 
Hence, no protection is given to those features that 
must necessarily be reproduced in their exact form 
and dimension in order to permit the product, in 
which the design is incorporated, to be mechanically 
connected to another product (for example, exhaust 
pipes or coupling sleeves are examples of “must fit” 
designs in the automotive industry). This permits 
the possibility that either product may perform its 
function.
102 This provision turned out to be rather redundant, 
insofar as spare parts, which are not visible in 
normal use63, and those that are solely dictated by 
their technical function, are anyway excluded from 
design protection64.
62 At 5.4.6.2.
63 See Article 4(2)(a) CDR.




103 One of the most problematic issues the EU legislators 
had to face concerns the so-called “must-match” 
exclusion65. This exclusion deals with the visual 
synchronisation and aesthetic appearance of a 
complex product, rather than with functionality. In 
other terms, the must-match provision concerns the 
design of a component part, which should be used for 
the purpose of the repair of a complex product so as 
to restore its original appearance (e.g. the design of 
a car body panel that is used to restore the original 
appearance of the vehicle).
104 The protection of must-match spare parts has 
occasioned the greatest controversy among a wide 
range of stakeholders, especially in the automotive 
industry. The following analysis provides a brief 
overview of the legislative history on this issue. This 
will help explain why the dispute is not resolved yet.
105 The original idea in the 1993 proposals for a 
Regulation on the Community design66, and for a 
Directive on the legal protection of designs67, was 
to introduce a must-match exception in Europe, 
specifying that only after a period of three years, 
from the first placing on the market of a complex 
product, the rights conferred by a RCD could not be 
exercised to prevent third parties from using the 
design of a component part, in order to restore the 
original appearance, or to permit the repair of, the 
complex product. The Council of Ministers rejected 
this option.
106 The European Parliament advanced a different 
solution in the Amended Proposal for the Design 
Directive, opting for a compulsory licensing regime 
that allowed the use of component parts, for repair 
purposes, immediately after the placing on the 
market of the complex product, in exchange for a fair 
and reasonable remuneration of the right holder68. 
apply to design features which allow the multiple assembly 
or connection of mutually interchangeable products within 
a modular system (Recital 11, Article 8(3) CDR). Hence, 
design subsists in interconnection features of construction 
toys or modular furniture. Cornish et al., in Intellectual 
Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade marks and Allied rights, 7th 
edn Sweet & Maxwell (2007), p. 613, maintain that the special 
treatment offered to toy manufacturers has no reasonable 
explanation, except that it shows how determined lobbying 
can squeeze special concessions into legislation.
65 The “must-match” terminology comes from the UK 
legislation on UK Unregistered Design Rights. Such 
exception was first introduced within the UK Community 
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
66 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation 
on the Community Design, COM (93) 342 final-COD 463, 3 
December 1993, Article 23 of the Draft Regulation.
67 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive 
on the Legal Protection of Designs, COM (93) 344 final-COD 
464, 3 December 1993, Article 14. 
68 Amended Proposal Design Directive [1996] OJ C1 42/7, 
Article 14.
Manufacturers of component parts were required to 
inform the public as to the origin of their products 
used for the repair by means of a trademark or trade 
name. They also had to notify the right holder of 
the intended use of the design, and regularly inform 
her as to the scale of such use. Nonetheless, no 
agreement on the compulsory licensing clause was 
reached by the European Council.
107 Ultimately, the disagreement between EU institutions 
was the subject of a Conciliation Committee meeting, 
where the Council insisted on its position against 
a remuneration scheme. It recommended, instead, 
an extension of the period of exclusivity over 
component parts for a period ranging from three 
to seven years.
108 In such a tense context, the European Union opted 
for the so-called “freeze plus” solution, stating that 
until amendments to the Directive are adopted on 
a proposal from the Commission on this subject, 
Member States shall maintain in force their existing 
legal provisions. Member States should only change 
their laws if they wished to liberalise their market 
for spare parts, pursuant to Article 14 Directive 
98/71/EC. Therefore, Member States had alternative 
options: they could introduce a clause allowing 
any use of the design for repair purposes; adopt a 
remuneration system; provide a term-limited design 
protection; or craft their own exception, which is a 
combination of the second and third options.
109 Article 110 CDR codified another “freeze plus” or 
transitional provision, mirroring the one set forth 
in the Directive. Thus, in 2004 the Commission 
made its third attempt to achieve harmonisation in 
this convoluted area, issuing a proposal designed 
to liberalise the aftermarket for spare parts69. This 
proposal, known as the “repairs clause”, purported to 
increase legal certainty and allow market operators 
and consumers to take full advantage of a uniform 
Internal Market for spare parts70.
110 In fact, the situation at that time was characterised 
by opposed regimes, where nine Member States, 
including Italy and the UK, have liberalised, whereas 
sixteen Member States had de jure design protection 
to spare parts (among them, Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Portugal, Sweden). The European 
Commission found that the status quo – with mixed 
protection regimes of design protection for spare 
parts – was altogether unsatisfactory and created 
trade distortion in the Internal Market71. The non-
69 European Commission (2004), Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 
98/71/EC on the Legal Protection of Designs: Extended 
Impact Assessment.
70 Id., at 2.
71 Id., at 1.1.1.
CAD Files and European Design Law
2016159 2
harmonisation of the must-match exclusion means 
that independent manufacturers are only able to 
sell their products and offer their services in some 
Member States but not in others.
111 Following a lack of progress at Council level, in May 
2014 the proposal was withdrawn. Successively, the 
Commission launched a comprehensive legal and 
economic evaluation of the overall functioning of EU 
design systems72. In the framework of this evaluation, 
an external contractor, Europe Economics, presented 
“The Economic Review of Industrial Design in 
Europe”73. The latter suggests that, among various 
policy options, full liberalisation, meaning a complete 
elimination of design protection for spare parts 
within the EU, would be the best outcome. In an age 
of widespread availability of 3D printers, consumers 
and independent manufacturers think that they are 
entitled to produce their own 3D-printed spare parts 
for the purpose of repair. Hence, a de facto repairs 
clause might become inevitable anyway. Insofar 
as it is impossible to enforce design law against all 
infringers in the 3DP landscape, a full liberalisation 
has to take place.
112 In response to this argument, one could maintain 
that 3DP makes the introduction of a repairs clause 
a more delicate issue than it was in the relatively 
recent past, because 3D printed products might not 
meet quality and safety standards. Any proposal 
for full liberalisation should foresee a method to 
ensure that component parts are safe and useable, 
when it becomes possible for different industries to 
manufacture spare parts using 3DP.
113 In a study commissioned by the UK Intellectual 
Property Office (“IPO”), Reeves and Mendis stressed, 
in this regard, that it is rather unrealistic to assume 
that 3DP will be heavily used, in the near future, 
to make component parts in certain industrial 
sectors, such as the automotive aftermarket74. The 
component parts that, according to the UK IPO’s 
study, are not yet suited to additive manufacture 
include: tyres, batteries, oil filters, air conditioning, 
etc. There are also aftermarket parts whose 
manufacture is technically possible by means of 3DP, 
but not economically viable yet, since the production 
costs would be higher than the current aftermarket 
value. The latter include: exhaust pipes, distributor 
caps, water pumps, and radiators75.
72 See <http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-property/
industrial-design/protection/index_en.htm>.
73 Europe Economics, The Economic Review of Industrial Designs 
in Europe, a study commissioned by DG Internal Market and 
Services (January 2015).
74 Reeves, Mendis, report commissioned by the UK IPO, The 
Current Status and Impact of 3D Printing Within the Industrial 
Sector: An Analysis of Six Case Studies (March 2015), p. 19.
75 Id., p. 17.
114 As noted by the authors, one of the biggest limitations 
to the production of 3D printed spare parts lies in the 
lack of credible design data from which to print. In 
the Office’s opinion, it is erroneously “assumed that 
parts can be simply scanned and reverse engineered, 
with the resulting data then being stored on the 
cloud” for downstream 3DP. It is of fundamental 
importance to have access to the original CAD files, 
to understand “issues such as tolerances, loading 
conditions and material requirements”.
115 Hence, whether the impact of 3DP on the liberalisation 
of the aftermarket sector will be significant in the 
next future is not altogether clear yet76. 
116 For the sake of completeness, it is also worth recalling 
a recent Order from the CJEU in Ford Motor Company v 
Wheeltrims s.r.l.77, dealing with trademark law.
117 At first instance, in the Italian proceedings, the 
claimant Ford Motor Company claimed that the 
defendant, a company operating in the automotive 
aftermarket, had infringed its registered trademark 
“Ford”. Wheeltrims was marketing wheel caps 
bearing the registered trademarks of the original 
manufacturers – including Ford’s trademark – 
without the owners’ authorisation. The defendant 
raised the repairs clause defence, arguing that 
Article 241 of the Italian Industrial Property Code, 
implementing Article 14 of the Design Directive, 
should apply as a defence to trade mark infringement. 
The use of the trademark “Ford” was justified for the 
purpose of restoring the original appearance of the 
complex product, in derogation of the Trade Mark 
Regulation (EC) 207/2009 and Trade Mark Directive 
84/104/EC. The Tribunale Ordinario di Torino made 
a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU on 
the interpretation of the repairs clause set forth in 
the DD and CDR.
118 The CJEU answered the referred questions by Order, 
stating that Article 14 of DD and Article 110 CDR must 
be interpreted as not allowing – by way of derogation 
from the provisions of the Trade Mark Directive 
2008/95/EC and Trade Mark Regulation 2009/207/
EC– a manufacturer of replacement parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles to affix to its products 
a sign, which is identical to a trademark registered 
for such products by the original manufacturer, 
without the latter’s authorisation, on the ground 
that the use thus made of the trade mark is the 
only way to restore the original appearance of the 
complex product.
119 Hence, the CJEU has made clear that, in its current 
76 According to Reeves and Mendis it will not be significant for 
the next 10 years. Id., p. 20.





form, the repairs clause that is anchored in European 
design law does provide a defence to an alleged 
trademark infringement. As a result, a third party 
who replicates by means of 3DP a component part, to 
which the manufacturer’s own trademark is affixed, 
may be found liable for trademark infringement, 
provided that the private use exception does not 
apply78.
G. Exclusive rights conferred 
by a design
120 In the event that a design is registered, the holder of 
a RCD is granted an exclusive right to use it and to 
prevent any third party not having her consent from 
using it. Pursuant to Article 19 CDR, the right to use 
the design covers different sorts of activities, such as 
the making, offering, putting on the market or using 
of a “product” in which the design is incorporated. 
In contrast, an UCD confers the right to prevent the 
same aforementioned activities, but only insofar as 
the contested use results from copying the protected 
design, and is not the result of an independent work 
of creation.
121 The owner’s exclusive rights extend towards any 
third party, without any differentiation between 
primary and secondary infringers. This, in turn, 
implies that the holder of a RCD can pursue claims 
for direct infringement against intermediaries (e.g. 
online 3D platforms).
122 Furthermore, as already mentioned, infringement 
is not confined to the use of the design on the same 
product, in which the design was incorporated in 
the first place. Protection extends toward any use 
of the design, in relation to any products. It is also 
worth remembering that infringement cannot 
occur with respect to acts done privately and for 
non-commercial purposes79, and acts done for 
experimental purposes (Article 20 CDR).
123 In light of the above considerations, the question 
of whether 3D printing a design-protected product 
from a CAD file constitutes or not an infringing 
activity is straightforward. There is no doubt that the 
acts prohibited under Article 19 CDR will encompass 
the manufacture of objects via 3DP, that is done in 
the context of a commercial activity and outside the 
78 According to Article 10 of Directive 2015/2436/EC, in 
order to commit an infringement the use of a third party’s 
trademark should be “in the course of trade”, i.e. in the 
context of a commercial activity with a view to economic 
advantage and not as a private matter. See the CJEU’s ruling 
in Arsenal Football Club plc. v Reed, C-206/01 [2002] ECR 
I-10273, [40].
79 These criteria are cumulative. Use should be both private 
and for purposes that are not commercial. 
scope of the private use exception (i.e. “making” 
the design)80. Infringement will not be actionable, 
instead, against an individual, who 3D prints a design 
product at home, for private and personal use.
124 Moreover, the fabrication of products, by means of 
3DP, done for scientific research will be exempted, 
irrespective of whether it is for a private or 
commercial purpose81. As noted by Suthersanen, 
this exception should be interpreted narrowly and 
be only allowed if the experimental usage of the 
design is in the general interest. A demarcation 
should always be made between acts of experimental 
nature, and those that seek to exploit the design82.
125 Whether the scope of design protection should also 
include the act of making a scanned representation 
and/or a CAD file from a design already existing 
as a tangible article is less clear-cut. Also, does the 
unauthorized act of copying and marketing a third 
party’s CAD file, in which a design is incorporated, 
amount to infringement of the design right?
126 The unsolved issue, therefore, is whether activities 
carried out in relation to CAD files fall foul of Article 
19 CDR, and constitute an illegitimate “use” of the 
design. Moreover, who is the party responsible for 
the infringement: the one who uploads, downloads 
or markets the CAD file? Should the host of the file-
sharing site be held liable too?
127 A strict interpretation of the law would suggest that 
the answer to these questions should be no. Just as a 
design requires there to be a product, infringement 
should only occur where a person uses a physical 
product83. The latter should not necessarily be the 
same product to which the design was incorporated 
in the first place, but it should however be an 
industrial or handicraft item.
128 Furthermore, the CDR does not provide protection 
against indirect use of a design, differently from 
patent law. There is no specific provision that confers 
on the holder of a Community design the right 
to prevent third parties, not having her consent, 
from supplying the “means” for using the design 
(e.g. marketing a complete kit that, when made up, 
constitutes the design)84. A CAD file could be seen as 
a “means” enabling the fabrication of the product in 
which the design is incorporated. As a consequence, 
80 See Malaquias, The 3D Printing Revolution: an Intellectual 
Property Analysis (8 August 2014), available at: <http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495416>.
81 Article 20(1)(b) CDR.
82 Suthersanen (2010), supra note 20, p. 140.
83 Bently, Sherman, Intellectual Property Law, 3rd ed., Oxford: 
OUP (2008), p. 666.
84 See Article 30 of the Convention for the European Patent 
for the Common Market (Community Patent Convention) 
76/76/EEC.
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making and distributing a CAD file would constitute 
an authorized (indirect) use of the design85. 
129 Therefore, a crucial issue to address is the extent 
to which a design right can be used against a new 
form of exploitation that does not imply the making 
of physical objects, but the creation and sharing of 
digital files.
130 It is here suggested that confining the scope of 
design protection to use on material products only 
is overly restrictive, in the light of the current 
technological change brought about by 3DP. This 
technology is blurring the line between the physical 
and the immaterial worlds. An increasing number 
of undertakings might decide to make their CAD 
files available online in the course of their business. 
Digital networks might emerge as an ordinary means 
of distributing 3DP templates of protected designs. 
In this way, undertakings would not need to mass-
produce or distribute their products any longer.
131 Once a design is made available in the form of a CAD 
file, it then becomes extremely easy for anyone to 
replicate it, either by entrusting a third party with 
the task of printing the product, or by using personal 
hardware. Future advancements in personal 3D 
printers will further expand this capability. Hence, 
design-based industries have to be equipped for 
the digitalization of things. In order for alternative 
business practices to come to light, it is of utmost 
importance to ensure that material protected by an 
IP is respected.
132 This, in turn, calls for a reinterpretation of the legal 
basis on which right holders shall receive protection. 
Arguably, they should be exclusively entitled to use 
– and prevent third parties from using and dealing 
with – the CAD files of their protected designs.
133 There are several ways to address this issue. 
A first option would be to consider the digital 
representation of a design as a “product” within 
the meaning of Article 19 CDR. Accordingly, this 
provision would cover different activities, such 
as the unauthorized making of CAD files (i.e. the 
making of a product), sharing of CAD files with other 
Internet users (i.e. use of the design), and the sale 
of CAD files on 3DP marketplaces (i.e. offering the 
product and putting it on the market). Furthermore, 
a possible interpretation of Article 20 CDR would be 
that the private use exception exempts from liability 
a third party who simply downloads a CAD file and 
saves it on her computer.
134 One may support this conclusion arguing that 
requiring products to have some physical form would 
85 Bently, Sherman (2008), supra note 83, p. 666.
be unduly limiting86. From a systemic perspective, 
it seems rather contradictory to allow registration 
of graphic symbols – including computer icons – 
and, at the same time, postulate that the notion 
of “product” is tied to a physical dimension for 
infringing purposes.
135 Furthermore, the scope of design protection is not 
limited to a certain category of products; rather, it 
covers any use of the design, in relation to “any” 
product that does not produce on the informed 
user a different overall impression. As noted by 
Malaquias, it seems very difficult to ascertain that 
a CAD file “will produce on the informed user a 
different overall impression from the protected 
design, considering that its purpose is to replicate 
the existing design in three-dimensions”87.
136 In the opinion of the present writer, the preferable 
solution is to follow the recommendation, made 
by the European Commission in the “Legal Review 
on Industrial Design Protection in Europe”88, to 
introduce an infringement provision stating that 
the creation of a design document amounts to an 
infringing use89.
137 As suggested by the European Commission, a 
template for such provision may be Section 226(1) 
of the UK CDPA 1988, which states that “the owner 
of a design has the exclusive right to reproduce 
the design for commercial purposes [...] by making 
a design document recording the design for the 
purposes of enabling such articles to be made”.
138 In the UK jurisdiction, “design document” is 
defined in Section 51(3) CDPA as: “any record of a 
design, whether in the form of a drawing, a written 
description, a photograph, data stored in a computer 
or otherwise”. The scope of this provision is wide 
enough to include CAD files as design documents90.
139 Furthermore, EU design law could fashion an 
additional provision similar to Section 226(3) CDPA 
1988, specifying that it is a primary infringement 
of a design right to do or “authorise” another to 
do, without the design right owner’s permission, 
86 This expression is used by Bently and Sherman, id., p. 667, 
footnote 66.
87 Malaquias (2014), supra note 80, p. 27.
88 MARKTD2014/083/D.
89 Id. 133.
90 It should however be borne in mind that in the UK 
jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 51(1) CDPA 1988, copyright 
in a design document (i.e. in the CAD file) will not infringed 
by making a 3D article from it, where the design is for 
anything other than an artistic work or a typeface. Hence, 
if a CAD file embodies a utilitarian design (for example, 
the design of automotive spare parts), printing the object 
will not result in copyright liability. In this respect, the UK 




anything which is the exclusive right of the design 
right owner.
140 In the first place, this provision would clarify 
that making a CAD file from an existing design-
protected product, for the purposes of 3D printing 
such product, amounts to an infringement of the 
design right. This provision would also specify that 
intermediary parties (such as 3DP online platforms) 
might also be directly liable for “authorising” design 
infringement. As stressed in the Commission’s 
review, the benefit of such a provision is that 
neither actual nor constructing knowledge would 
be required for a positive finding of infringement91.
H. Conclusions
141 A clear message emerges from the arguments 
developed in this paper. European design law 
should adapt to the reality of digitized goods and 
accommodate greater protection for right owners.
142 To date, the EUIPO accepts 3D digital representation 
of designs as “representations of the design that are 
suitable for reproduction”, within the meaning of 
Article 36 CDR. Such a representation is enclosed 
in the application form for a RCD to show, in the 
same way as a photograph, the design for which 
protection is sought.
143 It has also been noted that, although the CDR is 
structured on the concept of “product”, the EUIPO 
does not take into consideration whether a product 
is actually made or used, or can be made or used, in 
an industrial or handicraft fashion. This, means that, 
in theory, the CAD representations included in the 
application for a RCD will determine the scope of 
design protection, regardless of whether the product 
is actually manufactured or not.
91 As an alternative remedy, the European Commission 
proposes to introduce “indirect design infringement” as a 
separate head of liability. As noted above, a CAD file may 
be seen as a “means” that enables the actual infringement 
of the design right, i.e. as an “indirect” use of a design. 
In addition, the European Commission focuses on the 
possibility to review the private and non-commercial use 
exception. One way to restrict the scope of this exception 
is to employ the 3-step language adopted in Article 26 
of the TRIPs Agreement (“provided that such exceptions 
do not unreasonably conflict with the normal exploitation of 
protected industrial designs, and do not unreasonably prejudice 
the legitimate interests of the owner of the protected design, 
taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties”), in 
order to provide greater flexibility and achieve a balance 
between the legitimate interests involved. The latter 
recommendation does not seem advisable. The language 
employed in the three-step test may lead to ambiguity and 
to a non-uniform interpretation. Rather than representing 
a useful tool, it may create additional confusion. Cf. 6.1 of 
the report (MARKTD2014/083/D).
144 It has also been contented that in case a CAD file 
clearly unveils the outer appearance of a product, 
its publication online will be tantamount to a 
“disclosure” for the purposes of Article 7 CDR. As a 
consequence, all later products – and CAD files for 
products – will have to produce a different overall 
impression on the informed user. By contrast, it is 
not entirely clear whether publishing a CAD file on 
a website that is hosted outside the EU will trigger 
UCD protection from the date of the first online 
publication, given the geographical limitation 
contained in Articles 11 and 110(a) 5 CDR.
145 Hence, there are many issues that have to be 
clarified. First, who is the informed user of a product 
represented digitally as a CAD file, as opposed to the 
informed user of the finished product? Second, is the 
designer’s degree of freedom enhanced or limited 
by the fact that she creates a product design using 
CAD software? Third, if many individuals begin to 
create their own CAD files for products and upload 
them online, thereby disclosing the design for which 
protection is sought, will many market sectors 
suddenly become overcrowded? Will all subsequent 
designs have to depart from the considerable amount 
of CAD models already made available online?
146 Besides, the ease of converting a CAD file into a 
physical item leads us to suggest that design owners 
should be entitled to claim protection for the CAD 
representations of their designs. In a hypothetical 
world of widespread 3D printers, it could be that 
CAD files become almost interchangeable with 
end products. The owner of a CAD file might be as 
satisfied as if she possesses the end product itself. A 
CAD file would then serve as a substitute for a good, 
offered to the same or actual potential customers.
147 Many are the fields in which clear-cut rules are 
needed, since new technologies empower the 
individual in her creativity and yet should make 
her responsible for potential infringement of third 
parties’ exclusive rights.
148 In this respect, the present writer supports the 
following recommendations, made by the European 
Commission in its recent report “Legal Review on 
Industrial Design Protection in Europe”: first, to 
introduce a provision that confers upon the design 
right owner an exclusive right to make a design 
document, which is a record of the design (i.e. a 
CAD file); second, to introduce a provision on direct 
primary infringement by authorisation.
* Viola Elam is a Ph.D. Researcher at the European University 
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able or not. Therefore, we inter alia assess the Opin-
ion of the Advocate General of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) regarding a preliminary ruling on the in-
terpretation of the dispute concerning whether a dy-
namic IP address can be considered as personal data, 
which may put an end to the dispute whether an ab-
solute or a relative approach has to be used for the 
assessment of the identifiability of data subjects. 
Furthermore, we outline the issue of whether the an-
onymisation process itself constitutes a further pro-
cessing of personal data which needs to have a legal 
basis in the GDPR. Finally, we give an overview of rel-
evant encryption techniques and examine their im-
pact upon the GDPR’s material scope.
Abstract:  Encryption of personal data is 
widely regarded as a privacy preserving technology 
which could potentially play a key role for the compli-
ance of innovative IT technology within the European 
data protection law framework. Therefore, in this pa-
per, we examine the new EU General Data Protection 
Regulation’s relevant provisions regarding encryption 
– such as those for anonymisation and pseudonymi-
sation – and assess whether encryption can serve as 
an anonymisation technique, which can lead to the 
non-applicability of the GDPR. However, the provi-
sions of the GDPR regarding the material scope of 
the Regulation still leave space for legal uncertainty 
when determining whether a data subject is identifi-
A. Introduction
1 Seventeen years ago, Lawrence Lessig wrote that 
“encryption technologies are the most important 
technological breakthrough in the last one thousand 
years”.1 This might be a slight exaggeration, 
but it emphasises the importance of encryption 
technologies in today’s digital world. Encrypted 
data plays a significant role in the protection 
of data subjects’ privacy. Its legal problems are 
closely related to the scope of the data protection 
laws and the legal effects of anonymisation and 
pseudonymisation.
1 Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, 1999, p. 35.
2 Encrypting personal data is becoming increasingly 
important for many business models in a data-driven 
economy and for preserving data subjects’ privacy 
with regard to today’s monitoring and profiling 
possibilities – both of government institutions and 
of high-tech companies. Be it for the processing of 
sensitive health data, for the Internet of Things or for 
connected cars, for the privacy preserving use of Big 
Data or cloud computing technologies2, encryption 
can be a key to protect an individual’s privacy and 
2 See e.g. the PRACTICE project, funded by the EU-FP7-
programme, which aims to build a secure cloud framework 
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can make several IT innovations possible, which 
would otherwise conflict with the data protection 
framework. For many years, the discussion about 
the material scope of the European Data Protection 
Directive3 (DPD) and about the exact definition of 
personal data and the interpretation of the term 
“identifiable” has been one of the “key issues”4 of 
European data protection law. 5 Additionally, the 
legal effects of encrypted data for the applicability of 
data protection law and for the personal references 
of data have still not sufficiently been examined. 
These questions regarding personal data and 
encryption once again occur in the new EU General 
Data Protection Regulation6 (GDPR).
3 Encrypting personal data and deleting any personal 
reference from the data could also be a way to work 
with this information when it is transferred to third 
countries outside of the EU.7 EU standard contractual 
clauses or compliance to the new Privacy Shield 
when transferring data to the U.S. would therefore 
not be necessary if the data lost all of its personal 
reference. However, legal uncertainty concerning 
whether the encryption of personal data has the 
effect that such data loses its personal reference or 
not may discourage controllers to use these privacy 
preserving measures. Thus, in this article we will 
examine the legal effects of encryption in regards 
to the applicability of the GDPR.8
4 The GDPR only applies if “personal data” is 
processed. Thus, the notion of personal data is 
crucial for the application of the GDPR. Depending 
on how “personal data” is defined and interpreted, 
the effect a valid encryption of this data takes 
may be different. Furthermore, we will examine 
3 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, L 281, pp. 31-50.
4 Boehme-Neßler, Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 2016, p. 
419.
5 See e.g. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 
4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, pp. 6 
et seq.; Hon/Millard/Walden, Queen Mary University of 
London – Legal Studies Research Paper No. 75/2011, pp. 8 
et seq., available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1783577##>, accessed 26 August 2016; 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on 
Anonymisation Techniques, WP 216, pp. 5 et seq.
6 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), Official 
Journal of the European Union, L 119, pp. 1-88.
7 Cf. Esayas, European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 6, 
No 2 (2015), p. 13; Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 
July 2000, Official Journal of the European Communities L 
215/7 (24).
8 See infra B.II.2.d.).
how encrypted data is treated in the GDPR – as 
anonymised or pseudonymised data – and where 
and how in the GDPR encryption can be used as 
a technical and organisational measure.9 With 
regard to some important encryption tools for the 
transport, storage and processing of personal data 
we will demonstrate the effect of encryption on the 
material scope of the GDPR.10
B. The General Data Protection 
Regulation and Encryption
5 After years of intensive negotiations, the GDPR has 
now been passed and will finally come into force 
from 25 May 2018 (see Article 99 Par. 2 GDPR) and 
will, according to Article 94 Par. 1 GDPR, repeal the 
old Directive 95/46/EC.11 Due to its legal form of as a 
Regulation, the GDPR will be binding in its entirety 
and will be directly applicable in all Member States of 
the European Union.12 We will examine the material 
scope of the GDPR and the effect of encryption on 
personal data.
6 The importance for controllers of knowing the exact 
scope of the Regulation and whether the data they 
process will be considered as personal data or not, 
e.g. due to the use of encryption, increases with the 
GDPR’s very broad territorial scope, especially the 
rules for controllers not established in the EU will be 
changed dramatically.13 According to Article 3 Par. 1 
the GDPR “applies to the processing of personal data 
in the context of the activities of an establishment of 
a controller or a processor in the Union, regardless 
of whether the processing takes place in the Union 
or not”. Moreover, Par. 2 states that the Regulation 
applies even to the processing of personal data where 
the processing activities are related to the offering of 
goods or services or the sheer monitoring of the data 
subject’s behaviour as long as their behaviour takes 
place within the Union. “Monitoring” means inter 
alia the online tracking of natural persons to create 
profiles in order to take decisions, for analysing or 
predicting personal preferences, behaviours and 
attitudes (see Recital 24 S. 2 GDPR).14
9 See infra B.II.1.
10 See infra B.II.3.
11 See for an overview of the legislative process of the GDPR 
Albrecht, Computer Law Review International 2016, pp. 33 et 
seq.
12 Reding, International Data Privacy Law 2012, p. 119 (121).
13 See Kindt, CiTiP Working Paper 26/2016, pp. 13 et seq., 
available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/JELJOUR_
Results.cfm?form_name=journalbrowse&journal_
id=1781425>, accessed 8 August 2016.
14 Under the DPD, according to Article 4 Par. 1 (c) controllers 
targeting EU data subjects only had to comply with the 
DPD if they made use of “equipment” situated in the EU to 
process personal data.
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7 Thus, the GDPR’s broad territorial scope leads 
towards a new awareness of data controllers (also 
established outside the Union) regarding their 
processing of personal data. Therefore, technologies 
which minimise the use of personal data – especially 
encryption – and which avoid the application of the 
GDPR become even more important.
I. Personal Data: The Material 
Scope of the GDPR
8 As already outlined, the characteristics of personal 
data are crucial for the application of the GDPR. 
However, the GDPR does not introduce major changes 
to the concept of personal data in comparison to the 
DPD. Just like the DPD, the GDPR follows a “black/
white approach”, hence the data are either personal 
or not, which means that if the data has a personal 
reference, all data protection rules apply and if not, 
it is outside the GDPR’s scope.15 According to Article 
2 Par. 1 GDPR
“This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data 
wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing 
other than by automated means of personal data which form 
part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing 
system.”
9 Article 4 No. 1 S. 1 GDPR defines that “‘personal data’ 
means any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person16 (‘data subject’)” 
which is the same wording as Article 2 (a) DPD. In 
this regard, “any information” means virtually any 
information, even publicly available information; 
when a reference to a natural person can be made 
the data protection principle of the GDPR always 
applies regardless of the data’s content.17 However, 
Article 4 No. 1 S. 2 GDPR introduces a new definition 
of the concept of an “identifiable natural person”, 
which refers to a person “who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or 
more factors specific to the physical, physiological, 
genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity 
of that natural person”. Thus, the definition of an 
“identifiable natural person” distinguishes between 
identifiability on the basis of a reference to an 
identifier which can clearly identify a natural person, 
15 Forgó, International Data Privacy Law 2015, p. 54 (59).
16 Like in Article 1 Par. 1 of the DPD, the material scope of 
the GDPR only applies to the processing of personal data of 
natural persons according to Article 1 Par. 1 GDPR.
17 Cf. Kranenborg, in: Peers/Hervey/Kenner/Ward (eds.), The 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2014, Art 8, Recital 08.85; 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 136 (supra Note 5), 
pp. 6 et seq; Karg, Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 2015, p. 
520 (521).
or due to special personal characteristics such as a 
person’s sexual preferences or medical condition.18
10 However, it is still highly controversial whether or 
not a so-called absolute or relative approach has to be 
applied for assessing the data controller`s abilities 
to identify a natural person.
1. The “Identifiable Natural Person”
11 Crucial to understanding the exact scope of the 
concept of “personal data” is how much a potential 
data controller has to do in order to establish a link 
between a natural person and the data, in other 
words what efforts are required to identify a person.
a.) Absolute Approach 
12 The absolute approach takes into account all 
possibilities and chances in which the data 
controller would be able to identify the data subject 
individually. Thus, all ways and means for a data 
controller without any regard to expenses etc. are 
taken into account. Even theoretical chances of 
combining data so that the individual is identifiable 
are included. If identifiability is assessed absolutely, 
then it is sufficient for the application of personal 
data acts if anyone in the world is able to decrypt or 
decode the encrypted data.19
13 In terms of encryption, as long as anyone in the world 
is able to decrypt the data set, the operations of the 
controller or processor using this encrypted data are 
subject to data protection legislation, even if they 
don’t possess the key for decryption. Based on this 
approach data protection legislation is applicable, 
regardless of the applied encryption technique, as 
long as one entity holds the key for decoding.20
b.) Relative Approach 
14 In contrast, the relative approach considers the 
necessary effort required by the data controller 
18 Cf. Härting, Datenschutz-Grundverordnung, 2016, Recital 
275 et seq.
19 Kuner, European Data Protection Law: Corporate 
Compliance and Regulation, 2nd Ed. 2007, p. 92; Pahlen-
Brandt, Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 2008, p. 34 (38); 
Nink/Pohle, Multimedia und Recht 2015, p. 563 (565), who 
criticize that consequently this approach would lead to the 
result that there would virtually be no more anonymous 
data.
20 Cf. Meyerdierks, Multimedia und Recht 2009, p. 8 (10).
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in order to identify the data subject.21 Therefore, 
only realistic chances of combining data in order 
to identify an individual are taken into account – 
and not highly theoretical identification risks.22 
With regards to encryption issues, data protection 
legislation is only applicable if the data controller is 
able to decrypt a certain data set23 – or, at least has 
reasonable chances of obtaining the decrypting key. 
In the case law of some courts, the trend is beginning 
to lean towards favouring a relative understanding.24
c.) The GDPR’s Approach
15 The GDPR utilises a broad approach regarding the 
interpretation of “identifiable natural person” 
however, some terms can also be interpreted in a 
relative way. Additionally, both Article 7 and Article 
8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(CFR) always have to be taken into account when 
interpreting the data subject`s rights.25
16 Recital 26 S. 3 of the GDPR states that “to determine 
whether a natural person is identifiable, account 
should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to 
be used, such as singling out, either by the controller 
or by another person to identify the natural person 
directly or indirectly.” On the one hand, the Recital 
refers to means reasonably likely to be used “by 
another person” which have to be taken into 
account, which veers towards an absolute approach, 
because this third person could be any person in the 
world.26 This is also in tune with the scope of Article 
21 Roßnagel/Scholz, Multimedia und Recht 2000, p. 721 (723); 
Meyerdierks (supra Note 20), pp. 8 et seq.; Voigt, Multimedia 
und Recht 2009, p. 377 (379); Lundevall-Unger/Tranvik, 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology 
2010, p. 53 (58); Hon/Millard/Walden (supra Note 5), p. 14.
22 Esayas (supra Note 7), p. 6.
23 Cf. Spindler, Verhandlungen des 69. Deutschen Juristentages, 
Band I, Gutachten, 2012, pp. 115 et seq.
24 England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court), 
[2011] EWHC 1430 (Admin), Case No. CO/12544/2009, Recital 
51 f.; Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber), 
[2011] UKUT 153 (AAC), Appeal Number: GI/150/2011, 
GI/151/2011, gi/152/2011, Recital 128; House of Lords, 
[2008] UKHL 47, recital 27; The Paris Appeal Court, decision 
of 15 May 2007 – Henri S. vs. SCPP; Local Court of Munich, 
decision of 30 September 2008 – 133 C 5677/08, Recital 26; 
District Court of Wuppertal, decision of 19 October 2010 – 25 
Qs 10 Js 1977/08-177/10; District Court of Berlin, decision 
of 31 January 2013 – 57 S 87/08; different point of view: The 
Stockholm Lænsrætt, reference No. 593-2005, publication 
date 8 June 2005; Local Court of Berlin-Mitte, decision of 27 
March 2007 – 5 C 314/06, Recital 20; Administrative Court of 
Wiesbaden, decision of 27 February 2009 – 6 K 1045/08.WI, 
Recitals 52 et seq.
25 Cf. Vedsted-Hansen, in: Peers/Hervey/Kenner/Ward (eds.) 
(supra Note 17), Art 7, Recital 07.72A.
26 Cf. Zuiderveen Borgesius, Computer Law & Security Review 
2016, p. 256 (267) who interprets Recital 26 as “an absolute 
8 CFR, according to which “identifiable” has to be 
interpreted widely.27
17 Moreover, stating in Article 4 No 1 S. 2 GDPR that 
every “identifier” shall contain personal references 
is another hint for a rather absolute approach of the 
Regulation regarding the identifiability of a natural 
person.28 Additionally, Recital 26 states that using 
means for “singling out” the natural person directly 
or indirectly may make this person identifiable. 
Thus, a data subject may now be singled out for data 
processing even if it is unlikely that his or her name 
can be tied to the data, because even this could result 
in harming his or her privacy.29
18 On the other hand, the term “means reasonably 
likely to be used” suggests limitations through 
relative elements, in particular the notion of 
“reasonably”.30 Additionally, if a zero risk threshold 
would be applied for any potential data user, no 
existing technique could achieve the required level 
of anonymisation.31 Moreover, according to the 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (interpreting 
the Data Protection Directive), “a mere hypothetical 
possibility to single out the individual is not enough 
to consider the person as ‘identifiable’”.32
19 Recital 26 GDPR continues by stating objective 
factors which shall be relevant for the interpretation 
of the means used to identify a natural person:
“To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used 
to identify the natural person, account should be taken of 
all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of 
time required for identification, taking into consideration 
the available technology at the time of the processing and 
technological developments.”
20 These factors illustrate a further attempt to limit 
the broad absolute elements of the GDPR’s material 
approach to identifiability”; Polonetsky/Tene/Finch, Santa 
Clara Law Review, (Forthcoming) 2016, p. 593 (614).
27 Cf. Kranenborg, in: Peers/Hervey/Kenner/Ward (eds.) (supra 
Note 17), Art 8, Recital 08.85.
28 Brink/Eckhardt, Zeitschrift für Datenschutz 2015, p. 205 
(208); Buchner, Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 2016, p. 
155 et seq.; Härting (supra Note 18), Recital 279.
29 Hon/Kosta/Millard/Stefanatou, Tilburg Law School Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series No. 07/2014, p. 9, available 
at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2405971>, accessed 15 August 2016; Zuiderveen Borgesius 
(supra Note 26), p. 256 (267); Marnau, Datenschutz und 
Datensicherheit 2016, p. 428 (430).
30 Cf. Esayas (supra Note 7), p. 6; Härting (supra Note 18), Recital 
282.
31 Esayas (supra Note 7), p. 6; regarding “anonymisation of 
personal data in the GDPR” see infra B.II.2.d.).
32 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 136 (supra Note 5), 
p. 15; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra 
Note 5), pp. 8 et seq.
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scope.33 Significant objective factors will be inter alia 
the state of science and technology, including future 
technological developments as well as the time and 
costs needed to identify somebody.34
21 In October 2014, the German Federal Court of Justice 
(BGH) requested the European Court of Justice (ECJ)35 
for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the 
dispute regarding whether a dynamic IP address can 
be considered as personal data,36 in particular if the 
relevant additional information is held by a third 
party, such as an internet service provider. The 
ECJ will most likely resolve the dispute between 
an absolute or relative approach regarding dynamic 
IP-addresses by interpreting Article 2 (a) DPD and 
especially recital 26 of the DPD.37 Since Article 2 
(a) DPD and Article 4 No. 1 GDPR are very similar, 
the ECJ’s decision will certainly also have a major 
influence on the general interpretation of defining 
“identifiability” in the GDPR.38 On 12 May 2016 
the Advocate General (AG), Campos Sánchez-Bordona 
published his opinion regarding this case, however, 
whilst the ECJ is not bound to follow his opinion, it 
often does so.39
22 In his opinion, the AG contradicts an interpretation 
of “means likely reasonably to be used … by any other 
person” in such a way that it would be sufficient 
that any third party might obtain additional data 
in order to identify a person40, since this “overly 
strict interpretation would lead, in practice, to 
the classification as personal data of all kinds of 
information, no matter how insufficient it is in itself 
to facilitate the identification of a user”.41 Moreover, 
the AG emphasises that otherwise “it would never 
be possible to rule out, with absolute certainty, the 
possibility that there is no third party in possession 
of additional data which may be combined with that 
information”.42 This can be interpreted as a tendency 
of the AG towards a relative approach. Furthermore, 
according to the AG, “(j)ust as recital 26 refers not to 
any means which may be used by the controller (…), 
33 Spindler, Der Betrieb 2016, pp. 937 et seq.
34 Härting (supra Note 18), Recital 284; Zuiderveen Borgesius 
(supra Note 26), p. 256 (262).
35 ECJ, Case C-582/14 – Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland.
36 German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), decision of 28 
October 2014 – VI ZR 135/13.
37 German Federal Court of Justice, (supra Note 36), Recitals 27, 
29 et seq.
38 Härting, Der IT-Rechts-Berater 2016, pp. 36 et seq.; Keppeler, 
Computer und Recht 2016, p. 360 (364).
39 Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona, 
delivered on 12 May 2016, Case C-582/14 – Patrick Breyer v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
40 Opinion of the Advocate General (supra Note 39), Recital 64.
41 Opinion of the Advocate General (supra Note 39), Recital 65.
42 Opinion of the Advocate General (supra Note 39), Recital 65.
but only to those that it is likely ‘reasonably’ to use, 
the legislature must also be understood as referring 
to ‘third parties’ who, also in a reasonable manner, 
may be approached by a controller seeking to obtain 
additional data for the purpose of identification”.43 
The AG concludes that contacting third parties shall 
not be reasonable when it is “very costly in human 
and economic terms, or practically impossible or 
prohibited by law”.44 Otherwise, distinguishing 
between the different means would be nearly 
impossible, since it would always be possible to 
imagine the hypothetical contingency of a third 
party who could — now or in the future — have 
additional relevant data to assist in the identification 
of a data subject.45
23 Although the AG states that in the future advances in 
technical means will “significantly facilitate access to 
increasingly sophisticated instruments for collecting 
and processing data” and thus, the safeguards put in 
place in defence of privacy are justified, this shall not 
result in a failure to take account of “the means likely 
reasonably to be used” by certain third parties.46 
Consequently, the AG’s opinion includes several 
relative elements which clearly advocate against an 
absolute approach that would lead to an indefinite 
scope of the GDPR.
24 Nevertheless, according to the AG, it would be 
sufficient to obtain information “reasonably” if 
the legal possibility of retaining and transferring it 
to others exists. The possibility that the data may 
be transferred shall itself transform the dynamic 
IP address into personal data for the provider of 
services on the Internet.47 The reasonable means of 
access shall be lawful means, therefore, “the legally 
relevant means of access are reduced significantly, 
43 Opinion of the Advocate General (supra Note 39), Recital 68 
(emphasis added).
44 Opinion of the Advocate General (supra Note 39), Recital 68; 
see also in favour of an “unreasonableness” of using illegal 
means Spindler/Nink in: Spindler/Schuster (eds.), Recht der 
elektronischen Medien, 3rd Ed. 2015, § 11 TMG Recital 8; 
Brisch/Pieper, Computer und Recht 2015, p. 724 (728), who 
argue that the wording of „reason“ is not compatible with 
the use of illegal means, but who are, however, against a 
strict classification of illegal means as unreasonable and 
thus recommend a consideration of each individual case.
45 Cf. Opinion of the Advocate General (supra Note 39), Recital 
68.
46 Opinion of the Advocate General (supra Note 39), Recital 66 et 
seq.
47 Opinion of the Advocate General (supra Note 39), Recital 
72, who additionally names this possibility “perfectly 
reasonable”; cf. regarding the classification of dynamic IP 
addresses as personal data for access providers judged by the 
EJC, Case C-70/10, judgement of 24 November 2011 – Scarlet 
Extended SA v Sabam, Recital 51, which states that “[IP] 
addresses are protected personal data because they allow 
those users to be precisely identified”.
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since they must be exclusively lawful”48, however, 
according to the AG it shall not matter how 
restrictive they may be in their practical application 
for constituting “reasonable means”.49 Allowing even 
the possibility of obtaining the data is a significant 
limitation of the above mentioned relative elements 
of the AG’s interpretation and widens the material 
scope of the DPD and, consequently, also that of the 
GDPR significantly.
25 A further broadening of the scope and an orientation 
towards an absolute interpretation of identifiable 
can be found in the GA’s statement that alone the 
sheer potential possibility of identification shall be 
sufficient and not that the dynamic IP address only 
becomes personal data when the Internet service 
provider receives it.50 Hence, the AG’s opinion can be 
interpreted as a vote for a rather absolute approach, 
which would lead to an even wider scope of the 
GDPR.
26 However, extending the scope of the Regulation too 
widely could lead to burdening regulations for data-
processing entities which would be incommensurate 
with the actual risks to the privacy of the data 
subjects51 and would thus not be compatible with 
the purpose of data protection law.52 Because if 
the ECJ followed this broad – and nearly absolute 
– approach of the AG, virtually all data would have 
to be considered as personal data, which would, in 
the end, weaken the data protection framework 
and could make it unworkable53, for instance 
because of an increase of informed consents and 
legal permissions to process the data.54 If all data 
should be treated as personally identifiable and 
subjected to the GDPR, this could result in creating 
“perverse incentives” for controllers to abandon 
anonymisation and therefore increase, rather than 
relieve, privacy risks.55 Thus, the very opposite of 
the protective intention would occur. Hence, we 
48 Cf. supra Note 44.
49 Opinion of the Advocate General (supra Note 39), Recital 73.
50 Opinion of the Advocate General (supra Note 39), Recital 
77: “(…) their potential as a means of identifying — by 
themselves or together with other data — a natural person”; 
cf. Keppeler (supra Note 38), p. 360 (362).
51 Cf. Schwartz/Solove, California Law Review 2014, p. 877 (887).
52 Cf. Recital 4 S. 2 GDPR: “The right to the protection of 
personal data is not an absolute right; it must be considered 
in relation to its function in society and be balanced against 
other fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle 
of proportionality”.
53 Cf. Tene/Polonetsky, Stanford Law Review 2012, p. 63 (66).
54 Keppeler (supra Note 38), p. 360 (364), who points out the 
practical problem that an increase of informed consents 
could mean that the text of the consents will be read 
even less by the data subjects and that a consent can be 
withdrawn by the data subject at any time, Article 7 Par. 3 
GDPR.
55 Cf. Tene/Polonetsky (supra Note 53), p. 63 (66).
still hope that the ECJ will not follow the lines of 
argumentation of the AG.
2. Non Personal Data
27 Data which does not have any personal references, 
for instance sheer machine data or so called attribute 
data, does not fall under the material scope of the 
GDPR. Sensors that collect data for applications, 
e.g. made for climate analysis or the monitoring of 
industrial complexes do not process personal data 
at any stage.56
28 However, this attribute data can still turn into 
personal data when related to a natural person, 
for instance in the case of a worker’s shift or when 
being linked with other information in a Big Data 
scenario.57 Data from the Internet of Things58, e.g. 
from cars, machines (“Industry 4.0”), smart homes 
or household applications will in many cases be 
connected to natural persons and thus be considered 
as personal data.59 Moreover, the huge amounts of 
data can be used in connection with technologies 
like radio frequency identification tags (“RFID-
tags”) or monitoring and personal profiling so that 
identification might be easier than before.60 How easy 
a re-identification is was demonstrated by a study 
carried out by computer science professor Latanya 
Sweeney which showed that the combination of a 
postal code, date of birth, and gender, is sufficient 
to identify 87% of individuals in the U.S61, despite the 
fact that such data that are usually considered to be 
non personal data62.
56 See Rouvroy, Council of Europe, T-PD-BUR(2015)09REV, Of 
Data and Men: Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in a World 
of Big Data, p. 20, available at: <https://www.coe.int/t/
dghl/standardsetting/dataprotection/TPD_documents/T-
PD-BUR(2015)09REV_Big%20Data%20report_A%20%20
Rouvroy_Final_EN.pdf>, accessed 28 July 2016.
57 Cf. Karg (supra Note 17), p. 520 (522).
58 See for more use cases of the Internet of Things: Vermesan/
Friess (eds.), Digitising the Industry - Internet of Things 
Connecting the Physical, Digital and Virtual Worlds, pp. 
15 et seq., available at: <http://www.internet-of-things-
research.eu/pdf/Digitising_the_Industry_IoT_IERC_2016_
Cluster_eBook_978-87-93379-82-4_P_Web.pdf>, accessed 8 
August 2016.
59 Härting (supra Note 18), Recital 268.
60 See regarding RFID and data protection law TAUCIS, 
Technikfolgenabschätzung: Ubiquitäres Computing und 
Informationelle Selbstbestimmung, 2006, pp. 198 et seq., 
available at: <https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/
taucis/ita_taucis.pdf>, accessed 29 July 2016; Schmid, Radio 
Frequency Identification Law Beyond 2007, in: Floerkemeier 
et al., The Internet of Things, 2008, pp. 196 et seq.
61 Sweeney, Carnegie Mellon University, School of Computer 
Science, Data Privacy Lab, Working Paper No. 3, 2000, 
available at: <http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/
identifiability/paper1.pdf>, accessed 15 August 2016.
62 Schwartz/Solove, N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 2011, p. 1814 (1842), 
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29 Recital 30 of the GDPR now explicitly states that: 
“(n)atural persons may be associated with online identifiers 
provided by their devices, applications, tools and protocols, 
such as internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other 
identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags. This 
may leave traces which, in particular when combined with 
unique identifiers and other information received by the 
servers, may be used to create profiles of the natural persons 
and identify them.”
30 Thus, a lot of the data which originally was attribute 
data, e.g. produced by Internet of Things technologies, 
will become personal data due to the association 
of online identifiers with natural persons. Data of 
machines connected to the internet and operated by 
factory workers, of customers being tracked by RFID-
tags, smart grid data, or of devices in smart homes or 
connected household appliances (e.g. toothbrushes, 
fridges, watches or TVs) will therefore be considered 
as personal data.63 Additionally, natural persons can 
often be identified or be identifiable by “singling 
out”64 their data. Thus, because of the broad material 
scope of the GDPR and of Big Data technologies, there 
are fewer and fewer possibilities to process data 
without a personal reference, in particular in the 
Internet of Things era.
3. Conclusion
31 The GDPR’s material scope contains several parts 
which can be interpreted as relative approaches 
regarding the identifiability of natural persons, 
most prominently with the duty to include means 
only, if they are “reasonably likely to be used”. 
Moreover, according to the AG, illegal means shall 
not be considered. Nevertheless, several other terms 
indicate a rather absolute approach of the GDPR, 
be it the wide scope of the online identifiers, the 
incorporation of “singling out” or that information 
obtained by a third person shall be sufficient to 
make the data personal for a controller. If the AG’s 
opinion that the mere possibility of retaining and 
transferring the data to others is sufficient for a 
personal reference of data will prevail, the GDPR’s 
available at: <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/
facpubs/1638>, accessed 10 August 2016; Ohm, UCLA Law 
Review 2010, p. 1701 (1705) with further examples.
63 See International Working Group on Data Protection in 
Telecommunications, Working Paper on Big Data and Privacy 
– Privacy principles under pressure in the age of Big Data 
analytics, 55th Meeting, 2014, Skopje, p. 4, available at: 
<http://dzlp.mk/sites/default/files/u972/WP_Big_Data_
final_clean_675.48.12%20%281%29.pdf>, accessed 28 July 
2016.
64 Regarding singling out people without knowing their names 
(for behavioural targeting) see Zuiderveen Borgesius (supra 
Note 26) pp. 256 et seq. and supra B.I.1.c.).
material scope will have to be interpreted widely, 
using a mix of relative and absolute elements – an 
approach which could turn out to be a pyrrhic victory.
II. Encrypted Data and the GDPR
32 Encrypting personal data is a data security 
technique which has the effect of rendering data 
unintelligible to any person who is not authorised 
to access it due to encoding the information into 
a mutilated state, so that only parties with access 
to a decoding mechanism and a secret decryption 
key can access the information.65 Encryption of data 
seems to be one of the promising solutions in order 
to ensure privacy particularly in cloud computing 
environments. When a controller encrypts the data 
before uploading it to a cloud, the data is regarded 
as personal data for the controller who holds the 
decryption key and the controller thus remains 
accountable for the data.66 As encrypted personal 
data makes sure that no unauthorized person is 
able to use the sensitive data, only the original data 
controller is able to identify the persons related to 
data stored in the cloud – and not the cloud operator 
nor third persons. Hence, encryption may serve as 
a tool to safeguard data protection. Furthermore, 
when processing is carried out on behalf of the 
controller, such as in a cloud computing scenario, 
the GDPR introduces several new obligations to 
comply with - especially for processors and not only 
for controllers. Encrypting personal data can thus 
be a useful way to avoid these obligations for the 
processor.
33 In the cases where third parties are able to decrypt 
the data but the controller cannot, the question 
whether the GDPR shall be applicable for this 
controller is a point of controversy.67 Moreover, if 
decryption has been achieved only by the use of 
illegal means, the controller who has not used those 
means shall not be subjected to the GDPR.68
34 In this section, we examine the provisions of 
the GDPR regarding encryption, anonymous and 
pseudonymous data in order to be able to assess the 
effect of encrypted personal data on the material 
scope of the Regulation.
65 Cf. ENISA, Privacy by design in big data – An overview of 
privacy enhancing technologies in the era of big data 
analytics, 2015, p. 38; available at: <https://www.enisa.
europa.eu/publications/big-data-protection>, accessed 9 
August 2016; Gürses/Kundnani/van Hoboken, Media, Culture & 
Society, Crypto and empire: the contradictions of counter-
surveillance advocacy, 2016, p. 7.
66 Hon/Kosta/Millard/Stefanatou (supra Note 29), p. 10.
67 See infra B.II.2.d.).
68 Cf. the Opinion of the Advocate General, supra Note 44.
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1. Encryption in the GDPR
35 Unlike the proposal of the Parliament69, the final 
version of the GDPR does not provide a further 
definition of encrypted data, but mentions 
encryption in several provisions as a compliance 
requirement. According to Article 32 Par. 1 (a) GDPR, 
encryption is regarded as an appropriate technical 
and organisational measure to ensure the security 
of processing. It is apparent that this does not deal 
with the applicability of the GDPR, but rather with 
the protection of personal data.70
36 Moreover, in case of a data breach, the controller is 
not required to communicate to the data subject if 
he or she has implemented encryption as a technical 
and organisational protection measure (Article 34 
Par. 3 (a) GDPR).
37 Additionally, it is one of the “appropriate safeguards” 
of Article 6 Par. 4 (e) GDPR, which have to be taken 
into account when assessing the compatibility of a 
processing for a purpose other than that for which 
the personal data have been collected. Finally, 
depending on the classification of encryption as 
pseudonymisation or not71, the provisions of the 
GDPR regarding pseudonymous data72 may be 
applicable for encrypted data, too.
2. Is Encrypted Data Anonymised 
or Pseudonymised?
38 Since the GDPR does not define “encrypted data”, 
we have to examine if encryption is a technique 
which anonymises or just pseudonymises personal 
data. In this regard, again the dispute regarding 
the material scope of the Regulation, as described 
above, plays an important role. To assess whether 
encrypted data has to be treated as anonymised or 
pseudonymised data, we first have to provide an 
overview of the GDPR’s provisions regarding these 
privacy preserving techniques.
69 Article 4 No. 2b of the proposal of the European Parliament 
for a GDPR (LIBE proposal) defines encrypted data as 
“personal data, which through technological protection 
measures is rendered unintelligible to any person who is not 
authorised to access it”, thus, according to LIBE, encrypted 
data shall just be a subcategory of personal data, which shall 
not lose its personal reference due to encryption.
70 See Recital 83 GDPR for more details regarding these 
measures.
71 See infra B.II.2.c.).
72 See infra B.II.2.b.).
a.) “Anonymous Information” in the GDPR
39 Although technologies to anonymise personal data 
are considered to be of high value to protect the 
fundamental privacy rights of the data subjects, the 
GDPR does not provide a specific article to regulate 
“anonymous information” in the Regulation, it is 
only mentioned in one Recital. According to Recital 
26 S. 4 and 5 GDPR the:
“principles of data protection should (…) not apply to 
anonymous information, namely information which does not 
relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to 
personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the 
data subject is not or no longer identifiable. This Regulation 
does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous 
information, including for statistical or research purposes.”
40 Thus, the GDPR is not applicable to anonymous 
data. To examine whether data can be considered 
as anonymous; once again the problem of the 
identifiability of data subjects arises.73 In this regard, 
the possibility to anonymise personal data in the 
GDPR can be seen as another hint in favour of a 
relative approach, because given the possibilities to 
re-identify and combine data (Big Data), anonymous 
information could not be established when following 
a pure absolute approach.74 However, to determine 
whether encrypted data may be considered as 
anonymous data, we will first take a look at the 
GDPR’s provisions regarding pseudonymisation.
b.) “Pseudonymisation” and 
“Pseudonymous Data” in the GDPR
41 Unlike in the DPD, the GDPR includes a definition 
of “pseudonymisation”. According to Article 4 No. 5 
GDPR, pseudonymisation:
“means the processing of personal data in such a manner that 
the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data 
subject without the use of additional information, provided 
that such additional information is kept separately and is 
subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure 
that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or 
identifiable natural person”.
42 Moreover, “(t)he application of pseudonymisation to 
personal data can reduce the risks to the data subjects 
concerned and help controllers and processors to 
meet their data-protection obligations” (Recital 28 S. 1 
GDPR). Furthermore, Recital 28 S. 2 GDPR emphasises 
that the explicit introduction of “pseudonymisation” 
does not intend to preclude any other measures of 
data protection. Thus, the connection between a 
73 See supra B.I.1.
74 Härting (supra Note 18), Recital 291.
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natural person and the information on the basis 
of a corresponding rule remains – pseudonymised 
data is still qualified as personal data.75 Hence, 
pseudonymisation is merely a method which can 
reduce the likelihood of identifiability of individuals, 
but does not exclude this data from the material 
scope of the GDPR. It is handled by the Regulation 
primarily as a data security measure,76 and its use is 
encouraged in several articles of the GDPR; Article 
32 Par. 1 (a) names it an appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to ensure a level of security 
appropriate to the risk.
43 Moreover, pseudonymisation shall, like encryption, 
be one of the “appropriate safeguards” of Article 6 Par. 
4 (e) GDPR.77 In addition, in accordance with Article 
89 Par. 1 S. 3 GDPR, pseudonymisation is a safeguard 
to ensure that technical and organisational measures 
are applied when personal data is being (further) 
processed for archiving purposes in the public 
interest, scientific or historical research purposes 
or statistical purposes. Finally, pseudonymisation 
is a technical and organisational measure that 
shall be implemented by the controller as a way 
to comply with the principle of data minimisation 
for the newly introduced provisions for “data 
protection by design and by default”.78 However, 
the GDPR does not distinguish between the quality 
of the possible pseudonymisation measures and its 
consequences for the controller. Nevertheless, to 
clearly define the unclear provision and the use of 
pseudonymisation, associations and other bodies 
representing categories of controllers or processors 
may prepare “codes of conduct” according to Article 
40 Par. 2 (d).79
c.) Encrypted Data as Pseudonymised 
Data or Anonymous Data?
44 When encrypting personal data, in accordance 
with Article 4 No. 5 GDPR, the encryption key is the 
“additional information” which is “kept separately” 
and “subject to technical and organisational 
measures”. Hence safety measures such as a secure 
key management and the respective encryption 
method used by the controller have to be used “to 
ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an 
identified or identifiable natural person”. Therefore, 
because of its existing assignment rule encryption is 
an example of pseudonymisation.80
75 Karg (supra Note 17), p. 520 (522); see infra B.II.2.c.).
76 Zuiderveen Borgesius (supra Note 26), p. 256 (267).
77 See supra B.II.1.
78 According to Recital 78 GDPR, personal data should be 
pseudonymised “as soon as possible”.
79 Marnau (supra Note 29), p. 428 (431).
80 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra Note 5), 
45 However, it is controversial whether encrypted 
personal data, and thus pseudonymised data, 
can be regarded as anonymised81 data. Encrypted 
personal data should nevertheless undisputedly 
remain personal data to a person who holds the 
decryption key.82 The relevant question is whether 
encrypted data shall also be personal data for a 
controller or processor who does not have access to 
the decryption key, for instance a cloud provider. 
Some academics have argued in this direction83; far 
more important, the Art. 29 Data Protection Working 
Party opines that believing that a pseudonymised 
dataset is anonymised is a “common mistake”.84 
Additionally, the wording of Recital 26 S. 2 GDPR 
states that “personal data which have undergone 
pseudonymisation, which could be attributed to a 
natural person by the use of additional information 
should be considered to be information on an 
identifiable natural person”.
46 At first sight, this is a clear statement of the EU 
legislator that pseudonymised data shall always be 
personal data. Nevertheless, to resolve this dispute, 
once again the question is crucial whether an absolute 
or a relative approach regarding the identifiability of 
a data subject has to be applied. According to the 
absolute approach, encrypted data will consequently 
always be personal data, because somebody, at least 
the key holder or any other party given sufficient 
time, economic resources and computing power, will 
always be able to decrypt the data, since no system 
of encryption can be completely secure85. According 
to this logic, encryption is merely a technical and 
organisational measure to ensure that data is not 
accessible to unauthorised persons rather than 
changing the data’s quality. However, with a relative 
approach the data could be regarded as anonymous 
for the controller.
p. 21; Esayas (supra Note 7), p. 8; Hennrichs, Cloud Computing - 
Herausforderungen an den Rechtsrahmen für Datenschutz, 
2016, p. 137.
81 For an overview of existing anonymization techniques 
such as randomization or generalization see the Opinion 
of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra 
Note 5), pp. 12 et seq.; International Working Group on Data 
Protection in Telecommunications (supra Note 63), pp. 13 et 
seq., which provides guidelines for procedures for robust 
anonymisation; ENISA 2015 (supra Note 65), pp. 27 et seq.; 
Lagos, Indiana Law Review 2014-2015, pp. 187 et seq.
82 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra Note 
5), p. 29; Borges, in: Borges/Meents (eds.), Cloud Computing, 
2016, § 6 Recital 33; Polonetsky/Tene/Finch (supra Note 26) p. 
593 (613).
83 Wagner/Blaufuß, Betriebs-Berater 2012, p. 1751; Esayas (supra 
Note 7), p. 8.
84 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra Note 5), 
p. 21.
85 Cf. Kuner, International Business Lawyer 1996, p. 186.
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d.)  Requirements for Encrypted 
Data in order to be considered 
as Anonymous Data
47 Consequently, we have to examine which level 
of encryption is sufficient so that with a relative 
approach the encrypted personal data can be 
considered as anonymous data. As mentioned 
above, only the knowledge and possibilities of the 
controller to identify the data subject shall be taken 
into account, therefore, processing encrypted data 
without affecting the scope of the data protection 
law might be possible.86
48 In order to concretise whether the means to 
decrypt the dataset and identify the data subject are 
reasonably likely to be used, one should take account 
of objective factors. There are three relevant factors 
that have to be considered when assessing the level 
of security of encrypted data against decryption, 
namely the strength of the encryption algorithm 
used, the length of the encryption key (the longer the 
key the safer the encryption will be) and the security 
of the key management.87 Obviously, the key always 
has to be stored separately from the encrypted data 
in a secure way. If not, attackers may easily be able 
to decrypt the data88 and thus, the personal data 
would no longer be anonymous. The simplest and 
most common way of decryption is using exhaustive 
key search or brute-force attacks which means to try 
all possible keys and eventually guessing correctly.89 
However, if a secure encryption technology is 
used, this way of decrypting the dataset cannot be 
considered as very likely for the controller.90
49 Other approaches to get access to the secret key are 
e.g. legally getting access to a key via a court decision, 
extracting the key from software or hardware, or 
by using accidental errors or systematic backdoors 
implemented in the encryption technique for law 
enforcement.91 These ways are only considered to be 
86 Cf. Hon/Kosta/Millard/Stefanatou (supra Note 29), p. 10; Borges, 
in: Borges/Meents (eds.) (supra Note 82), § 6 Recital 33; 
Hennrichs (supra Note 80), 2016, p. 137.
87 Hon/Millard/Walden (supra Note 5), p. 22.
88 Cf. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra Note 
5), p. 22; Hon/Kosta/Millard/Stefanatou (supra Note 29), p. 10.
89 See with further examples Gürses/Preenel, in: van der Sloot/
Broeders/Schrijvers (eds.), Exploring the Boundaries of Big 
Data, 2016, Part I, 3, Cryptology and Privacy in the Context 
of Big Data, p. 49 (62) available at: <http://www.ivir.nl/
publicaties/download/1764.pdf>; accessed 29 August 2016; 
Kroschwald, Zeitschrift für Datenschutzrecht 2014, p. 75 (77).
90 Cahsor/Sorge, in: Borges/Meents (eds.) (supra Note 82), § 
10 Recital 32, who state that using the 128 bits key lengths 
of AES encryption would make such an attack nearly 
impossible and thus not likely.
91 Gürses/Preenel, in: van der Sloot/Broeders/Schrijvers 
(eds.) (supra Note 89), p. 49 (63); the German and French 
government are currently deliberating on legal obligations 
likely for the controller if they do not violate the law 
or if they can be achieved by the use of computational 
power which can be reasonably expected. However, 
if a backdoor is implemented by the government 
into an encryption technology, the GDPR would be 
applicable for the controller who knows about this 
(governmental) possibility of accessing the personal 
data.
50 Additionally, as outlined above92, the available 
encryption technology at the time of the processing 
has to be considered: applying the AG’s opinion on 
encryption it would not be reasonably likely if it 
were practically impossible to decrypt the dataset, 
thus, if a state of the art encryption technology is 
enabled, in most of the cases, decrypting will be 
virtually impossible and therefore not likely and 
only possible with unreasonable efforts.93 However, 
if according to the AG even the potential possibility of 
obtaining the decryption key from another person in 
a lawful way would be sufficient for an identification, 
the possibilities to avoid the applicability of the 
GDPR due to anonymisation via encryption would 
be very restricted.
51 Arguments against this wide interpretation could be 
sustained by Recital 57 GDPR, which deals with the 
data subject’s right to access personal data held by 
the controller, where “the personal data processed by 
a controller do not permit the controller to identify 
a natural person”. Then, “the data controller should 
not be obliged to acquire additional information in 
order to identify the data subject for the sole purpose 
of complying with any provision of this Regulation”. 
This could be a hint against a too wide interpretation 
of getting access to a key obtained by a third party.
52 Additionally, future technological developments 
of decryption, e.g. due to more computing power 
or improved algorithms have to be considered (cf. 
Recital 26 GDPR), especially regarding the lengths of 
the secret key. The controller has to assess whether 
the future development is evidently foreseeable and 
thus ought to be regarded as a present information.94 
According to the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party (regarding the DPD), the controller should 
to implement backdoors in encryption techniques for law 





93 Different opinion: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 
216 (supra Note 5), p. 10, according to which the intentions 
of the data controller or recipient shall not matter, as long 
as the data are identifiable, data protection rules shall 
apply; see regarding the effect of different encryption 
technologies upon the applicability of the GDPR infra B.II.3.
94 Borges, in: Borges/Meents (eds.) (supra Note 82), § 6 Recital 
38.
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take into account the technological development 
for the period of time in which the data is meant to 
be processed, therefore, if the data shall be processed 
for ten years, he or she has to take the technological 
possibilities for these ten years into account; if the 
data can be decrypted in the ninth year, the data 
shall become personal data from that date on only.95
53 Therefore, due to technical developments, encrypted 
data will only be anonymous for a certain period 
of time and thus, the level of encryption has to be 
checked constantly by the controller and not only 
when the controller processes the data for the first 
time.96 Moreover, if a controller receives an already 
encrypted dataset, he or she has to obtain further 
information regarding whether the original dataset 
has included personal data; if yes, the controller 
has to regularly check the state-of-the-art of the 
encryption technique.97
54 Thus, if the controller does not have the key to 
decrypt the data or other means to make it legible, 
it is in most cases reasonably likely that he or she 
cannot access the personal information, which 
consequently has to be regarded as anonymous 
information. Therefore, according to the GDPR, 
when using state-of-the-art encryption technique, 
encrypted personal data can be anonymous data, 
with the limitation that a potential possibility of 
obtaining the key, also by a third party and especially 
due to decryption, always has to be considered, but 
only if the means used are reasonably likely.
e.) Anonymisation as (Further) 
Processing of Personal Data
55 There is legal uncertainty regarding the lawfulness 
of the anonymisation process, more precisely 
whether anonymising personal data means “further 
processing” of personal data.98 The Working Party 
states in its WP 216 (still regarding the DPD), that 
“anonymisation constitutes a further processing 
of personal data; as such, it must satisfy the 
requirement of compatibility by having regard to 
95 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 136 (supra Note 5), 
p. 18.
96 Spindler, (supra Note 23), p. 115; Borges, in: Borges/Meents 
(eds.) (supra Note 82), § 6 Recital 40; different opinion 
Lundevall-Unger/Tranvik (supra Note 21), p. 53 (71) who 
call it “a burden [for the controllers] that they probably 
cannot be expected to bear” and state that it “will not make 
controllers in a wired world more inclined to comply with 
the provisions of the [European data protection law]”.
97 Borges, in: Borges/Meents (eds.) (supra Note 82), § 6 Recital 
41.
98 See El Emam/Álvarez, International Data Privacy Law 2015, p. 
73 (79); Hon/Kosta/Millard/Stefanatou (supra Note 29), p. 12; 
Esayas (supra Note 7), pp. 4 et seq.
the legal grounds and circumstances of the further 
processing”.99
56 Nevertheless, this further processing of personal 
data is considered to be compatible with the 
original purposes of the processing but only if 
the anonymisation process leads to “reliable (…) 
anonymised information”.100 Furthermore, the 
data controller’s legitimate interest always has to 
be balanced against the data subject’s rights and 
fundamental freedoms.101 Consequently, according to 
the Working Party, anonymisation can be compatible 
with the original purposes of the processing, but 
it would be a violation of data protection law if 
personal data was anonymised for purposes that are 
not compatible with the original purpose and if there 
were no other legitimate grounds for processing the 
data, such as the data subject’s consent.102
57 The Working Party clarifies this by providing as 
an example the anonymisation of the contents 
of traffic data immediately after its collection by 
mobile operators which performed deep packet 
inspection technologies. It was lawful in accordance 
with Article 7 (f) DPD, because of a legal permission 
stipulated in Article 6 Par. 1 of the e-Privacy 
Directive for certain traffic data which has to be 
erased or made anonymous as soon as possible when 
it is processed and stored by the provider of a public 
communications network or publicly available 
electronic communications service.103
58 Another example is given by Esayas, according to 
which the anonymisation of personal data for the 
purpose of using this data for advertising would 
constitute a violation of data protection law (unless 
there are other legitimate grounds for the processing 
– for instance the data subject’s consent), if the data 
has originally been collected to provide a certain 
service for the data subject.104
59 Applying the Working Party’s interpretation to the 
GDPR, the Regulation’s requirements regarding 
further processing need to be fulfilled when 
anonymising personal data. Thus, it has to be 
analysed whether anonymisation is a compatible 
use according to the GDPR, then no legal basis 
separate from that which allowed the collection of 
99 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra Note 5), 
pp. 3, 7.
100 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra Note 5), 
p. 7.
101 Cf. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra Note 
5), p. 8.
102 Cf. Walden, International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 2002, p. 224 (233); Esayas (supra Note 7), p. 4.
103 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra Note 5), 
p. 8.
104 Esayas (supra Note 7), p. 4.
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the personal data would be required (Cf. Recital 50 
GDPR). Recital 49 GDPR states that: 
“(t)he processing of personal data to the extent strictly 
necessary and proportionate for the purposes of ensuring (…) 
information security (…) constitutes a legitimate interest of 
the data controller concerned. This could, for example, include 
preventing unauthorised access to electronic communications 
networks and malicious code distribution (…).”
60 According to this, the anonymisation of personal 
data could be interpreted as necessary for ensuring 
information security and be, in accordance with 
Article 6 Par. 1 (f) GDPR, of legitimate interest to a 
controller.105 Apart from this, according to Article 5 
Par. 1 (b) GDPR a “further processing for archiving 
purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical 
research purposes or statistical purposes shall, in 
accordance with Article 89 (1), not be considered to 
be incompatible with the initial purposes”.
61 Furthermore, according to the compatibility test 
of Article 6 Par. 4 GDPR, account should be taken 
inter alia of the possible consequences of the 
intended further processing for data subjects. Since 
anonymisation, pseudonymisation and encryption 
are privacy preserving technologies106, in most cases 
applying these tools on the data subject’s personal 
data will be in their interest.
62 However, regarding a possible re-identification of 
the personal data, the consequences of anonymising 
personal data for a data subject could also be serious 
(e.g. when processing special categories of personal 
data according to Article 9 GDPR) and thus not in its 
interest if the anonymous data, which is not affected 
by the scope of the GDPR, is transferred unrestricted 
from controller to controller.
63 Even though these concerns have to be taken 
seriously, the Working Party’s opinion implies a 
non-existent weakness of the data protection law. 
Because as long as the data is anonymous, there is 
no threat to the privacy of the data subjects and as 
soon as a re-identification of the data is possible the 
GDPR with all its protective instruments is applicable 
again. Moreover, the need to justify the process of 
anonymisation itself could discourage the use of 
anonymisation and pseudonymisation as privacy-
enhancing techniques.107 However, with the use of 
105 Cf. Esayas (supra Note 7), p. 5; Hon/Kosta/Millard/Stefanatou 
(supra Note 29), p. 12, who criticise that this legitimate 
interest should also refer to processors.
106 Cf. Recital 29 S. 1 GDPR which gives incentives for controllers 
to apply pseudonymisation when processing personal data; 
Article 5 Par. 1 (c) which regulates the principle of data 
minimisation, which is fulfilled by these technologies that 
reduce the amount of personal data.
107 Hon/Kosta/Millard/Stefanatou (supra Note 29), p. 12; Esayas 
(supra Note 7), p. 5.
Recital 49 GDPR, this dispute could possibly come to 
an end as soon as the GDPR comes into effect.
3. The Impact of different 
Encryption Techniques upon 
the GDPR’s Material Scope 
64 Finally, we will give a short overview of significant 
encryption technologies and examine the effect of 
these technologies on the applicability of the GDPR 
by determining inter alia which technical level of 
encryption has to be achieved to avoid a decryption 
or de-anonymisation of personal data and thus the 
applicability of the Regulation.
65 We have to distinguish between encrypted transport 
of data (e.g. encryption of e-mails or messages of 
messenger services via end-to-end encryption108) and 
encrypted storing of data (e.g. online backups in a 
cloud). However, if personal data is encrypted whilst 
being stored, applications and programs may not be 
able to handle and further process that encrypted 
data unless the data is decrypted and thus once 
again personal data. Processing stored encrypted 
data (e.g. in the cloud) in a secure and useful way – 
hence without the need of spending too much time 
or computer power – might be possible by using 
Fully Homomorphic Encryption109 or Secure Multiparty 
Computation110.
66 However, first of all, a distinction is made between 
symmetric cryptography and asymmetric cryptography 
techniques.
a.) Symmetric Cryptography – 
Secret Key Encryption
67 In a symmetric cryptography scenario, the parties use 
a publicly known encryption algorithm to transform 
the personal data into ciphertext or to later decrypt 
the dataset, the encryption is performed by a 
secret key which both parties have access to.111 The 
level of security of the encrypted data depends 
significantly upon the secure storing, management, 
and transportation of the key which often cannot be 
transmitted safely.112 Thus, a safe key management is 
108 See for details regarding WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption 
<https://www.whatsapp.com/security/?l=en>, accessed 26 
August 2016. 
109 See infra B.II.3.c.).
110 See infra B.II.3.d.).
111 Cf. Gürses/Preenel, in: van der Sloot/Broeders/Schrijvers 
(eds.) (supra Note 89), p. 49 (53).
112 Maisch, Informationelle Selbstbestimmung in Netzwerken, 
2015, p. 322.
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a necessary condition for avoiding the applicability 
of the GDPR, however, this can hardly be achieved 
when only using symmetric cryptography, because 
any holder of the key can easily re-identify the data 
subjects through decryption of the dataset.113
68 However, a safe transportation can be achieved when 
encrypting the symmetric key with an asymmetric 
encryption technique114 (hybrid cryptosystem). Thus, a 
decryption in this scenario, when not asymmetrically 
encrypting the key, will in many cases be reasonably 
likely and the data protection law would thus be 
applicable for the controller or processor of the 
symmetrically encrypted database.
b.) Asymmetric Cryptography – 
Public Key Encryption
69 In asymmetric or public-key cryptography, two 
different keys are used, the first key (the public key) 
is used by the sender to encrypt the information, the 
second key is a private and secret key used by the 
recipient to decrypt the information.115 Therefore, 
the encryption key can be made public, a common 
secret is not needed to be agreed on by the parties 
in advance as the second secret key is only known 
by the recipient.116
70 This technique is used mostly for end-to-end 
encryption. Thus, in an asymmetric encryption 
scenario the private key has to be kept secret. 
The risk that a third party could obtain the key 
consequently arises e.g. if the secret key is stored at 
a cloud provider which also holds the public key or 
by man-in-the-middle attacks, if a third party misleads 
the other parties by pretending to be the respective 
counterpart. If all necessary security measures are 
complied with – in the sense of the relative approach 
– it is not reasonably likely that a man-in-the-middle 
attack occurs.
71 However, in light of the AG’s wide approach it may 
be sufficient that there is a potential possibility of 
identification by a third party. Thus, if the secret 
key is held safely by the recipient, a third party, 
e.g. a cloud provider which stores or transports the 
encrypted data does not have access to the private 
key and will, provided that a state-of-the-art key is 
used, not be able to decrypt the data (with reasonable 
efforts) and therefore does not fall under the scope 
113 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP 216 (supra Note 5), 
p. 20.
114 See infra B.II.3.b.).
115 Gürses/Preenel, in: van der Sloot/Broeders/Schrijvers (eds.) 
(supra Note 89), p. 49 (53).
116 Gürses/Preenel, in: van der Sloot/Broeders/Schrijvers (eds.) 
(supra Note 89), p. 49 (53).
of the GDPR. However, the controller always has to 
monitor the technological development regarding 
the key used and possible innovative technological 
ways of decryption.117 Since asymmetric encryption 
has a significantly lower performance than symmetric 
encryption, in practice hybrid encryption is mostly 
used. 
c.) Fully Homomorphic Encryption
72 Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is an encryption 
technology that allows the performance of an analysis 
“in the ciphertext in the same way as in the plaintext 
without sharing the secret key”.118 Therefore, for the 
processing of the data, no decryption and thus no 
knowledge of the private key is needed. Moreover, 
even the result of the processing is encrypted, which 
can only be decrypted by the user and not by the 
cloud provider.119 The cloud provider will never 
see the data in plaintext. Thus, when processing 
personal data with the use of FHE, the GDPR is not 
applicable to the cloud provider which consequently 
does not process personal data. Unfortunately, due 
to its still very low performance, FHE is at present 
still highly inefficient and currently not a practical 
alternative to the processing of personal data on 
plaintext.120
d.) Secure Multiparty Computation 
73 Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC )121 allows for 
secure computation of sensitive data sets, such as tax 
or health data, without having to trust a centralised 
entity (such as a trusted third party).122 It refers to 
a field of cryptography that deals with protocols 
involving two or more participants who want to 
mutually compute a useful result without having to 
117 See supra B.II.2.d.).
118 ENISA 2015 (supra Note 65), p. 40; FHE was first shown to 
be possible by Gentry, A fully homomorphic encryption 
scheme, 2009; another type of homomorphic encryption is 
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption (SHE) which has a better 
performance than FHE but limits the number of operations.
119 Gürses/Preenel, in: van der Sloot/Broeders/Schrijvers (eds.) 
(supra Note 89), p. 49 (58).
120 ENISA, Privacy and Data Protection by Design – from policy 
to engineering, 2014, p. 43, available at: <https://www.enisa.
europa.eu/publications/privacy-and-data-protection-by-
design>, accessed 10 August 2016; Gürses/Preenel, in: van der 
Sloot/Broeders/Schrijvers (eds.) (supra Note 89), p. 49 (58).
121 MPC was first introduced by Yao, Proceedings of the 23rd 
Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer 
Science, 1982, pp. 160 et seq.; for further details about 
MPC see Cramer/Damgård/Nielsen, Secure Multiparty 
Computation and Secret Sharing, 2015.
122 Gürses/Preenel, in: van der Sloot/Broeders/Schrijvers (eds.) 
(supra Note 89), p. 49 (60).
2016
Gerald Spindler and Philipp Schmechel
176 2
trust each other with their sensitive data.123 Every 
party will provide an input value and learn only the 
result of their own individual value so that nobody 
is able to access all the information.124 A data donor 
distributes the data into shares using secret-sharing 
and sends one random share of each value to a single 
server.
74 When using Sharemind125, each party will receive one 
share of every secret value. The original secret can 
only be reconstructed by collecting all the shares 
of a value and adding them up.126 After the data has 
been transmitted and stored, the server can perform 
computations on the shared data; however, the 
server does not share the information with other 
servers so that none of them can reconstruct the 
input values.127 An increase of servers reduces the 
risk of collusions. After finishing the computation, 
the results of the servers are transmitted and 
published to the client of the computation. The 
servers send the share of the results to the client 
who reconstructs the real result.128
75 Thus, Sharemind requires three steps: the donors 
have to be informed whose data shall be provided; 
the data has to be divided; and then stored on the 
different servers. If it is necessary for one data donor 
to specify whose information the other donor has to 
provide, this has to be considered as processing of 
personal data. It would then be inevitable to identify 
the data subjects whose information is needed for 
the purposes of computation. Alternatively, to 
reduce the amount of personal data shared, all data 
can be loaded to Sharemind and securely joined using 
ciphertexts.
76 As outlined above, before the data is stored on 
the different servers, it has to be divided into the 
shares. This process must be carried out in plaintext 
using personal data. Although Article 4 No. 2 GDPR 
mentions the “alteration” of data as processing, the 
division of data does not entangle the application 
of the GDPR as “alteration” refers to the alteration 
of content, not of its appearance.129 The secret-
sharing of personal data by dividing it thus does not 
fall under the GDPR’s scope. Once the data has been 
123 Cf. Bogdanov, Sharemind: programmable secure 




124 Kamm/Willemson, International Journal of Information 
Security, 2015, p. 531 (532).
125 See <https://sharemind.cyber.ee//>.
126 Bogdanov (supra Note 123), p. 34.
127 Kamm/Willemson (supra Note 124), p. 531 (532).
128 Kamm/Willemson (supra Note 124), p. 531 (533).
129 Cf. for the German Federal Data Protection Act Gola/Klug/
Körffer, in: Gola/Schomerus, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, 12th 
Ed. 2015, § 3 Recital 30.
divided, it will be stored on the different servers. 
Applying an absolute approach on the identifiability 
of data subjects, these data chunks would have to 
be considered as personal data and this kind of 
processing would be processing of personal data – 
however, with the approach opined in this article, 
the data chunks are not considered to be personal 
data since it is highly unlikely for a party to receive 
the other shares.
77 SMC is advantageous due to the fact that simply 
random fragments of personal data are used. The 
original data can only be restored (and thus turned 
into personal data) if all fragments are put together. 
Hence, it is crucial to determine whether the GDPR is 
applicable to the computation over data fragments. 
Without the other parts, the file cannot be read 
in any way. One fragment itself does not contain 
information regarding a person and thus cannot 
be regarded as personal data. Only if all fragments 
of the data were gathered and put together, the 
Regulation would be applicable. Theoretically, all 
server providers may collude and reengineer the 
personal data. However, this is highly unlikely since 
the providers of the server themselves have a high 
interest in ensuring safety and confidentiality of the 
SMC and may be legally bound by contract.130 This 
unreasonable chance of collusion leads to ruling out 
the applicability of the GDPR.
78 In contrast to SMC, when using FHE the parties do not 
need to be available online and the result is always 
encrypted.131 However, FHE and SMC are special 
cases that still are not widespread, thus, when 
processing encrypted data without using these or 
similar technologies on some point it will always 
be necessary to decrypt the information with the 
consequence that in this moment the GDPR will be 
applicable to the controller again.132
C. Conclusion
79 Encrypting personal data can lead to the non-
applicability of the GDPR and might thus be an 
important privacy preserving technology for 
controllers – however, since the provisions of the 
GDPR regarding its material scope also include several 
elements which can be interpreted in an absolute 
point of view and since the Advocate General of the ECJ 
has widened the scope in his opinion a lot, there is 
still legal uncertainty regarding the applicability of 
the GDPR for encrypted data. Therefore, controllers 
130 Regarding the risks for the confidentiality if parties pool 
their information see ENISA 2015 (supra Note 65), p. 41.
131 Gürses/Preenel, in: van der Sloot/Broeders/Schrijvers (eds.) 
(supra Note 89), p. 49 (60).
132 Hoppen, Computer und Recht 2015, p. 802 (804).
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have to analyse each encrypted dataset on its own 
and determine whether a decryption might be 
reasonably likely, also taking continuously into 
account the use of future decryption technologies 
and the security of the key management. We hope 
that the ECJ does not follow this nearly absolute 
interpretation of the identifiability of natural 
persons since it would tremendously harm future 
incentives of controllers to implement privacy 
preserving technologies.
80 Additionally, encryption serves as a technical and 
organisational measure to ensure the security 
of processing in several parts of the Regulation. 
Controllers have to consider that the process 
of encryption as well as anonymisation might 
constitute a further processing of personal data.
81 Using state-of-the-art asymmetric encryption 
technologies especially for transporting personal 
data is a method which will in most of the scenarios 
be unlikely to be decrypted and can according to our 
interpretation prevent the applicability of the GDPR. 
Storing encrypted data in a cloud can also be done 
in a secure way without falling within the material 
scope of the GDPR. Although existing technologies 
such as FHE and SMC can exclude the applicability 
of the GDPR for the processing of encrypted data, 
processing encrypted data in most cases still has to 
be undertaken in plaintext by decrypting the data 
and thus by the use of personal data.
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